Two worlds in agricultural policy making in Africa? Case studies from Ghana, Kenya, Senegal and Uganda by Mockshell, Jonathan
  
 
University of Hohenheim 
Faculty of Agricultural Sciences 
Institute of Agricultural Economics and Social Sciences in the Tropics and Subtropics 
Chair of Social and Institutional Change in Agricultural Development 
Prof. Dr. Regina Birner 
 
Two Worlds in Agricultural Policy Making in 
Africa? Case Studies from Ghana, Kenya, 
Senegal and Uganda 
 
Dissertation  
Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for 
the degree of “Doktor der Agrarwissenschaften” 
(Dr. sc. agr./Ph.D. in Agricultural Sciences) 
 
 
to the 
Faculty of Agricultural Sciences 
 
presented by 
 
Jonathan Mockshell 
Born in Accra, Ghana 
 
2016 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis was accepted as a doctoral dissertation in fulfillment of the requirements for 
the degree “Doktor der Agrarwissenschaften” (Dr.sc.agr. / Ph.D. in Agricultural Sciences) 
by the faculty Agricultural Sciences of the University of Hohenheim on December 17, 
2015. 
 
Date of oral examination: January 28, 2016 
 
Examination Committee 
Supervisor and Reviewer:  Prof. Dr. Regina Birner 
Co-Reviewer:    Prof. Dr. Harald Grethe 
Additional Examiner:   Prof. Dr. Andrea Knierim 
Head of the Committee:  Prof. Dr. Thilo Streck  
 
i 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................................. i 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ....................................................................................................... vi 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................................... viii 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG ........................................................................................................ xiii 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................. xix 
LIST OF TABLES ................................................................................................................... xxi 
LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................................ xxii 
1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................ 1 
1.1 Agricultural policy context and political environment .......................................... 3 
1.2 Historical overview of agricultural policy changes ............................................... 7 
1.2.1 Ghana ...................................................................................................... 8 
1.2.2 Uganda .................................................................................................. 11 
1.2.3 Senegal ................................................................................................. 13 
1.2.4 Kenya .................................................................................................... 15 
1.3 Explaining agricultural policy changes ............................................................... 17 
1.3.1 Quantitative research approaches ......................................................... 17 
1.3.2 Limitations of the quantitative research approaches ............................ 19 
1.3.3 Qualitative research approaches ........................................................... 19 
1.3.4 Conceptual framework ......................................................................... 20 
1.4 Research topics and overview of the thesis ......................................................... 27 
1.5 References ........................................................................................................... 29 
2 DONORS AND DOMESTIC POLICY MAKERS: TWO WORLDS IN 
AGRICULTURAL POLICY MAKING? .......................................................................... 36 
Abstract ......................................................................................................................... 36 
2.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 37 
2.2 Explaining agricultural policy choices: Insights from the literature ................... 40 
2.2.1 Patterns of agricultural policy choices ................................................. 40 
2.2.2 Political economy explanations ............................................................ 42 
2.3 Research methods ................................................................................................ 44 
ii 
 
2.3.1 Conceptual framework ......................................................................... 44 
2.3.2 Sampling procedure and interviews ..................................................... 46 
2.3.3 Data analysis ......................................................................................... 47 
2.4 Results ................................................................................................................. 48 
2.4.1 Policy themes and policy beliefs .......................................................... 48 
2.4.2 Policy discourse coalitions ................................................................... 50 
2.4.3 Actors in the discourse coalitions ......................................................... 51 
2.4.4 Policy beliefs ........................................................................................ 52 
2.5 Discussion ........................................................................................................... 59 
2.6 Conclusions ......................................................................................................... 62 
2.7 Acknowledgments ............................................................................................... 63 
2.8 References ........................................................................................................... 63 
3 AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY DEBATES: WHO HAS THE 
BETTER STORY? ............................................................................................................. 67 
Abstract ......................................................................................................................... 67 
3.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 68 
3.2 The Advocacy Coalition Framework and Narrative Policy Analysis ................. 70 
3.3 The Senegalese agricultural sector and policy landscape .................................... 72 
3.4 Research methods ................................................................................................ 73 
3.4.1 Data collection and interview approach ............................................... 74 
3.4.2 Data analysis ......................................................................................... 75 
3.5 Policy narrative coalitions and coalition members .............................................. 77 
3.5.1 The agricultural support and agricultural support critique narratives .. 78 
3.5.2 Agricultural support stories .................................................................. 78 
3.5.3 Agricultural support critique non-stories .............................................. 81 
3.6 Discussion and conclusions ................................................................................. 84 
3.7 References ........................................................................................................... 86 
4 AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY MAKING: WHAT ARE THE 
POLICY PROCESSES AND WHO ARE  THE INFLUENTIAL ACTORS .................... 90 
Abstract ......................................................................................................................... 90 
4.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 91 
4.2 Agricultural policy concerns and policy processes in Ghana .............................. 93 
4.3 Government agricultural policy strategies .......................................................... 93 
4.4 The Advocacy Coalition Framework and discourse analysis.............................. 94 
iii 
 
4.5 Research methods and data collection ................................................................. 96 
4.5.1 Process Net-Map approach ................................................................... 96 
4.5.2 Procedure for implementing the Process Net-Map .............................. 96 
4.5.3 Sampling procedure and interviews ..................................................... 97 
4.5.4 Stakeholder maps analyses ................................................................... 98 
4.5.5 Discourse analysis ................................................................................ 98 
4.6 Results ................................................................................................................. 98 
4.6.1 CAADP policy process......................................................................... 98 
4.6.2 Block Farms Program policy process ................................................. 101 
4.6.3 Discourse of the policy processes ...................................................... 103 
4.7 Discussion and policy strategies ........................................................................ 106 
4.8 References ......................................................................................................... 108 
5 PROVIDING ANIMAL HEALTH SERVICES TO THE POOR IN NORTHERN 
GHANA: RETHINKING THE ROLE OF COMMUNITY ANIMAL HEALTH  
WORKERS? ..................................................................................................................... 111 
Abstract ....................................................................................................................... 111 
5.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 112 
5.2 Materials and methods ....................................................................................... 113 
5.2.1 Study area ........................................................................................... 113 
5.2.2 Sampling technique ............................................................................ 113 
5.3 Data analysis ...................................................................................................... 114 
5.3.1 Perception of service delivery systems .............................................. 114 
5.3.2 Financial loss to livestock keepers ..................................................... 114 
5.3.3 Econometric approach ........................................................................ 114 
5.4 Results ............................................................................................................... 116 
5.4.1 Livestock farmer and service provider characteristics ....................... 116 
5.4.2 Perception of livestock service delivery systems ............................... 116 
5.4.3 Financial loss to producers ................................................................. 117 
5.4.4 Factors influencing farmers’ preference ............................................. 118 
5.5 Discussion ......................................................................................................... 119 
5.5.1 Perception of service provider attributes ............................................ 119 
5.5.2 Financial losses ................................................................................... 119 
5.5.3 Preference of service providers .......................................................... 120 
5.6 Acknowledgements ........................................................................................... 121 
5.7 References ......................................................................................................... 121 
iv 
 
6 ARE GOVERNMENT VETERINARY PARAPROFESSIONALS SERVING THE 
POOR? THE PERCEPTIONS OF SMALLHOLDER LIVESTOCK  FARMERS IN 
WESTERN KENYA ........................................................................................................ 123 
Abstract ....................................................................................................................... 123 
6.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 124 
6.2 Materials and methods ....................................................................................... 124 
6.3 Results ............................................................................................................... 125 
6.4 Discussion ......................................................................................................... 127 
6.5 Acknowledgements ........................................................................................... 128 
6.6 References ......................................................................................................... 128 
7 DISCUSSION .................................................................................................................. 130 
7.1 Beyond self-interest: The role of agricultural policy beliefs ............................. 130 
7.2 Limitations of the study and recommendations for future work ....................... 137 
7.2.1 Limitations of the study approaches ................................................... 137 
7.2.2 Recommendations for future work ..................................................... 139 
8 CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS ........................................................ 140 
8.1 Overall conclusions ........................................................................................... 140 
8.2 Strategies to bridge the gap between the two worlds ........................................ 141 
8.3 Policy strategies ................................................................................................. 141 
8.3.1 Promote policy-oriented learning ....................................................... 141 
8.3.2 Deliberative democracy ...................................................................... 143 
8.3.3 Building new coalitions ...................................................................... 145 
8.4 References ......................................................................................................... 147 
APPENDIX ............................................................................................................................. 151 
Appendix 2.1: Story-lines and policy beliefs identified in the discourse analysis ...... 151 
Appendix 2.2: Self-and other-representation of the two coalitions* .......................... 154 
Appendix 2.3: Policy themes ...................................................................................... 155 
Appendix 2.4: Nominal Rate of Assistance values for Ghana and Uganda (1955-
2004) ............................................................................................................... 156 
Appendix 3.1: Policy themes in the narrative of the respondents ............................... 157 
Appendix 3.2: Summary of agricultural support stories and agricultural support 
critique non-stories.......................................................................................... 158 
Appendix 3.3: Cluster analysis ................................................................................... 160 
Appendix 4.1: Interview guide .................................................................................... 162 
v 
 
Appendix 4.2: Animal health service delivery household questionnaire .................... 167 
CURRICULUM VITAE ......................................................................................................... 186 
AUTHOR’S DECLARATION ............................................................................................... 191 
 
  
vi 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
This thesis is the output of support from many people. First, I would like to express 
my heartfelt thanks to Professor Regina Birner for her dedication and personal commitment 
to my research. Her systematic guidance, great ideas, encouragement, and generous 
support propelled me throughout this thesis. During my M.Sc. studies, Professor Birner 
offered me the opportunity to work as a Student Assistant and to conduct my M.Sc. thesis 
under her supervision before offering me the unique opportunity to conduct my 
doctoral research under her supervision. This straight academic path was my dream upon 
entering the University of Hohenheim and Professor Birner contributed significantly to 
make it a reality. I would like to thank Professor Harald Grethe and Professor Andrea 
Knierim for being part of the committee to review my Ph.D. thesis. During the search for 
my ideal academic path, I had some discussions with Professor Harald Grethe, which 
inspired me very much. I would like to thank him for being part of this journey. 
My heartfelt thanks go to the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (BMZ) for funding this research through the collaborative project 
“Promoting Participatory and Evidence-Based Agricultural Policy Processes in Africa 
(PEBAP).” I  am also thankful to the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), 
Washington D.C. for coordinating this collaborative project. I would like to express my 
gratitude to Professor Christian Henning, Professor Felix Asante, Dr. Sam Benin, Dr. 
Michael Johnson, Dr. Eva Krampe, Dr. Patience Rwamigisa, and Sadibou Cheickh Fall for 
the helpful suggestions during the annual PEBAP project workshops and for supporting my 
fieldwork in Ghana, Uganda, and Senegal. I would like to thank Jacob Asravor, Mame 
Diarra, Aicha Sall, and Michael Kiragga for assisting in transcribing my interviews. I 
would also like to thank Michael Kansiime, Djiby Dia, Astou Camara, and Yacine Ngom for 
making my fieldwork in Uganda and Senegal relatively easy. My appreciation also goes 
to all the farmers and policy experts in Ghana, Uganda, and Senegal for making the time 
and willingly providing information for this research. Dr. Irene Egyir and Professor Daniel 
Sarpong have been of great support during my Undergraduate time at the University of 
Ghana and have maintained active interest in my professional progress. I would like to thank 
PD Dr. Khalid Siddig and Professor Manfred Zeller for offering me the opportunity to 
continue my research and teaching work at the Chair of Rural Development Theory and 
Policy. 
vii 
 
The “Welcome Center” of the University of Hohenheim made me an alumnus at an 
early stage and provided financial support through the “STIBET Dissertation Completion 
Award” and “STIBET Teaching Award”. Many thanks to Dr. Silke Will of the “Welcome 
Center” for organizing our “Stammtisch international meetings”. My heartfelt appreciation 
to the German Academic Exchange Services (DAAD) for the “Development Professional” 
Scholarship to pursue my M.Sc. studies at the University of Hohenheim, which also paved 
the way for my Ph.D studies. Katrin Winkler has always been of great support.  
Writing a thesis is a lonely activity, but many colleagues from 490c made this 
experience enjoyable and fun. Dr. Ulrike Müller offered helpful suggestions on my initial 
manuscripts. Dr. Saurabh Gupta not only provided intellectual support, but also 
encouragement and hospitality on numerous occasions. John Ilukor, Josey Kamanda, Juliet 
Kariuki, Rupsha Banerjee, and Martha Ngigi dedicated time to read my initial manuscripts 
and offered useful suggestions. Patchimaporn Udomkun, a colleague from another academic 
world has been “my life line” during “my deadline”, reading my thesis and supporting in 
many diverse ways. Emmy Wassajja, Ravi Verma, Teferi Tensay, Lilli Scheiterle, Saima 
Jabeen, Adu-Gymafi Poku, and Athena Birkenberg have all offered opportunities for useful 
discussions. Dr. Ling Yee Khor, Dr. Tim Loos, Katherina Mayer, Cornelia Schumacher, 
Emily McNulty, Christine Bosch, Alexander Nimo Wiredu,  and Susanne Ufer of 490a have 
provided a lot of practical support and encouragement. Christine Bosch has been of great 
help in translating my executive summary. Mira Frommknecht also provided useful 
comments on the German version of the executive summary. Dr. Thea Nielsen has been a 
great colleague, offered encouragement, and contributed to my social life to help free my 
mind. Dealing with administrative issues has not been always easy, but many thanks to 
Denise Güttler, Katherina Mayer and Linn Doppler for the practical support.  
My stay in Germany involved a lot of sacrifice on the part of friends and family 
members. However, over the years, we have learned to deal with the situation and enjoy 
the moments whenever the opportunity comes for a reunion. I greatly appreciate the constant 
encouragement from my mothers’ (Angela Sadick, Felicia Bart-Plange, and Janet Aboagye) 
and my siblings. My heartfelt appreciation to Esenam Sunu for her constant support and 
encouragement. Integrating in Germany, particularly Stuttgart has been relatively easy for 
me, I like Maultaschen and Spätzle in addition to other dishes. Many friends and families 
have been part of this experience. I would like to thank Manfred and Claudia Nädele, Roland 
and Tamar Schmidt, Petra Schmidt, Bodo and Sonja Neef, Max and Grace Harrison, and 
Inga Trefz for the great hospitality.  
viii 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
There has been a renewed interest among donors and domestic policy makers in 
promoting agricultural development in Africa. Such renewed interest is evident in initiatives, 
such as the Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Program (CAADP), the 
Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), the New Alliance for Food Security 
and Nutrition, and TerrAfrica. Yet, the choice of policy instruments that are most suitable to 
promote agricultural development in Africa remains subject to a contested debate. The main 
objective of this cumulative thesis is to analyze the role that the policy beliefs of different 
actors play in determining policy choices and policy implementation, a topic that has been 
largely neglected in the agricultural economics and political science literature on the 
political economy of agricultural policies in Africa. 
While some policy actors argue that agricultural development requires strong state 
support, others criticize state-focused instruments and favor market-oriented strategies. 
Examples of such unresolved debates regarding the role of the state versus the private sector 
include controversies about input subsidies, import taxes, price stabilization, and buffer 
stock programs. On the ground, one can observe that African governments implement input 
subsidy programs and reverse the abolishment of parastatal organizations, in spite of the 
prevailing critique of such policy instruments by some donor organizations. As the literature 
reviews included in this thesis show, the dominant explanations in the agricultural economics 
literature for the choice of such agricultural policies have mainly been based on the rational 
choice paradigm, such as interest group theories and voter-politician models. Explanations 
in the political science literature have focused on the role of politician’s self- interest in the 
form of patronage. Neither of these strands of literature has paid attention to the role of 
policy beliefs that different actors have and the influence of such beliefs on policy 
choices. The main rationale for this thesis is the proposition that a narrow focus on self-
interest in the prevailing explanations of agricultural policy choices in Africa limits their 
value. This is especially the case, if the goal of policy research is to identify strategies on 
how long-standing controversies can be resolved with a view to moving towards more 
effective policy implementation. 
This thesis is based on case studies conducted in four countries: Ghana, Kenya, 
Senegal, and Uganda. The countries were selected because they are similar in the following 
aspects: They are largely agrarian-based, they implemented Structural Adjustment Programs 
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in the 1980s, and they moved towards increasing support to agriculture in recent years. 
However, they differ in important characteristics, especially regarding the nature of their 
political system. These characteristics make them good case study examples for analyzing 
contested agricultural policy debates. By combining different types of case studies, the thesis 
covers the entire spectrum from policy formulation to policy implementation. 
The thesis begins with an introduction, which presents the rationale for the study, 
provides background information on the agricultural policy context in the four case study 
countries, and reviews the relevant literature in the fields of agricultural economics and 
political science. After the introduction, the thesis presents two case studies that deal with 
policy formulation. They focus on the policy discourse in three of the four case study 
countries, namely, Senegal, Ghana, and Uganda. In these case studies, the roles of policy 
discourses and policy beliefs in the policy process are examined. The case studies combine 
the Advocacy Coalition Framework with discourse analysis and narrative policy analysis to 
identify the predominant policy beliefs of different coalitions of actors. Based on interviews 
with a wide range of policy-makers and stakeholders, two main coalitions were identified in 
each country. In the case study of Ghana and Uganda, these coalitions were labeled “donor 
discourse coalition” and “domestic discourse coalition.” In Senegal, the labels “agricultural 
support coalition” and “agricultural support critique coalition” were used. As the cluster 
analysis showed, the donor coalition and the agricultural support critique coalition 
mostly comprise international financial institutions, the finance ministry, and academia. 
Members from the agricultural ministry, Parliament, political parties, and civil society 
groups mostly form the domestic coalition and the agricultural support coalition. The study 
finds strikingly similar patterns of policy beliefs across the three case study countries. 
Donors and domestic policy makers held fundamentally different policy beliefs regarding the 
question: What does it take to develop smallholder agriculture? While domestic policy actors 
tend to believe that transforming smallholder agriculture requires public intervention to 
provide modern inputs at subsidized rates, members of the donor coalition tend to believe 
that these interventions are market distorting and only motivated by political patronage. 
The narrative policy analysis of the discourses suggests that the agricultural support 
narrative has a convincing story-line with a clear beginning (low productivity caused by lack 
of inputs), middle (providing subsidized inputs), and end (increased productivity). In 
contrast, the agricultural support critique is mostly presented in the form of a non-story 
(focusing on what should not be done without providing a convincing alternative story-line 
of what should be done). 
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Moving from policy formulation to decision-making on policy adoption, the third 
case study examines how divergent policy beliefs are translated into policy programs. The 
analysis focuses on two major agricultural programs in Ghana: the Block Farms Program 
and the agricultural investment program developed under CAADP, called Medium Term 
Agriculture Sector Investment Plan (METASIP). A participatory mapping of the process 
leading to the policy programs (called Process Net-Map) was combined with in-depth 
interviews conducted with policy experts. The empirical results reveal two divergent policy 
processes: (1) The METASIP policy process that involved broad stakeholder consultation, 
but where donors were considered the most influential policy actors in the process. (2) The 
policy process leading to the Block Farms Program. In contrast to the METASIP process, 
donors did not feature as policy actors in this policy process, which was also less 
consultative. Domestic policy makers, including the ruling political party, Parliament, and 
the president, played key roles in this policy process. A fundamental difference between the 
two programs relates to the policy orientation: The Block Farms Program takes a public 
sector approach, while METASIP stresses private sector participation in agricultural service 
provision. Thus, this case study indicates that basic differences in policy beliefs between 
donors and domestic policy makers are translated into different policy programs through 
parallel policy processes, which are not connected to each other. Therefore, the case study 
suggests that “two worlds” (donors and domestic policy makers) exist not only with regard to 
policy beliefs, but also with regard to policy processes and the resulting policy choices. 
After having covered policy formulation and policy adoption, the last two case studies 
deal with policy implementation. They focus on animal health services, because this is a 
policy field where the case study countries had already implemented policy reforms 
during the structural adjustment period. These reforms largely followed donor prescriptions 
to reduce government involvement and promote privatization. The two case studies aimed 
to analyze the effects of these reforms in relation to prevailing policy beliefs regarding the 
potential positive and negative effects of privatization. Data for the two case studies were 
collected through surveys of livestock keepers in a marginal livestock production area in the 
northern region of Ghana and in a high-potential dairy production area in Kenya. Key 
informant interviews with livestock policy experts were also conducted in Ghana. The 
analysis showed that the policy reform of liberalization introduced new players into the 
animal health service delivery systems. A multinomial logit model was applied to determine 
the factors that influence households’ choice of service providers. In Ghana, a low potential 
region (semi-arid, remote) was examined, and the analysis revealed that in this region 
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government para-vets were preferred to community animal health workers and private para- 
vets. This choice was attributed to the relatively low performance of the community animal 
health workers, resulting from their limited training. In areas with few or no government 
para-vets, farmers resorted to self-treatment or to selling sick animals for human 
consumption, which has undesirable health implications. In Kenya, a high-potential area 
with intensive dairy production was examined. The results expectedly suggest that service 
delivery was generally better than in Ghana, as a private service provider market had indeed 
emerged. In this respect, the experience corresponded to the policy beliefs of those policy 
actors who had pursued this reform. However, the study found that poorer framers in these 
areas also face challenges in accessing qualified service providers. Thus, the findings 
indicate that privatization of livestock services had problematic results for farmers in 
marginal areas, as well as for poor farmers in high-potential areas. These experiences in the 
liberalization of the livestock sector may be one contributing factor to why domestic policy 
makers did not change their policy beliefs regarding the need for government intervention 
in support of smallholder farming. 
The final two chapters of the thesis discuss the findings of the five case studies in a 
cross-cutting perspective and derive implications from for policy processes that aim at 
developing smallholder agriculture in Africa. As the case studies show, the policy beliefs of 
donors and domestic policy makers are not easily reconciled, especially since there is a 
tendency among policy actors on both sides to have a positive self-representation and a 
negative other representation, which can easily lead to “blame games”. What seems rather 
problematic for bridging the gap between the “two worlds” is the view identified in the donor 
discourse that domestic policy makers only pursue government-focused programs as a 
strategy to stay in political power or to create opportunities for corruption. There would be no 
contradiction in accepting that domestic policy makers genuinely believe in the need for 
better physical access of smallholders to inputs, while acknowledging that such instruments 
have political advantages as well. The study suggests that if donors could accept genuine 
concerns of domestic policy makers, it would be easier to engage in a more productive 
policy dialogue, such as on how to make input-subsidy programs more effective or how to 
address service needs of poor livestock keepers. Based on the proposition that a more 
consensus-oriented approach will ultimately lead to more effective agricultural policies, the 
study concludes that it is critical to find strategies to promote such a dialogue between donor 
coalitions and domestic coalitions. Such strategies may aim at engaging policy actors 
through deliberation, building new coalitions, promoting policy-oriented learning, and 
xii 
 
involving policy brokers to find new alternative solutions to reach a consensus. Considering 
the similarities found across the four case study countries, the study also concludes that the 
findings are relevant for other African countries. 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Bei Entwicklungsorganisationen und politischen Entscheidungsträgern in Afrika ist die 
Förderung der landwirtschaftlicher Entwicklung im letzten Jahrzehnt wieder in das Zentrum 
der entwicklungspolitischen Agenda gerückt. Dieses Interesse zeigt sich in Initiativen wie dem 
“Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Program” (CAADP), der “Alliance for a 
Green Revolution in Africa” (AGRA), der “New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition” 
und „TerrAfrica“. Die Wahl der am besten geeigneten Politikmaßnahmen, um die 
landwirtschaftliche Entwicklung in Afrika zu unterstützen, bleibt jedoch umstritten. Das 
Hauptziel dieser kumulativen Doktorarbeit war es, die Rolle der politischen Überzeugungen 
(„policy beliefs“) unterschiedlicher Akteure in Bezug auf politische Wahlmöglichkeiten und 
deren Implementierung zu analysieren. Dieses Thema ist in der agrarökonomischen und 
politikwissenschaftlichen Analyse der politischen Ökonomie landwirtschaftlicher 
Politikmaßnahmen in Afrika bislang vernachlässigt worden.  
Politische Überzeugungen unterscheiden sich vor allem bezüglich der Rolle, die der 
Staat zur Förderung der landwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung spielen soll. Auf der einen Seite 
wird argumentiert, dass die landwirtschaftliche Entwicklung eine starke Unterstützung des 
Staates erfordert. Kritiker dieser Position weisen auf die Probleme staatlicher Subventionen 
hin und befürworten marktorientierte Strategien. Beispiele für solch ungelöste Debatten sind 
Kontroversen über Subventionen für Betriebsmittel wie Dünger und Saatgut, Einfuhrsteuern, 
Preisstabilisierung und staatliche Lagerhaltung von Getreide. Vor Ort kann man beobachten, 
dass afrikanische Regierungen Subventionen implementieren und die Abschaffung staatlicher 
Einrichtungen wieder aufheben, trotz vorherrschender Kritik von Geberorganisationen an 
solchen Politikmaßnahmen. Wie die im Rahmen dieser Arbeit durchgeführt Literaturrecherche 
zeigt, beruht die Analyse der Wahl solcher Politikmaßnahmen in der agrarökonomischen 
Literatur hauptsächlich auf dem Paradigma rationaler Entscheidungen („rational choice 
model“). Beispiele sind Theorien über Interessensgruppen oder Politiker-Wähler-Modelle. 
Erklärungen agrarpolitischer Entscheidungen in Afrika, die in der politikwissenschaftlichen 
Literatur entwickelt wurden, fokussieren auf die Rolle des Eigennutzens von Politikern in 
Form von Patronage. Keine der beiden Literaturströmungen nimmt die Rolle der politischen 
Überzeugungen von verschiedenen Akteuren in den Blick und untersucht den Einfluss dieser 
Überzeugungen auf politische Entscheidungen. Die Grundlage dieser Arbeit ist die These, 
dass Erklärungsansätze für landwirtschaftlichen Politikentscheidungen in Afrika, die nur von 
xiv 
 
Eigennutzen ausgehen, als Basis für die Politikberatung nur begrenzt nützlich sind. Dies gilt 
im Besonderen für das Ziel, Strategien zur Lösung von lange ausstehenden Kontroversen zu 
identifizieren und zu einer effektiveren Implementierung von Politikmaßnahmen beizutragen. 
Die Arbeit basiert auf Fallstudien aus vier verschiedenen Ländern: Ghana, Kenia, 
Senegal und Uganda. Diese Länder wurden ausgewählt, weil sie sich in den folgenden 
Aspekten nur wenig unterscheiden: Ihre Wirtschaft basiert hauptsächlich auf dem 
Agrarsektor; sie haben in den 1980er-Jahren Strukturanpassungsprogramme implementiert 
und erhöhten die Förderung für die Landwirtschaft in den letzten Jahren. In wichtigen 
Aspekten unterscheiden sie sich jedoch, insbesondere in den jeweiligen politischen Systemen. 
Auf Grund dieser Charakteristiken eignen sie sich gut für Fallstudien, um die umstrittene 
Debatte über Agrarpolitik zu analysieren. Indem verschiedene Arten von Fallstudien 
kombiniert werden, deckt die Arbeit das ganze Spektrum von der Formulierung bis zur 
Umsetzung der Politikmaßnahmen ab. 
Im Einleitungskapitel dieser kumulativen Dissertation wird zunächst der Hintergrund 
der Studie und der agrarpolitische Kontext in den vier Ländern dargestellt. Außerdem 
wird die relevante Literatur der Agrarökonomie und Politikwissenschaften zu diesem 
Thema dargestellt. 
Im Folgenden werden zwei Fallstudien vorgestellt, die sich mit der 
Politikformulierung (als erster Stufe im politischen Prozess) befassen. Diese Fallstudien 
analysieren den politischen Diskurs in drei der vier untersuchten Länder, Senegal, Ghana und 
Uganda. In diesen Fallstudien wird die Rolle des Politikdiskurses und politischer 
Überzeugungen im Politikprozeß untersucht, wobei die Formulierung von politischen 
Maßnahmen im Mittelpunkt steht. Die Fallstudien kombinieren den „Advocacy Coalition 
Framework“ mit Diskurs- und narrativer Politikanalyse, um die vorherrschenden politischen 
Überzeugungen der verschiedenen Akteurskoalitionen zu identifizieren. Die empirische Basis 
der Studie sind Interviews mit einem weiten Spektrum von politischen Entscheidungsträgern, 
Interessenverbänden und anderen politischen Akteuren. In Ghana und Uganda wurden zwei 
Koalitionen identifiziert, die „Geber-Diskurskoalition“ und „Inlands-Diskurskoalition“ 
genannt werden. Im Fall von Senegal wurden die Begriffe „Agrarförderungs-Koalition“ und 
„Agrarförderungskritik-Koalition“ benutzt. Wie eine Clusteranalyse zeigte, bestanden die 
Geberkoalition und die Agrarförderungskritik- Koalition hauptsächlich aus internationalen 
Finanzinstitutionen, dem Finanzministerium und akademischen Institutionen. Die Inlands-
Diskurskoalition und die Agrarförderungs- 
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Koalition setzten sich hauptsächlich aus Mitgliedern des Agarministeriums, des 
Parlaments, der politischen Parteien und zivilgesellschaftlichen Gruppen zusammen. Die 
Studie identifizierte auffallend gleiche Muster von politischen Überzeugungen in den drei 
Fallstudienländern. Geber und inländische politische Entscheidungsträger haben, sie die 
Analyse zeigte, fundamental unterschiedliche politische Überzeugungen bezüglich der Frage: 
Was ist nötig, um die kleinbäuerliche Landwirtschaft zu entwickeln? Während inländische 
politische Akteure eher glauben, dass öffentliche Interventionen nötig sind, um moderne 
Inputs bereitszustellen, gehen Mitglieder der Geber-Koalition eher davon aus, dass diese 
Interventionen marktverzerrend sind und nur durch Patronage motiviert sind. Eine 
narrative Analyse der politischen Diskurse deutet darauf hin, dass die 
Agrarförderungsnarrative einen überzeugenden argumentativen Aufbau („story-line“) hat. 
Dieser zeigt sich in einem klaren Anfang (niedrige Produktivität verursacht durch einen 
Mangel an Inputs), Hauptteil (subventionierte Inputs zur Verfügung stellen) und Schluss 
(erhöhte Produktivität). Dagegen wird die Agrarförderungskritik meist in der Form einer 
„Non-story“ präsentiert. Die Kritiker führen lediglich aus, was nicht gemacht werden sollte 
(z.B. keine Subventionen), ohne aber einen überzeugenden alternativen Handlungsstrang zu 
vorzuschlagen, der Grundproblem lösen könnte. 
Die dritte Fallstudie untersucht, wie die divergierenden politischen Überzeugungen in 
der Praxis in Politikmaßnahmen umgesetzt werden. Die Analyse bezieht sich auf zwei 
wichtige Agrarprogramme in Ghana, das „Block Farms Program“ und das 
landwirtschaftliche Investitionsprogramm METASIP, das unter CAADP entwickelt wurde. 
Die empirische Basis wurde durch Tiefeninterviews mit politischen Entscheidungsträgern und 
Stakeholdern erarbeitet. Dazu wurde auch eine partizipative Forschungsmethode, mit der 
Prozesse visualisiert werden (Process Net- Map) angewandt. Die empirischen Ergebnisse 
legen zwei unterschiedliche politische Prozesse offen: METASIP beinhaltete eine breite 
Konsultation, und Geber wurden als die einflussreichsten politischen Akteure im Prozess 
identifiziert. Im Gegensatz dazu wurden die Geber im Prozess zum „Block Farms Program“ 
nicht als politische Akteure genannt, dieser Prozess war auch weniger partizipativ. Inländische 
politische Entscheidungsträger, einschließlich der regierenden Partei, dem Parlament und dem 
Präsidenten, spielten eine tragende Rolle in diesem Prozess. Ein fundamentaler Unterschied 
zwischen den beiden Programmen betrifft die politische Orientierung: Das „Block Farms 
Program“ weist dem öffentlichen Sektor eine Schlüsselrolle zu und sieht die staatliche 
Bereitstellung von landwirtschaftlichen Dienstleistungen vor, während METASIP die 
Beteiligung des privaten Sektors in der Versorgung mit diesen Dienstleistungen hervorhebt. 
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Diese Fallstudie zeigt, dass grundsätzliche Unterschiede in den politischen Überzeugungen 
zwischen Gebern und inländischen politischen Entscheidungsträgern in unterschiedlichen 
Politikprozesse münden, die nicht in Beziehung zueinander stehen. Sie werden dann 
entsprechend auch in unterschiedliche Politikprogramme übersetzt. Auf Grund dieser 
Erkenntnis kommt die Fallstudie zu dem Schluss, dass „zwei Welten“ (die der Geber und 
die der inländischen politischen Entscheidungsträger) nicht nur im Hinblick auf politische 
Überzeugungen, sondern auch auf politische Prozesse und die daraus resultierenden 
politischen Entscheidungenbestehen. 
Während sich die ersten drei Fallstudien mit der Politikformulierung und der Adoption 
von Politikprogrammen befassen, geht es in den weiteren beiden Fallstudienum die 
Implementierung von Politikmaßnamen. Thematisch geht es in den beiden Studien um 
Dienstleistungen für die Tierproduktion ist ein Bereich, insbesondere Dienstleistungen zur 
Förderung der Tiergesundheit. Diese Thematik wurde gewählt, da die Fallstudienländer 
während der Strukturanpassungszeit in diesem Bereich bereits Politikreformen durchgeführt 
hatten, die weitgehend den Vorgaben der Geber folgten. Entsprechend wurde die staatliche 
Versorgung mit Veterinärdienstleistungen zurückgefahren, mit dem Ziel, den Aufbau privater 
Veterinärdienste zu fördern. Die zwei Fallstudien zielten darauf ab, die Effekte dieser 
Reformen im Hinblick auf die vorherrschenden politischen Überzeugungen der zwei 
„Politikwelten“ zu analysieren, die in den ersten drei Studien identifiziert wurden. Wie oben 
dargestellt unterscheiden sich diese ja insbesondere im Hinblick auf die Rolle von Staat und 
Privatwirtschaft. Die zwei Studien waren so angelegt, dass die Effekte der Privatisierung in 
unterschiedlichen Regionen betrachtet werden konnten. In Ghana wurde eine entlegene semi-
aride Region gewählt, die als marginaler Standort betrachtet werden kann. Hier dominiert die 
extensive Weidehaltung. In Kenia wurde eine Region mit gut entwickelter, intensiver 
Milchviehhaltung gewählt. Die Daten für die beiden Fallstudien wurden durch 
Befragungen (Surveys) von Tierhaltern und Veterinärdienstleistern erhoben. Zusätzlich 
wurden Tiefeninterviews mit Schlüsselpersonen durchgeführt. Die Analyse zeigte, dass durch 
die Liberalisierung neue Akteure aufgetreten sind, die Tiergesundheitsdienste anbieten. Die 
Faktoren, die die Wahl der Haushalte für einen bestimmten Dienstleister beeinflussen, 
wurden mit Hilfe eines multinomialen Logit-Modells bestimmt. Für das Gebiet mit niedrigem 
Potenzial in Ghana ergab die Analyse, dass die Tierhalter die von den staatlichen Para-
Veterinären (Hilfstierärzten) angebotenen Leistungen bevorzugen. Dienstleister auf 
Gemeinde-Ebene („Community Animal Health Workers“), waren hingegen nicht die erste 
Wahl ,was vor allem auf die ungenügende Ausbildung dieser Dienstleister zurückzuführen 
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ist. In Gegenden, in denen kaum oder keine staatlichen Veterinärdienstleistungen mehr zur 
Verfügung stehen, weichen die Tierhalter auf Eigenbehandlung aus, oder verkaufen kranke 
Tiere zum menschlichen Verzehr, was unerwünschte gesundheitliche Folgen haben kann. In 
Kenia stellt sich die Situation erwartungsgemäß anders dar. Hier weisen die Ergebnisse 
darauf hin, dass tatsächlich ein privater Dienstleistungsmarkt entstanden ist. Jedoch hatten 
ärmere Tierhalter auch in dieser Region Probleme im Zugang zu qualifizierten Dienstleistern. 
Insgesamt zeigen die Ergebnisse somit, dass die Privatisierung von 
Tierhaltungsdienstleistungen problematische Folgen für Tierhalter in marginalisierten 
Gebieten und auch für ärmere Tierhalter in Gebieten mit hohem Produktionspotenzial hatte. 
Diese Erfahrungen habe möglicherweise dazu beigetragen, dass inländische politische 
Entscheidungsträger ihre Überzeugungen zur Rolle des Staates in der landwirtschaftlichen 
Entwicklung trotz des Einflusses der Geber nicht grundlegend geändert haben. 
Das vorletzte Kapitel der Arbeit diskutiert die Ergebnisse der fünf Studien aus 
übergeordneter Perspektive, wobei auch die Grenzen der Studien aufgezeigt werden. Das 
letzte Kapitel leitet daraufhin Implikationen für Politikprozesse ab, die zum Ziel haben, die 
kleinbäuerliche Landwirtschaft in Afrika zu fördern. Wie die Fallstudien zeigen, lassen sich 
die politischen Überzeugungen von Gebern und inländischen politischen 
Entscheidungsträgern nicht leicht in Einklang bringen. Die Ergebnisse weisen auch auf eine 
Tendenz zur positiven Selbstwahrnehmung der eigenen Koalition und negativen 
Wahrnehmung der jeweils anderen Koalition hin, was politische Konsensbildung erschwert. 
Besonders problematisch ist auch die in der Geber-Koalition weit verbreitete Überzeugung, 
dass inländische politische Entscheidungsträger regierungszentrierte Programme nur 
deswegen verfolgen, weil sie leicht zu ihrer politischen Machterhaltung eingesetzt werden 
können und Spielräume für Korruption eröffnen. Für den politischen Dialog wäre es hilfreich, 
wenn die Geber sich mehr darum bemühen würden, neben solchen strategischen Erwägungen 
auch die genuinen politischen Überzeugungen einheimischer politischer Entscheidungsträger 
anzuerkennen und ernsthaft sich damit auseinanderzusetzen. Ein produktiver Politikdialog 
könnte dann zum Beispiel zu der Frage entstehen, unter welchen Bedingungen welche Art von 
Subventionen für landwirtschaftliche Betriebsmittel zielführend sind, und wie sie effektiver 
gestaltet werden könnten. Ein weiteres Beispile sind Dialoge darüber, wie die 
Tiergesundheitsdienstleistungen für benachteiligte Tierhalter verbessert werden können.  
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Basierend auf der Proposition, dass ein stärker konsensorientierter Ansatz zu 
effektiveren landwirtschaftlichen Politikmaßnahmen führt, werden im letzten Kapitel 
Strategien für einen produktiveren Dialog zwischen der Geber- und der Inlands-Koalition 
vorgeschlagen. Der Vorschlag beinhaltet Strategien, die darauf abzielen, neue Koalitionen zu 
bilden, politikorientiertes Lernen zu fördern, und Politikvermittler zu involvieren. Auf Grund 
der Ähnlichkeiten, die in den vier Ländern in allen Phasen des Politik-Prozesses von der 
Politikformulierung bis zur Implementierung gefunden wurden, wird abschließend gefolgert, 
dass die Ergebnisse auch von Relevanz für weitere afrikanische Länder sein sollten. 
  
xix 
 
 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
AAA  Accra Agenda for Action 
ACF  Advocacy Coalition Framework 
AGRA  Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa  
AHA  Animal Health Assistants 
AMSEC Agricultural Mechanization Service Centers 
ASWG Agricultural Sector Working Groups 
BMZ  German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development 
CAADP Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program 
CAHWs  Community Animal Health Workers  
CAP  Common Agricultural Policy  
CBPP  Contagious Bovine Pleurapneumonia 
CGAIR Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research 
CSO  Civil Society Organization 
DAAD  German Academic Exchange Services 
ECOWAP Regional Agricultural Policy for West Africa 
ECOWAS Economic Community of West Africa States 
FAO   Food and Agriculture Organization 
FAOSTAT Food and Agriculture Organization Statistics 
FASDEP Food and Agriculture Sector Development Policy  
FBO  Farmer-Based Organizations 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product 
GH  Ghanaian Cedis 
GOANA Grande Offensive Agricole pour la Nourritur et l’Abondance 
GOS   Government of Senegal 
GPV  Government Para-veterinaries  
IAD  Institutional Analysis and Development Framework  
ICT   Information Communication Technology 
IFI  International Financial Institutions  
IFPRI  International Food Policy Research Institute 
ILCA  International Livestock Center for Africa 
IMF  International Monetary Fund  
xx 
 
KMO  Kaiser-Mayer-Olkin 
LOASP Loi d’Orientation Agro-Sylvo Pastorale 
MAAIF Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries 
METASIP Medium Term Agricultural Sector Investment Plan  
MNLM Multinomial Logit Model 
MoFA  Ministry of Food and Agriculture  
MT  Metric Tons 
NARS  National Agricultural Research System 
NDPC  National Development Planning Commission 
NGO  Non-Governmental Organization 
NPA  Nouvelle Politique Agricole 
NPA  Narrative Policy Analysis 
NRA  Nominal Rate of Assistance  
NTSPs  Non-Trained Service Providers 
PAHA  Private animal health assistants  
PCA  Principal Component Analysis 
PNIA  Programme National D’Investissement Agricole 
PPMED Policy Planning and Monitoring Division 
PPR  Peste des Petits Ruminants 
PPV  Private Para-veterinaries 
PRODAM Projet de developpment Agricole de Matam 
PRSP  Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
ReSAKSS Regional Strategic Analysis and knowledge Support System  
SAP  Structural Adjustment Program 
SPSS  Statistical Package for Social Sciences  
SSA  Sub-Saharan Africa 
TLU  Tropical Livestock Unit 
UGX  Uganda Shilling 
USD  United States Dollar 
WATSAN Water and Sanitation 
 
  
xxi 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1.1: Agricultural, economic, and political indicators........................................................ 5 
Table 2.1: Interviewed stakeholders in Ghana and Uganda ...................................................... 46 
Table 2.2: Policy themes and policy beliefs (identified by factor analysis) for Ghana ............ 49 
Table 2.3: Policy themes and policy beliefs (identified by factor analysis) for Uganda .......... 50 
Table 2.4: Participants in the discourse coalition (identified by cluster analysis) .................... 51 
Table 3.1: Interviewed stakeholders ......................................................................................... 74 
Table 3.2: Classification of policy actors .................................................................................. 77 
Table 3.3: Agricultural support policy themes .......................................................................... 81 
Table 3.4: Agricultural support critique policy themes ............................................................. 83 
Table 4.1: Interviewed stakeholders ......................................................................................... 98 
Table 4.2: Fundamental differences in the policy processes ................................................... 103 
Table 5.1: Description of variables used in econometric model ............................................. 115 
Table 5.2: Livestock service delivery systems used by livestock keepers .............................. 116 
Table 5.3: Perception of animal health service delivery systems (Rank analysis) ................. 117 
Table 5.4: Financial loss to livestock keepers due to diseases ................................................ 117 
Table 5.5: Cost of livestock treatment .................................................................................... 118 
Table 5.6: Determinants of animal health service providers (Multinomial logit model) ........ 118 
Table 6.1: Farmers’ perception of different types of animal health service providers ........... 125 
Table 6.2: Results of multinomial logit analysis .................................................................... 126 
  
xxii 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1.1: Partial agricultural productivity trends in Ghana, Kenya, Uganda, and Senegal 
(1990-2012)............................................................................................................... 6 
Figure 1.2: Agricultural labor and land productivity in Ghana, Kenya, Uganda, and 
Senegal (1990-2012) ................................................................................................. 7 
Figure 1.3: Nominal Rate of Assistance (NRA) to import-competing products, 
exportables, and total agriculture products, Ghana, 1955 to 2004 .......................... 11 
Figure 1.4: Nominal Rate of Assistance (NRA) to import-competing products, 
exportables, and total agriculture products, Uganda, 1962 to 2004 ........................ 13 
Figure 1.5: Nominal Rate of Assistance (NRA) to import competing products, 
exportables, and total agriculture products, Senegal, 1961 to 2005 ........................ 15 
Figure 1.6: Nominal Rate of Assistance (NRA) to import competing products, exportables 
and total agriculture products, Kenya 1956 to 2004 ............................................... 17 
Figure 1.7: Conceptual framework ........................................................................................... 22 
Figure 4.1: Conceptual framework ........................................................................................... 95 
Figure 4.2: Process Net-Map approach ..................................................................................... 97 
Figure 4.3: Process Net-Map of the CAADP policy process (METASIP program) ............... 100 
Figure 4.4: Influence level of actors in the CAADP policy process ....................................... 101 
Figure 4.5: Process Net-Map of the Block Farms Program .................................................... 102 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Agriculture plays an important role in Africa and has a great potential to contribute to 
poverty reduction and stimulate economic growth. The sector employs and supports the 
livelihoods of 60 to 80 percent of the population. However, compared to other regions in the 
world, low agricultural productivity remains a fundamental problem (Fuglie, Wang, and 
Ball, 2012: 237-266). In light of this problem, past efforts and recent renewed interest 
among donors and domestic policy makers have aimed at boosting agricultural development 
in Africa. Their interest is evident in initiatives, such as the Comprehensive Africa 
Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), the Alliance for a Green Revolution in 
Africa (AGRA), the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition, and TerrAfrica. 
Yet, there are contested policy debates among policy actors regarding the choice of policy 
instruments that are most suitable to promote agricultural development in Africa. While 
some actors argue that agricultural development requires strong state support, others 
criticize those state-focused instruments and favor market-oriented strategies. Examples of 
such unresolved debates regarding the role of the state versus the private sector include 
controversies about input subsidies; import taxes, price stabilization, and buffer stock 
programs (see Harrigan, 2003; Jayne, Govereh, Mwanaumo, Nyoro, and Chapoto, 2002). 
Summing these issues up, Kanbur (2001: 1084) asks: “How can people with seemingly the 
same ends disagree so much about means, and how can seemingly the same objective 
reality be interpreted so differently?” 
In most Sub-Saharan African countries, boosting agricultural productivity and 
promoting agricultural development have recently led to initiating government-driven 
programs. One can observe a resurgence of agricultural input subsidy programs (see Jayne 
and Rashid, 2013) and a return to the establishment of parastatal organizations in Africa. 
For example, government initiatives in Ghana include Agricultural Mechanization Service 
Centers, which provide highly subsidized mechanization services, Block Farms Program—a 
type of government-managed group farming schemes, National Food Buffer Stock 
Company, and Fertilizer Subsidy Program (see Benin et al., 2013). In Uganda, the 
“Prosperity for All” program and the most recent “Operation Wealth Creation” program 
both aim at distributing inputs to farmers by government agencies to promote agricultural 
development (MAAIF, 2015). The market intervention program of the Zambia Food 
2 
 
Reserve Agency and the Farm Input Subsidy Program of Malawi are other well-known 
examples. 
Most governments justify such intervention policies with “market failure”, while 
“state failure” arguments have been used by donors to justify the need to liberalize 
agricultural services, input markets, and output markets. The increasing popularity and 
implementation of these policies among African governments amid donor agencies’ 
concerns raise an important question: Why do countries implement such agricultural 
policies even though they do not have a positive record in the past, and are heavily criticized 
by funding agencies? 
The existing agricultural economics literature, which dealt with the political 
economy of agricultural policies, has explained such policy choices using a variety of 
models, such as interest group models or voter-politician models, which ultimately rest on 
the rational choice paradigm. This literature has identified factors such as using subsidies 
as a strategy to gain political support (Swinnen, 1994), the influence of lobby groups (Bates 
and Block, 2010), the creation of rent seeking opportunities (Jayne et al., 2002), the 
rationale of regulation or state control (Bates, 1981), and the role of rewards given to 
clientelistic networks (Van de Walle, 2001). Recent work has also considered the role of 
ideology (left wing versus right wing) in agricultural policies in a broad sense (see Dutt and 
Mitra, 2010; Olper, 2010). 
The seminal work of Krueger (Krueger, Schiff, and Valdés, 1991; Krueger, 1992, 
1996) on agricultural pricing polices provided useful insights on policy beliefs and ideas; 
however, recent studies have paid less attention to the role of policy beliefs in influencing 
policy choices in the political economy of the agricultural policy literature. In a review of 
the political economy of the agricultural policy literature, Binswanger and Deininger (1997: 
1999) observed that “knowledge of impacts of ideas as generators and facilitators of policy 
change still remains poorly integrated across subfields and schools of sciences where further 
research is needed.” 
In the political science literature, the role of policy beliefs in policy processes has 
been widely acknowledged (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993; Grindle and Thomas, 1989; 
Orren, 1988; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). The political science literature has shown 
that the assumption of fixed preferences or a narrow view on self-interest are not 
sufficient to adequately explain human behavior, particularly political decisions in policy 
making and implementation, where decisions may have multiple causes (Schlager, 1995). 
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Policy belief systems are proposed as an approach that can help to address the 
deficiencies in current explanations.  
Policy belief systems can be understood to “include value priorities, perceptions of 
important relationships, perceptions of world states (including the magnitude of the 
problem), perceptions of the efficacy of policy instruments etc.” (Sabatier, 1988: 132). 
According to Orren (1988: 13), “people do not act simply on the basis of their perceived 
self-interest, without regard to the aggregate consequences of their actions. They are also 
motivated by values, purposes, ideas, goals, and commitments that transcend self-interest”. 
The main rationale for this thesis is the proposition that a narrow focus on self- 
interest interpretations in the prevailing explanations of agricultural policy choices in 
Africa limits their value. This is especially the case, if the goal of policy research is to 
identify strategies on how long-standing controversies can be resolved with a view to 
moving towards more effective policy implementation. The narrow focus on only self- 
interest interpretations in explaining policy choices also limits the understanding of 
problems and the possibility of finding alternative strategies to solve them. Stigler (1975: 
ix) wrote, “Until we understand why our society adopts its policies, we will be poorly 
equipped to give useful advice on how to change those policies”. To enhance our 
understanding of agricultural policy making, this cumulative thesis analyzes the role that 
policy beliefs and policy discourses of different actors play in determining policy choices, a 
topic that has been largely neglected in the political economy of agricultural policy 
literature. The thesis is based on case studies conducted in four countries: Ghana, Kenya, 
Senegal, and Uganda. By combining different types of case studies, the thesis covers the 
entire spectrum from policy formulation to policy implementation. 
The following sections examine the agricultural policy context, briefly review the 
political economy and agricultural economics literature, describe the research methods and 
conceptual frameworks, and provide an overview of the individual papers in this cumulative 
thesis. 
 
1.1 Agricultural policy context and political environment 
Ghana, Kenya, Senegal, and Uganda are predominately agrarian-based economies, 
with the sector contributing significantly to Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Table 1.1 
presents major agricultural, economic, and political indicators of the case study countries. 
The agricultural sector remains a major employer of the economically active population. 
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Annual growth rate in agricultural value added is below the 6 percent target of the CAADP 
in Ghana, Kenya, and Senegal. The partial agricultural productivity1 differences among the 
four countries are illustrated in Figures 1.1 and 1.2. Agricultural output per land (land 
productivity) is increasing in Ghana, Kenya, and Uganda, but agricultural output per labor 
(labor productivity) is declining in Uganda, relatively stable in Kenya, and increasing in 
Ghana. This suggests that the increase in agricultural output in Uganda might be attributed 
to land expansion or population growth. Fuglie et al. (2012: 238) highlight that most of the 
recent acceleration in agricultural growth in Sub-Saharan Africa seems not to be 
productivity led, but primarily resource led. Chapoto et al. (2013: 3) also attribute 
agricultural growth in selected Sub-Saharan African countries to land expansion, population 
growth, and the possible uptake of agricultural technologies. 
In Senegal, agricultural output per land and output per labor were stagnant in the 
past and have been declining in recent times (Figures 1.1 and 1.2). Senegal has the lowest 
labor productivity among the four case study countries. Figure 1.2 shows that an adult 
worker is able to cultivate 0.5 to 0.9 hectares of land in Senegal, 0.8 to 1.2 hectares in 
Kenya, 1.2 to 1.3 hectares in Uganda, and 1.2 to 2.3 hectares in Ghana (see Figure 1.2). 
Compared to other regions in the world, labor and land productivity in Sub-Saharan Africa 
are the lowest (see Fuglie and Nin-Pratt, 2012). In Southeast Asia, land and labor 
productivity, from 2001 to 2009 are 3.76 (USD/ha) and 4.0 (USD/worker), respectively, 
compared to 2.34 (USD/ha) and 0.77 (USD/worker), respectively, in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(Fuglie and Nin-Pratt, 2012:23). 
All four case study countries initiated the structural adjustment and stabilization 
programs of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the 1980s. A 
major difference among the four countries is the perceived score of democracy, which 
indicates the nature of the political system. Based on Polity IV scores, Ghana, Kenya, and 
Senegal are perceived as more democratic and Uganda is perceived as less democratic (see 
Table 1.1). These characteristics make the different countries good case study examples in 
analyzing contested agricultural policy debates. The next section provides a historical 
background of the agricultural policy landscape of the case study countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 “Productivity measures output per unit of an input, some group of inputs or, in the case of total factor 
productivity (TFP), an aggregation of all economic inputs employed in production” (Fuglie et al., 2012: 239). 
5 
 
Table 1.1: Agricultural, economic, and political indicators 
 
Indicators Ghana Uganda Senegal Kenya 
Population (million) 2013a 25.9 37.5 14.1 44.3 
Agricultural value added as 
share of GDP (% of GDP) 
2013a 
22 25 18 29 
Agricultural value added 
(annual % growth) (2013) 
5 6 2 5 
Gross Domestic Product per 
capita (constant 2005 US$, 
2013)a 
769 416 796 632 
Share of population in 
agriculture (%) 2013 b 
53 72 69 69 
Comprehensive Africa 
Agriculture Development 
Program (CAADP) (6% 
growth rate and 10% 
budget allocation) 
October, 2009 March, 2010 October, 2009 July, 2010 
Structural Adjustment 
Program 
Initiated 
in 1983 
Initiated in 
1987 
Initiated in 
1980 
Initiated in 
1986 
Democracy score, 2013c 8 1 7 9 
 
Notes: (a) World Development Indicators, World Bank; (b) FAOSTAT (2014) (Total economically 
active population in agriculture /Total economically active population); (c) Polity IV (2013) Democracy 
score: ranges from 1 (less democratic) to 10 (full democratic). 
 
Source: Compiled by authors. 
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Figure 1.1: Partial agricultural productivity trends in Ghana, Kenya, Uganda, and Senegal 
(1990-2012) 
 
Note: Agricultural output is gross agricultural production value in constant 2004-2006 international 
dollars, agricultural labor is the total economically active adults employed in agriculture, and 
agricultural land is the total agriculture area in hectares (ha). 
Source: Authors’ representation using data from FAO/FAOSTAT (2014). 
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Figure 1.2: Agricultural labor and land productivity in Ghana, Kenya, Uganda, and 
Senegal (1990-2012) 
Note: The diagram follows the approach of Ruttan (2002) and Fuglie et al. (2012). Agricultural 
output is gross agricultural production value in constant 2004-2006 international dollars, agricultural 
labor is the total economically active adults employed in agriculture, and agricultural land is the 
total agriculture area in hectares (ha). Each line represents data from 1990 to 2012. Land and labor 
productivity are total agricultural output divided by the total agricultural land (ha) and the total 
number of adults employed in agriculture, respectively. The vertical lines illustrate the land to labor 
factor ratio (hectares of agricultural land per labor). The top horizontal axis and right-hand 
vertical axis represent the land to labor factor. 
Source: Authors’ representation using data from FAO/FAOSTAT (2014). 
 
1.2 Historical overview of agricultural policy changes 
A historical overview of the agricultural policy changes in the case study countries is 
necessary as it reflects an aggregate picture of previous policy preferences and helps to 
understand how they contribute to current policy choices. This aggregate picture also 
reflects the economic policy choices of the countries. Such policy choices includes trade 
taxes, commodity price interventions, and input subsidies as captured by the Nominal Rate 
of Assistance (NRA) measure of the World Bank project on distortions to agricultural 
incentives (Anderson, 2009).2 The NRA measures the gap between the actual domestic 
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price of a product and the price of the product under free market, without government 
policy intervention (Anderson and Masters, 2009). It is useful to compare the net effect 
of policies on prices and incentives across a range of commodities, years, and countries 
(Anderson and Masters, 2009). Negative NRA values mean a net taxation of farmers 
or subsidies to consumers. The NRA measure includes commodity price interventions, 
trade tariffs, and input subsidies (Fuglie et al., 2012: 253). Based on NRA indicators, the 
agricultural economics literature shows that developing countries have generally stopped 
taxing agriculture, especially export crops (Swinnen, 2010a). Yet, subsidies to import- 
competing products still exist (Swinnen, 2010a). This trend illustrates a gradual shift to 
‘overshooting’ agricultural policies, defined as the tendency for developing economies to 
shift from taxing to protecting the agricultural sector through government intervention 
programs (Anderson and Masters, 2009; Anderson, 2009). The ‘overshooting’ phenomenon 
has been criticized in literature and remains one of the most highly contested debates among 
policy makers and donors (see Anderson and Masters, 2009: 63). The next sections 
review specific policy changes in Ghana, Kenya, Uganda, and Senegal. 
 
1.2.1 Ghana 
This section reviews patterns of agricultural policy changes using the NRA 
indicators and discusses government-driven programs supporting the agricultural sector in 
Ghana. 
 
1.2.1.1   Agricultural policy changes 
Ghana embarked on cocoa sector reforms as part of the market liberalization policies 
initiated in 1983. The reforms allowed private licensed companies to purchase cocoa 
from farmers, but the state cocoa marketing board still remains the single exporter of cocoa 
in Ghana (Birner and Resnick, 2010). The reforms led to a gradual increase in producer 
prices paid to cocoa farmers, contributing to the declining taxation of exportable products 
(see Figure 1.3). From 2000 to 2004, the NRA shows this relative decline in taxation of 
cocoa to -19.8 percent. Although the current level of taxation is relatively high, producer 
prices received by farmers have improved, which has been coupled with the government 
supported ‘cocoa mass spraying’ program (Birner and Resnick, 2010). 
 
 
 
 
2 See www.worldbank.org/agdistortions. 
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Unlike exported goods, the import-competing products received government support 
over the last decade. The average NRA from 2000 to 2004 indicates a 35.8 percent level of 
support for import-competing products. Contributing to the NRA increase in this period is 
government policies to improve domestic staple production. Rice and maize received 
significant government support, with the NRA from 2000 to 2004 averaging 30.9 and 39.0, 
respectively. The next section describes some government programs that likely 
contributed to the ‘overshooting’ phenomena. 
 
1.2.1.2   Policies supporting import-competing products and cash crops 
From the late 2000s, import-competing products have also received direct and 
indirect government support through specific programs. In 2007, the Agricultural 
Mechanization Service Centers program driven by the Government of Ghana was 
introduced to improve farmers’ access to mechanization services in the districts. The 
Agricultural Mechanization Service Centers program is a credit facility provided by the 
government to private sector companies who receive a package consisting of five tractors 
and complementary implements. The companies are expected to deposit 10 to17 percent of 
the value and pay the remaining balance over a period of five years (Benin et al., 
2012). This arrangement is a shift from the direct provision of agricultural mechanization 
services by the government before the structural adjustment program to a “market- smart 
tractor subsidy”. 
After the world food crisis in 2008, there has been renewed interest in supporting 
domestic food production through government intervention programs. The Fertilizer 
Subsidy Program, Block Farms Program (Youth in Agriculture Program), and National 
Food Buffer Stock Company were implemented as an integrated program to achieve 
domestic food self-sufficiency. The Block Farms Program is designed to employ 
economies of scale, lower unit cost of inputs, and service delivery. It targets large tracks of 
land in different locations and selects specific crops depending on their comparative 
advantage. Target beneficiaries (rural youths and other farmers) are provided with 
subsidized fertilizer and certified seeds through the Fertilizer Subsidy Program and 
mechanization services on credit through the Agricultural Mechanization Service Centers. 
The beneficiaries are expected to pay back the credit in-kind after harvest. In the Northern 
region of Ghana and other parts of the country, the Block Farms Program and Fertilizer 
Subsidy Program target smallholder rice and maize productions. 
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The National Food Buffer Stock Company is designed to purchase output from 
farmers. It sets a guaranteed minimum price before production and sets a maximum price 
during the lean season to control price hikes (Benin et al., 2012). The focus on the Youth 
by the Block Farms Program is part of the Youth in Agriculture Program of the government. 
This government program aims at improving domestic food production, stabilizing prices, 
and improving farm income. The provision of cocoa seedlings, fertilizer, and spraying for 
cocoa farmers has been part of recent strategies by the government to boost cocoa 
production in Ghana. 
 
1.2.1.3   Livestock policy in Ghana 
In Ghana, the three northern regions accounts for over 50 percent of the ruminant 
population (sheep, cattle, and goat) in Ghana (GSS, 2008). As part of the structural 
adjustment policies in the 1980s, the livestock sector in Ghana was liberalized (World 
Bank, 1992). This led to the move from government livestock service provision to 
privatization of animal health services and cost recovery under the National Livestock 
Services Project which was adopted in 1992 (Turkson, 2004; World Bank, 1992). Due to 
the privatization of livestock services in Ghana, the government also implemented the 
policy of no automatic employment of animal health graduates to fill paraprofessional and 
veterinary positions (Turkson, 2003). This policy significantly reduced the number of 
animal health professionals in the country, especially in rural and marginal areas (Turkson, 
2001). The Community Animal Health Workers program was introduced to fill the gap of 
animal health service provision in rural areas by non-governmental organizations. The 
reforms also affected the animal drug market that used to be under the monopoly of the 
State Veterinary Services Directorate. With liberalization, access to drugs has improved, 
yet the quality of drugs is problematic due to ineffective regulation (Turkson and 
Brownie, 1999). 
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Figure 1.3: Nominal Rate of Assistance (NRA) to import-competing products, 
exportables, and total agriculture products, Ghana, 1955 to 2004 
Data source: Brooks et al. (2007: NRA spread sheet data). 
 
1.2.2 Uganda 
This section reviews patterns of agricultural policy changes using the NRA 
indicators and discusses government driven programs supporting the agricultural sector in 
Uganda. 
 
1.2.2.1   Agricultural policy changes 
Uganda initiated its Structural Adjustment Program in 1987, leading to a shift from a 
state control system to a liberalized market system. The liberalized agricultural policies 
led to coffee sector reforms, which abolished all coffee taxes and introduced private sector 
participation in the purchase and export of coffee to the international market (Anderson and 
Masters, 2009). This policy intervention has contributed to the significant decline in the 
NRA for export products, accounting for a near-zero level of taxation in 2004 (see Figure 
1.4). 
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In contrast to exportables, import-competing products, especially rice and maize, 
have generally received government support. Support for rice is mainly through a tariff 
policy to encourage domestic production and to substitute imports. Maize and beans have 
mixed trade status and have become important crops in East African regional trade. From 
2000 to 2004, the aggregate NRA for import-competing products has increased to an average 
of 15 percent (see Figure 1.4). Domestic staples, such as groundnut, yam, cassava, millet, 
sorghum, and plantain (matooke), have a non-tradable status (Anderson and Masters, 2009). 
The next section presents some subsidy programs that are likely to contribute to the 
‘overshooting’ phenomena. 
 
1.2.2.2   Policies supporting import-competing products 
Although tariff policies have been used to explain the relative increase in protection 
for import-competing products in the 1990s and 2000s (Anderson and Masters, 2009), 
government support through subsidy programs seems to be more common in recent times. In 
particular, input subsidy programs have characterized the recent agricultural policy 
landscape in Uganda. In particular, Birner and Resnick (2010: 1444) reported “the 
introduction of input packages provided by public extension services to farmer’s groups on 
loan basis in Uganda” (see also MAAIF, 2005; Rwamigisa et al., 2013). 
In 2006, the President of Uganda initiated the Prosperity for All (PFA) or ‘Bonna 
Bagagawale’ program. It aims at supporting farmers with input provision and technical 
advice, as well as with organizing farmers into production groups, marketing groups, or 
savings and cooperatives societies (MAAIF, 2011). Through the program, agricultural 
inputs, namely, fertilizer, improved seeds, tractors and credit, are provided to farmers using 
public funds. This policy orientation has been expressed in the 2005/06 budget speech, 
which aims at directing public expenditures toward investment in agricultural inputs, such as 
seeds, fertilizer, hoes, ploughs, and tractors (Joughin and Kjær, 2010). The shift to the 
“Prosperity for All” program of using public funds to create wealth for households through 
government intervention policies is a clear “U-turn” from market liberalization. These 
government subsidy programs are aimed at supporting smallholder farmers, correcting 
market failures and increasing domestic food production. 
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Figure 1.4: Nominal Rate of Assistance (NRA) to import-competing products, 
exportables, and total agriculture products, Uganda, 1962 to 2004 
Data source: Matthews et al. (2007: Appendix). 
 
1.2.3 Senegal 
This section reviews patterns of agricultural policy changes using the NRA 
indicators and discusses government driven programs supporting the agricultural sector in 
Senegal. 
 
1.2.3.1   Agricultural policy changes 
Since independence in the 1960s, the Senegalese agricultural sector has experienced 
different kinds of policies, from state control to market liberalization and a recent reversal to 
state supported input subsidies aimed at developing the agricultural sector through family 
farms. The main export crop (groundnut) was taxed and its revenue was used to import 
cheap broken rice from South Asia (Masters, 2007). Due to the high fiscal problems and the 
implementation of the Structural Adjustment Program in the 1980s, state interventions 
policies were discontinued. The Structural Adjustment Program set of policies were initiated 
under the Nouvelle Politique Agricole (new agricultural policy), which were launched in 
1984 and aimed at liberalization of the agricultural input and output markets (Oya, 
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2006). These policies affected exportable and import competing products. In the 1980s and 
early 1990s, support for import competing products was relatively high, while taxation on 
exportables was low. From 1995 to 2004, taxation of exportables and support for import-
competing products has experienced a significant decline (see Figure 1.5). 
The Senegalese agricultural sector remains underdeveloped and confronted with 
several challenges (Stads and Sène, 2011). In light of these challenges, a consultation 
process for “Loi d’Orientation Agro-Sylvo Pastorale” (LOASP) began in 2000 (Resnick 
and Birner, 2010). The LOASP was to provide a vision to facilitate the modernization of 
the agricultural sector and to reduce rural poverty (Oya, 2006). After the 2008 food crisis, 
the “Grande Offensive Agricole pour la Nourritur et l’Abondance” (GOANA) was lunched 
to improve domestic food production, reduce importation of food, and attain self-
sufficiency. This included modernizing the agricultural sector to increase production. 
Implementing the modernization and food sufficiency objective, the state reintroduced 
tractor, fertilizer and seed input subsidy programs. Through the subsidy programs, the state 
input subsidy covered the provision of irrigation facilities and subsidized fertilizer (a 50 
percent reduction of the market price) and seeds (a 75 percent reduction of the market price) 
(Stads and Sène, 2011). These subsidies remain for groundnut seeds and fertilizer. 
The current agricultural investment plan of Senegal, the Programme National 
D’Investissement Agricole (PNIA), was developed as part of the CAADP initiative and 
highlights eight priority areas, implemented from 2011 to 2015. Under the productivity 
increase component of the PNIA, the government aims at investing in seeds and fertilizer 
for smallholder farmers to increase production. Similar to Ghana and Uganda, the 
Senegalese government has driven other special initiatives to support smallholder farming 
and pastoralists. The “Projet de developpment Agricole de Matam” (PRODAM) was 
launched in 1995 as an example and aimed at improving agricultural productivity and 
ensuring food security. Locally consumed food crops, such as irrigated rice and maize, are 
cultivated under the program. The program targets community members who mainly 
managed the production process. The government provides support through the provision of 
seeds, fertilizer, irrigation, agricultural credit, and marketing services. 
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Figure 1.5: Nominal Rate of Assistance (NRA) to import competing products, 
exportables, and total agriculture products, Senegal, 1961 to 2005 
Data source: Masters (2007: NRA spread sheet data). 
 
1.2.4 Kenya 
This section reviews patterns of agricultural policy changes using the NRA 
indicators and discusses government driven programs supporting the agricultural sector in 
Kenya. 
 
1.2.4.1   Agricultural policy changes 
At independence in 1963, Kenya had favorable agricultural policies that supported 
small and estate farms. Such support was provided through marketing parastatals. Figure 
1.6 shows the different phases of support and taxation policies in Kenya. Generally, the 
NRA illustrates alternating phases of agricultural support and taxation in Kenya. The period 
from 2000 to 2004 shows an increase in support for agricultural exportables (coffee, tea, 
vegetables, and fruits) and import competing products (maize, wheat, and sugar) as 
indicated by the positive NRA. Support and taxation has been administered through state 
marketing boards, such as the Kenya Tea Development Authority (KTDA) for tea and
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coffee, and the National Cereals and Produce Board (NCPB) for wheat and maize (Gitau et 
al., 2009). However, due to managerial challenges, the government of Kenya also started 
agricultural sector reforms as part of the liberalization program in the late 1980s (Gitau et 
al., 2009). 
 
1.2.4.2 Animal health services sector 
Livestock keeping in Kenya is dominated by smallholder livestock farmers, with 
the majority of cattle being kept by pastoralists in mixed herds (FAO, 2005). Dairy farming 
is mostly found in the central and rift valley provinces and coastal highlands, with a higher 
concentration on smallholder dairy farms in peri-urban areas (FAO, 2005). 
The livestock sector, particularly dairy keeping, forms an important component of 
Kenya’s economy. Although indigenous Kenyan’s have always kept livestock, they only 
started to practice commercial livestock farming as a result of the Swynnerton Plan which 
brought about significant policy change in 1954 (Muriuki et al., 2003). The Swynnerton 
Plan allowed local people to enter into commercial farming, including dairy livestock 
keeping (Muriuki et al., 2003). In the post-independence phase (1963-1980), the livestock 
sector was heavily subsidized by the state. The state provided veterinary services, artificial 
insemination services, extension, training of veterinary staff, and marketing services to 
smallholder livestock keepers (Muriuki et al., 2003). During this time, the Kenya 
Creameries Cooperative (KCC) gained monopoly in the dairy market. Due to budgetary 
problems and governance challenges in managing parastatals, the government of Kenya 
embarked on livestock sector reforms as part of the Structural Adjustment Program in the 
1980s (Gitau et al., 2009). The reforms affected livestock policies, and led to the devolution 
of animal health services in Kenya (Oruko and Ndung’u, 2009). As part of the reforms 
government policies introduced cost sharing in service provision, privatization, and the 
adoption of a policy of no automatic employment for graduates trained in animal health 
services in Kenya (Oruko, Upton, and McLeod, 2000). As a result, animal health 
professionals were supported to start private practice (Oruko et al., 2000). The provision of 
clinical services, animal feed, drugs, management of dips, artificial insemination services, 
and the production and distribution of vaccines have been privatized (Muriuki et al., 2003). 
In high dairy potential areas, private animal health practice flourished, while in arid and 
semi-arid lands (ASAL) access to animal health services was limited (Irungu et al., 2006). 
This introduced other service providers, such as the Community Animal Health Workers 
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and village health scouts into the animal health sector in Kenya through initiatives largely 
promoted by donors or non-governmental organizations (Mugunieri, Irungu, and Omiti, 
2004; Oruko et al., 2000). 
 
 
 
Figure 1.6: Nominal Rate of Assistance (NRA) to import competing products, 
exportables and total agriculture products, Kenya 1956 to 2004 
Data source: Winter-Nelson and Argwings-Kodhek (2009: 27). 
 
1.3 Explaining agricultural policy changes 
The previous sections examined the agricultural policy changes in Ghana, Uganda, 
Senegal, and Kenya. This section reviews the quantitative and qualitative political economy 
literature, which has been developed to explain the policy choices and policy reforms 
that have been observed in practice. 
 
1.3.1 Quantitative research approaches 
Quantitative research approaches have made important contributions to explaining 
the observed agricultural policy choices and policy patterns over time. Different authors 
(see Binswanger and Deininger, 1997; Birner and Resnick, 2010; De Gorter and Swinnen,
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2002; Swinnen, 2010b) have published an extensive review of the agricultural economics 
and political economy literature. Prior to the publication of the agricultural distortions data 
set by the World Bank (see Anderson, 2009), which showed that patterns of subsidies and 
taxations of agriculture have changed, explanatory studies focused on explaining why 
industrialized countries supported their agricultural sector, while developing countries taxed 
it? This situation was often referred to as the “development paradox”. A review of the 
political economy literature by De Gorter and Swinnen (2002: 1902) highlighted four key 
elements of the political economy models of agricultural policy. These were derived from 
employing a “public choice approach”. They are classified as individual preferences of the 
citizenry, collective action by lobby groups, preferences of politicians, and political 
institutions (De Gorter and Swinnen, 2002: 1902). The works of Olson (1971) and Becker 
(1983) draw attention to how lobby groups organize for collective action to influence 
policy making. The interaction between politicians and voters (political support models) 
has also been used as an explanatory model (see Downs, 1957). These approaches capture 
interactions between politicians, who provide transfers to the constituency and voters, who 
provide political support for politicians (Swinnen, 1994). All of these explanations are 
based on the rational choice paradigm. They treat the policy making process just like any 
other economic activity, where actors (politicians, lobbyist, voters, and bureaucrats) seek to 
maximize their self-interest in the political environment by responding to incentives and 
constraints (De Gorter and Swinnen, 2002: 1902). 
Recent quantitative approaches have modeled legislative bargaining under different 
constitutional rules to capture interactions among politicians (Henning and Struve, 2007). 
The publication of the data set on the nominal rate of assistance mentioned above motivated 
researchers to consider new explanatory variables: political ideology (defined as right wing, 
center, and left wing) (Dutt and Mitra, 2005, 2010), regime type, and constitutional rules 
(Olper and Raimondi, 2010). Dutt and Mitra (2010) employed a political support function 
and median voter approach to identify political economy drivers in the evolution of 
international trade policies with respect to agriculture. They found that in poor countries, 
where there is higher labor employment in the agricultural sector, a left wing government 
relative to a right wing government is more likely to provide assistance to agriculture 
(Dutt and Mitra, 2010). Regarding protection, they found that in rich countries, a left wing 
government will want to protect the agricultural sector and in poor countries a left wing 
government will not (Dutt and Mitra, 2010). Olper (2010) also investigated how agricultural 
land ownership inequality and government ideology (right wing versus left wing) affect 
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agricultural protection and found that protection is decreasing with land inequality and with 
left wing government orientation. The study suggests that in a relatively unequal society, a 
left wing government tends to support agriculture. 
 
1.3.2 Limitations of the quantitative research approaches 
The political economy analyses in the 1980s and 1990s have presented a large 
variety of arguments and variables derived from different types of models (see Swinnen, 
2010). Yet, as discussed by De Gorter and Swinnen (2002), a fundamental limitation in 
quantitative economic approaches, partly due to methodology, is the “observational 
equivalence” problem. That is, more than one model can explain the same outcome (see 
Birner and Resnick, 2010). For example, the commonality between the “influence function” 
of the lobby group models and the “support function” of the politician-voter models may not 
allow one to distinguish between the two models (De Gorter and Swinnen, 2002: 1910). 
Another limitation of the quantitative economic models is the “as- if” assumption, 
suggesting that the behavior of policy makers and other interest groups can be explained 
by assuming that they optimize as assumed in the models, even though their actual rationale 
of action may be different (Birner and Resnick, 2010). Since these models do not capture the 
factors that actually drive political decision-making, such as policy beliefs and perceptions, 
the quantitative political economy models have limitations regarding their suitability to form 
the basis for providing specific policy recommendations and understanding specific policy 
contexts (Birner and Resnick, 2010). The above mentioned problem of observational 
equivalence and the narrow focus on the self-interest assumption in the dominant 
quantitative political economy literature makes these approaches less suitable for explaining 
the long- standing controversies in African agricultural policy-making, particularly if the 
aim is to identify strategies on how to resolve those policy controversies. 
 
1.3.3 Qualitative research approaches  
While qualitative approaches offer useful methods to understand a particular policy 
context, they are less suited for explaining aggregate agricultural policy patterns and changes 
over time. Earlier qualitative studies in the political science literature that aimed at 
explaining agricultural policy choices in Africa focused on self-interest and patronage 
explanations, suggesting that policy makers implement policies that reward their clientelistic 
networks in order to stay in power (Bates, 1981; Van de Walle, 2001). Bates (1981) 
highlighted aspects of these patronage activities in Africa as government interventionist 
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polices in issuing import permits, fixing market prices, and controlling exchange rates. 
Recent contributions in the qualitative literature make an important contribution to 
describing the interactions between donors and domestic policy makers, and in explaining 
how such interactions influence policy choices, implementation, or a lack of implementation 
(Harrigan, 2003; Jayne et al., 2002; Poulton, 2014; Rwamigisa et al., 2013). For instance, 
Harrigan (2003) examined agricultural reform policies in Malawi and found shifting in 
policy positions regarding input subsidies between donors and domestic policy makers, 
which she describes as “U-turns”. Harrigan (2003) described another phenomenon as “full 
circles”, representing instances when the government of Malawi moved back to its 
interventionism of the 1970s and principal donors, particularly the World Bank, retreated 
toward state minimalism of the 1980s. 
The role of policy beliefs in influencing policy choices has also been identified in 
previous qualitative studies (see Krueger et al., 1991; Krueger, 1996). Krueger's (1996: 166) 
cross-country project found that the belief that “modernization” can only be achieved 
through “industrialization” was a key factor determining initial agricultural policies in 
developing countries. Krueger's (1992) work suggests that policy makers select policies 
based on their beliefs (Krueger et al., 1991; Krueger, 1996), however, empirical research on 
the role of policy beliefs of different policy makers is largely missing in qualitative policy 
research, although it has been widely acknowledged in the policy science literature (see 
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). 
 
1.3.4 Conceptual framework 
This section presents the conceptual framework that has been developed to provide 
overall guidance to the cross-cutting analysis of the case studies included in this thesis. 
 
1.3.4.1   Overview 
As identified in the review of the quantitative and qualitative political economy of 
the agricultural economics literature in the previous section, dominant explanations for 
agricultural policy choices have used the rational choice paradigm or self-interest. However, 
as Orren (1988: 13) states, “people do not act simply on the basis of their perceived self-
interest, without regard to the aggregate consequences of their actions. They are also 
motivated by values, purposes, ideas, goals, and commitments that transcend self-interest”. 
As Schlager (1995) also notes, fixed preferences alone or a narrow view on self- interest is 
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not sufficient to explain human behavior, particularly political decisions in policy making 
and implementation, where decisions may have multiple causes. Acknowledging the 
important role of policy beliefs in policy making, the analysis in this thesis applies the 
Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) developed by Sabatier and Jenkins- Smith (1993). 
The ACF captures the broad spectrum of the policy process through multiple concepts; 
including policy beliefs (see Figure 1.7). Other frameworks, such as the Institutional 
Analysis and Development Framework (IAD), could be applied for this type of analysis, as 
well, but they do not emphasize policy beliefs. The IAD framework organizes inquiry into 
institutions and is compatible with the neoclassical economic theory of bounded rationality, 
but it pays less attention to the role of policy beliefs (see Schlager, 1995: 253). 
The framework applied in this study combines the ACF developed by Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Sabatier, 1988) with the discourse 
analysis approach developed by Hajer (1995) and Van Dijk (2004), and narrative policy 
analysis approach developed by Roe (see Roe, 1994). The ACF was developed as an 
alternative to the top-down (stages heuristic) approaches in the policy implementation 
literature and provides a framework to explain the policy process (Jenkins-Smith and 
Sabatier, 1994: 178; Weible, Sabatier, and McQueen, 2009). The different concepts of the 
policy subsystem, policy beliefs, policy coalitions, policy-oriented learning, and policy 
change makes the ACF particularly suitable to explain contested agricultural policy debates 
(Jenkins-Smith, Nohrstedt, Weible, and Sabatier, 2014). The ACF also has a dominant focus 
on actors’ beliefs and interests in driving policy preferences, compared to the IAD 
framework where self-interest is the dominant driver of preferences (Schlager, 1995). To 
capture the perceptions of policy actors and to identify their policy beliefs, the discourse 
analysis and the narrative policy analysis approaches serve as the main analytical tools.3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 The overall research approach combines both quantitative and qualitative approaches (mixed analysis). 
With this approach, we identify with a pragmatism research paradigm. That is, we apply appropriate methods 
to answer our research questions. This approach is important as diverse policy actors have different viewpoints 
and personal values. We acknowledge the paradigm differences of the ACF (positivism), discourse analysis 
(constructivism), narrative policy analysis (post-positivism), and multinomial logit (positivism). However, the 
latter refers to our conceptual and analytical approaches. There is no conflict here as paradigms are not 
mutually exclusive and can sometimes overlap. This also agrees with Guba and Lincoln (1994: 105), who 
stated that “questions of method are secondary to questions of paradigm, which we define as the basic belief 
system or worldview that guides the investigator.” 
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Figure 1.7: Conceptual framework 
Source: Adapted from Birner et al. (2011: 22) and Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier (1994: 181). 
 
 
1.3.4.2   Discourse and narrative policy analysis 
Discourse analysis and narrative policy analysis are two important analytical 
concepts applied in this study. They are both a communicative process where a set of ideas 
and beliefs are expressed as a written or verbal product (Van Dijk, 1998). Narrative policy 
analysis and discourse analysis approaches serve the critical purpose of unveiling the 
perceptions, goals, and value priorities that actors deploy in a dynamic policy landscape 
(Shanahan et al., 2011). 
Discourses refer to a set of ideas or beliefs expressed primarily through the use of 
language (Van Dijk, 1998). Following Van Dijk (1998), this thesis applies discourse 
analysis to identify policy beliefs. The study of discourses also shows that actors who 
engage in the communicative process on the one hand have a positive self-representation of 
their beliefs, goals, and values, but on the other hand have a negative representation of the 
others’ beliefs, goals, and values (Van Dijk, 1998). Discourses can be analyzed as texts 
(Fairclough, 1995), frames (Schön and Rein, 1994), and story-lines (Hajer, 1995, 
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2006). Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis approach examines texts, and relationship 
between discourse and social agents (Fairclough, 2003). This approach aims at promoting a 
“social change” and has been used in analyzing issues related to sexual harassment, 
racism, and injustice (Fairclough, 2005). A recent study on European Union agricultural 
policy has applied critical discourse analysis to examine public texts about the common 
agricultural policy (Erjavec and Erjavec, 2009). This study draws on Hajer’s approach of 
discourse analysis, which identifies story-lines and metaphors in discourses. Examining 
the story- lines and metaphors in the discourses is more suitable for this study than 
Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis approach. Metaphor represents an emblem of a 
general issue expressing it in a way everyone understands (Hajer, 2006). Discourses with 
similar story- lines combines to form discourse coalitions (Hajer, 2006). The concept of 
discourse coalitions is central in determining actors and examining their policy beliefs. In 
this case, Hajer’s discourse analysis approach better provides an analytical tool for 
determining coalitions and examining policy beliefs as described in the ACF. The concept of 
story-lines in discourses is further discussed in the narrative policy analysis approach below. 
Similar to discourse analysis, narrative policy analysis draws on literary theory that 
focuses on analyzing language use. It provides a systematic framework for analyzing the 
policy narratives of policy actors. Two main epistemological approaches have been used in 
analyzing policy narratives: positivist and poststructuralist (Jones and McBeth, 2010; 
Van Eeten, 2007). The positivist orientation to narrative policy analysis applies a 
systematic analytical approach and often formulates a set of testable hypotheses and code 
text (Jones et al., 2013; McBeth et al., 2007; Shanahan, Jones, and McBeth, 2011). In these 
studies, narratives are characterized by: (i) the context or setting where the policy problem 
is defined; (ii) the plot or sequence of events; (iii) characters or policy actors; and (iv) 
policy solutions or the moral of the issue (Jones and McBeth, 2010; Prior et al., 
2012). Most studies have often taken a poststructuralist orientation based on language use 
as the unit of analysis (Feldman, Skoldberg, Brown, and Horner, 2004; Fischer, 2003; Hajer, 
2005; Roe, 1994; Stone, 2012; Van Dijk, 2004; Yanow, 2000). In identifying policy actors’ 
story- lines and non-stories, Roe's (1994) approach of narrative policy analysis is followed 
in this thesis. This approach is based on an interpretative analysis of policy actors’ use of 
language as the unit of analysis. This method has been selected because it is particularly 
useful for policy problems characterized by uncertainty, complexity, and polarization.  
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Complexity follows from the intricacies of the problem and the interrelatedness 
of the policy issues, while polarization refers to the concentration of groups around policy 
issues (Roe, 1994). These attributes justify the use of narrative policy analysis and 
contribute to identifying stories and non-stories as constructed by contending policy actors 
(Roe, 1994; Yanow, 2000). Since the agricultural policy landscape involves multiple actors 
interacting in a policy environment, examining the story-lines and non-stories of policy 
actors is beneficial for understanding policy beliefs. Roe's (1994: 3-4) narrative policy 
analysis approach follows four steps: (i) identifying conventional narratives (stories) of 
interest; (ii) identifying “non-stories”; (iii) comparing stories and non-stories to generate a 
“meta- narrative” based on the comparison; and (iv) determining how the meta-narrative 
recasts the issue to make it more amendable to policy making. Steps (i) and (ii) focus on 
analyzing the current situation, whereas steps (iii) and (iv) can help to identify solutions 
for long- standing policy debates. 
Two forms of coalitions are identified in the literature: discourse coalitions, a 
concept developed by Van Dijk (1997), and advocacy coalitions, a concept developed by 
Sabatier and Jenkins Smith (see Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014). A discourse coalition is defined 
as an ensemble of story-lines, the actors that utter the story-lines, and the practices through 
which the story-line is expressed (Hajer, 2006). The concept of the discourse coalition 
has some similarities to the concept of the advocacy coalition in the ACF. In contrast 
to the advocacy coalition, actors in a discourse coalition may not necessarily engage in 
a joint political action, but by sharing a discourse, discourse coalitions are able to shape 
political debates and peoples’ opinions (Birner et al., 2011). This thesis uses the 
broader concept of discourse coalitions and acknowledges that agricultural policy actors 
who share a common discourse may not necessarily engage in joint political actions. This 
thesis applies the concept of policy beliefs developed by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993). 
Empirical research has shown that advocacy coalitions can be rather stable over time, 
especially if core policy beliefs are not in dispute, although members of coalitions can leave 
a particular coalition (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014). 
 
1.3.4.3   Policy belief system 
The policy belief system is a central concept applied in the conceptual framework 
of this thesis. A policy belief system can “involve value priorities, perceptions of important 
relationships, perceptions of world states (including the magnitude of the problem), and 
perceptions of the efficacy of policy instruments” (Sabatier, 1988: 132). In the ACF, beliefs 
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are classified into a hierarchical, tri-partite structure: (i) deep core beliefs, which are 
difficult to change; (ii) core beliefs that change more easily than deep core beliefs and 
represent causal perceptions across an entire policy domain (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, 
1994); and (iii) secondary beliefs, which can be changed most easily (Sabatier and 
Weible, 2007). Beliefs of policy actors are compared to religious beliefs – like a “glue” 
holding actors together and enabling them to pursue common goals and influence political 
outcomes (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993; Grindle and Thomas, 1989; Orren, 1988). In 
the ACF, actors who share a set of policy beliefs form a coalition, and operate within a 
policy subsystem (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, 1994). The coalition members with similar 
beliefs interact and engage in a significant degree of coordination to influence policy in a 
subsystem (Elgin and Weible, 2013; Weible et al., 2009). A policy subsystem consists 
of government officials, interest groups, researchers, and private sector actors concerned 
with a policy problem (Weible, 2007). The coalitions in the subsystem form beliefs about 
possible solutions and coordinate their activities in the policy process (Weible, 2007). This 
broad concept of the ACF captures the multiple actors involved in the policy landscape. 
 
1.3.4.4   Policy-oriented learning 
Policy-oriented learning is a central concept within the ACF and is defined as 
“enduring alternations of thought or behavioral intentions that result from experiences and 
which are concerned with the attainment or revision of the precepts of the belief system of 
individuals or of collectives” (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014: 198; Jenkins-Smith and 
Sabatier, 1994: 182). The ACF assumes that learning is instrumental for coalition members 
to better understand the world and associated solutions, and it also use political strategies for 
achieving policy objectives (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014; Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, 1994). 
Achieving cross-coalition learning depends on the extent to which policy actors perceive a 
threat to their core policy beliefs (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014: 199). At low and high levels 
of conflict, there is little cross-coalition learning (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014: 199). At a low 
level of conflict, actors focus on their policy sub-system affairs, while at a high level of 
conflict, actors defend their positions and reject information that undermines their policy 
beliefs (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014: 199). However, an intermediate level of conflict 
increases the livelihood of cross-coalition learning, as opposing coalitions are threatened 
just enough to attend to the issues and remain receptive enough to new information 
(Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014: 199). 
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Policy learning can take place in forums (conferences and workshops) where 
coalitions can interact, debate, and negotiate (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014: 199). Conflicting 
policy beliefs among coalitions in a policy subsystem can be mediated by policy brokers to 
facilitate cross-coalitions policy learning (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014; Jenkins-Smith and 
Sabatier, 1994). The aim of promoting policy-oriented learning is to facilitate policy change. 
In the context of this thesis, identifying the different discourse coalitions and their policy 
beliefs is beneficial for understanding how to alter policy beliefs to facilitate cross- coalition 
learning and promote policy change. 
 
1.3.4.5   Policy change 
One of the central aims of the ACF is to contribute to the understanding of policy 
change and stability (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014). “The ACF assumes that governmental 
programs are translation of policy-oriented beliefs and can be conceptualized and measured 
hierarchically like belief system” (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014: 201). In the ACF, policy 
change is classified into “major policy change” involving alterations in core aspects of 
policy beliefs and “minor policy change” involving alterations in secondary aspects of 
policy beliefs (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014: 201). The level of change of a governmental 
program is measured by the extent to which alterations deviate from previous policies and 
includes revisions of existing programs, termination of programs, or launching of new 
programs (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014). In the context of this thesis, the launching of input 
subsidy programs or reversing of marketing parastatals in developing countries are typical 
policy changes. 
Actors in the advocacy coalition often disagree or engage policy debates due to 
divergence in policy preferences regarding initiatives to either preserve or change 
governmental programs (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014). The ACF identifies four pathways to 
policy change (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014: 202-203). The first pathway is through external 
sources, which involve an external shock, crisis, or event outside of the subsystem. In the 
context of agricultural policies, the world food crises of 2008 may have contributed to the 
resurgence of input subsidy programs. The second pathway is through internal events, 
which include internal issues, such as scandal, fiascoes, and failures that are likely to affect 
policy beliefs. Such “internal events can be expected to confirm the policy core beliefs of 
minority coalition, and increase doubts about core beliefs of dominant coalitions and bring 
into question the effectiveness of their policies” (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014: 201). In the 
contested agricultural policy debates, while some actors argue for strong state support, 
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others have criticized the state focused policies and favor market-oriented strategies. 
Experience with managerial issues confronting state service or inadequate access to inputs 
in rural areas due to less developed private markets could influence internal policy beliefs of 
the actors, leading to certain policy preferences. The third pathway is through policy- 
oriented learning, which is thought of as serving an “enlightenment function” by gradually 
altering the concepts and assumptions of subsystem actors. The fourth pathway is through 
negotiated agreements between different coalitions. In the ACF, negotiation can take place 
when different coalitions perceive the status quo to be unacceptable (Weible and Nohrstedt, 
2012). 
 
1.4 Research topics and overview of the thesis 
As explained above, the main rationale of this thesis is the proposition that a narrow 
focus on self-interest as the prevailing explanation of agricultural policy choices in Africa 
limits the value of such explanatory approaches. This is especially the case, if the goal is to 
identify strategies for resolving long-standing disputes, with a view of moving towards 
more effective policy implementations. The broad objective of the thesis examines 
agricultural policy processes; covering policy formulation, policy adoption, and policy 
implementation. The first objective examines the role of policy belief and discourse in 
policy formulation. This objective is divided into two parts: first, explaining the contested 
agricultural policy debates by examining the “overshooting” problem (explained in Chapter 
1.2), and second, examining the prevailing “stories” and “non-stories” of the contested 
agricultural policy debates. The second objective deals with how policy beliefs translate 
into policy programs by examining two agricultural policy processes to determine the policy 
actors, and explain the prevailing policy discourses. The third objective examines policy 
implementation, aiming to analyze the effects of market-oriented policy reforms in the 
provision of animal health services. Based on the outlined objectives, this cumulative 
thesis examines the role that policy beliefs and policy discourses of different actors play 
in determining policy choices. 
As the literature review shows, this topic has been largely neglected in the 
agricultural economics and political science literature on the political economy of 
agricultural policies in Africa. To meet the main objectives of the thesis, five empirical 
case studies were conducted in Ghana, Kenya, Senegal, and Uganda. Through the inclusion 
of different types of case studies, the thesis covers the entire spectrum from policy 
formulation to policy implementation. The case studies are presented in Chapters 2 through 
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6 of this thesis. The first two case studies deal with policy formulation, the third case study 
deals with the adoption of policies, and the last two case studies deals with policy 
implementation. 
In Chapter 2, the topic “Donors and Domestic Policy Makers: Two Worlds in 
Agricultural Policy Making” is examined. This chapter aims to explain the contested 
agricultural policy debates by examining the “overshooting” problem. Chapter 3 is titled 
“Agricultural Development Policy Debates: Who has the Better Story?” This chapter deals 
with a similar topic by examining the prevailing “stories” and “non-stories” of the contested 
agricultural policy debates. These chapters aim at examining the role of policy discourses 
and policy beliefs in the policy process; focusing on policy formulation. These research 
topics examine agricultural policy making using Ghana, Uganda, and Senegal as case study 
examples. The combination of discourse analysis and the Advocacy Coalition Framework, 
as outlined above, guides the analysis. Transcripts of in-depth interviews conducted with 
policy stakeholders in Ghana, Uganda, and Senegal are the main empirical basis of the 
analysis. The interview questions were framed around broad initial questions on 
agricultural sector constraints and policy instruments to solve the problems (See Appendix 
4.1). Using the Advocacy Coalition Framework, the policy coalitions and their policy 
beliefs were examined through discourse and narrative policy analysis. The analytical 
procedure combines qualitative discourse analysis to identify the policy themes, cluster 
analysis to identify the coalitions, and factor analysis (principal component analysis) to 
examine agricultural policy beliefs. 
Chapter 4 examines how policy beliefs translate into policy programs, using a case 
study in Ghana. This chapter is titled, “Agricultural development policy making: What are 
the policy processes and who are the influential actors?” The analysis focuses on two 
major agricultural programs in Ghana: the Block Farms Program and the agricultural 
investment program developed under CAADP, called the Medium Term Agriculture Sector 
Investment Plan (METASIP). A participatory mapping of the process leading to the policy 
programs (called Process Net-Map) was combined with in-depth interviews of policy 
experts (Appendix 4.1). 
After having covered policy formulation and policy adoption, the last two case 
studies deal with policy implementation. They focus on animal health services, a field in 
which the case study countries had already implemented policy reforms that largely 
followed donor prescriptions to reduce government involvement and promote privatization. 
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The two case studies serve to analyze the effects of these reforms in relation to prevailing 
policy beliefs regarding the potential positive and negative effects of privatization. Chapter 
5 is titled “Providing Animal Health Services to the Poor in Northern Ghana: Rethinking 
the Role of Community Animal Health Workers?” This study was conducted in a 
marginalized livestock production area in the northern region of Ghana. Chapter 6 is titled 
“Are Government Veterinary Paraprofessionals Serving the Poor? The Perceptions of 
Smallholder Livestock Farmers in Western Kenya.” This chapter deals with animal health 
service provision in a high-potential dairy production area. The two case studies analyze 
animal health delivery systems used by livestock keepers after the implementation of 
market-oriented reforms. Data were collected through surveys of livestock keepers in the 
study countries (see Appendix 4.2). A multinomial logit model was applied to determine 
the factors influencing livestock keepers’ choice of alternative animal health service 
providers. 
The thesis has two final chapters that bring the insights from the five case studies 
together and analyze them through a cross-cutting perspective, using the conceptual 
framework presented above. Chapter 7 discusses the results against the background of the 
existing literature. The limitations of the case studies are discussed in Chapter 7. Chapter 8 
derives overall conclusions and policy implications, focusing on strategies that have 
potential to address the long-standing debates on agricultural policies in Africa. 
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Abstract 
 
In recent decades, many developing countries have moved from taxing their 
agricultural sector to subsidizing it, a phenomenon referred to as “overshooting”. Using 
Ghana and Uganda as case study countries, this study aims to contribute to explaining this 
phenomenon by examining the role of policy beliefs. The study is based on the Advocacy 
Coalition Framework and relies on discourse analysis as analytical method. In-depth 
interviews with policy actors in both countries served as empirical basis. A quantitative 
analysis of the transcripts was used to identify different discourse coalitions, and a 
qualitative analysis was conducted to examine the discourses and identify their underlying 
policy beliefs. The paper identified far-reaching differences in the agricultural policy beliefs 
between domestic policy makers and donors regarding the question: What does it actually 
take to develop smallholder agriculture? The evidence from this analysis highlights the role 
that divergent policy beliefs can play in influencing agricultural policy choices. 
Key words:  Agricultural input subsidies, Smallholder agriculture, Policy beliefs,  
Discourse analysis, Agricultural policies, Africa 
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2.1 Introduction 
In recent years, there has been a renewed interest among donors and domestic policy 
makers in promoting agricultural development in Africa. This is evident from policy 
initiatives such as the Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Program (CAADP), 
the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), and TerrAfrica. There is general 
agreement that agricultural productivity needs to be improved to promote agricultural 
development on the continent (World Bank, 2007). Yet, the choices of policy instruments 
that are suitable to achieve this goal remain subject to a highly contested debate. In 
particular, there is no agreement on the role of government interventions, such as input 
subsidies. Fertilizer subsidies are the most prominent case in this debate. The controversy 
between the Government of Malawi and donors on fertilizer subsidies made it to the front 
page of the New York Times (New York Times, 2007). Fertilizer subsidies are, however, 
only one way be which African governments support agriculture. In Uganda, for example, 
the government recently implemented “Operation Wealth Creation” (OWC), a program that 
is managed by the Uganda Army, which distributes coffee seedlings, maize seeds, animals 
of improved breeds as well as post-harvest equipment to farmers free of charge 
(MAAIF, 2015). To quote another example, Ghana has since 2007 operated a so- called 
“Block Farms Program”, under which beneficiaries, preferably young farmers, are 
supposed to cultivate adjacent fields (“blocks”), for which they receive not only 
government-subsidized fertilizer, but also seeds and mechanization services (Benin et al., 
2012). 
The proponents of such policies argue that they are necessary to increase agricultural 
productivity in view of widespread market failure in smallholder agriculture. While the 
critics hold that they are not very effective, due to governance challenges such as elite 
capture and corruption, among other reasons, and that they crowd out more profitable 
investments in agricultural productivity, i.e., in infrastructure (see review by Jayne and 
Rashid, 2013). The critics often argue that governments implement such programs mainly 
for political reasons, using them as a strategy to win elections (Jayne and Rashid, 2013: 
551). This explanation of the preference of African governments for such policy instruments 
fit well with the prevailing explanations for agricultural policy choices in the agricultural 
economics and political sciences literature. As further detailed in Section 2, the agricultural 
economics literature is based on models that use self-interest of voters and politicians as 
main behavioral assumption, known as the rational-choice paradigm. The political 
science literature has also focused on the political incentives of the ruling elite to stay in 
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power, e.g., through clientelistic networks (Van de Walle, 2001), when explaining 
agricultural policy choices. 
The main objective of this paper is to contribute to a deeper understanding of the 
debate on agricultural policy choices in African agriculture by highlighting the role that 
policy beliefs play, next to material and political interests. The paper does not argue that 
such interests are not relevant, they clearly are, but explanations that focus on interests only 
miss an important dimension of policy making. Policy belief systems can be understood to 
“include value priorities, perceptions of important relationships, perceptions of world states 
(including the magnitude of the problem), perceptions of the efficacy of policy 
instruments, etc.” (Sabatier, 1988: 132). In the political science literature, the role of ideas 
and policy beliefs in explaining policy choices and facilitating political action has long 
been acknowledged and documented (Böcher, 2012; Grindle and Thomas, 1989; Goldstein 
and Keohane, 1993; Orren, 1988; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1994). 
The paper argues that a better understanding of the role of policy beliefs can move 
the current debate about agricultural policy choices in Africa beyond the current impasse, by 
which donors criticize governments for using input subsidies, but cannot ultimately 
prevent them from doing so. This focus has hindered a more fruitful dialogue on ways in 
which such policy instruments could be used more strategically and effectively, e.g., by 
developing better targeting mechanisms (cf. Jayne and Rashid, 2013). To contribute to a 
better understanding of the role of policy beliefs in policy making, the paper presents an 
empirical case study of agricultural policy beliefs in two countries: Ghana and Uganda. 
These countries have been selected because they have comparatively high levels of 
government support to agriculture and are, therefore, well suited for an analysis of this 
topic (see Section 2.2). 
The contribution of the paper has to be seen against the background that the role of 
policy beliefs has not received much attention in the agricultural policy literature. A notable 
exception is the classical study on the political economy of agricultural pricing policy 
by Krueger (Krueger, 1992, see also Krueger, Schiff, and Valdés, 1991). Analyzing the 
narratives on the political economy of agricultural policy choices in the different countries 
included in that study, Krueger showed that the beliefs of policy makers about the effects 
of different policy instruments played an important role in explaining agricultural policy 
choices. Dominant beliefs about the effect of cheap food prices on industrialization strongly 
influenced the choice of agricultural policy instruments in developing countries in the early 
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post-independence period (Krueger, 1992). An important insight of this analysis was that 
policy instruments implemented to achieve this goal often had effects that the policy-makers 
did not anticipate, partly because they neglected the administrative challenges of 
implementing them. Rather than withdrawing the original instrument, policy-makers often 
implemented additional policy instruments to counteract unwanted effects, a strategy that 
tended to exacerbate unwanted effects. Krueger (1992: 130) used the term “whoops-
theory” to describe such type of policy making that is based on inaccurate policy beliefs 
about the effect of specific policy instruments. 
Subsequent studies on agricultural policy choices largely neglected the role of policy 
beliefs. In their 1997 review of the literature on the political economy of agricultural 
policies, Binswanger and Deininger, (1997: 1999) found that “knowledge of impacts of 
ideas as generators and facilitators of policy change still remains poorly integrated across 
subfields and schools of sciences where further research is needed.” 
In the meantime, some quantitative cross-country studies have included variables 
that capture political ideology and they found rather complex interactions between 
ideologies, political institution, economic structure and agricultural protection (see review 
by Swinnen, 2010a). These studies referred to a rather broad classification into left-wing 
and right-wing ideologies. There is a lack of empirical research that identifies the policy 
beliefs that different actors involved in agricultural policy making processes have with 
regard to different policy instruments. 
This paper addresses this knowledge gap by conducting a case study of policy 
beliefs in Ghana and Uganda, which is based on in-depth interviews with 67 actors involved 
in agricultural policy processes. The Advocacy Coalition Framework (Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith, 1994) is applied with discourse analysis (Van Dijk, 1998; Hajer, 1995, 2006) as 
analytical method. A quantitative analysis was used to identify different discourses and 
discourse coalitions, and a qualitative analysis was conducted to examine the different 
discourses and identify their underlying policy beliefs. Using this approach, the paper was 
able to provide a differentiated picture of the policy beliefs held by different actors and to 
derive implications for agricultural policy making that should be helpful to address the 
impasse mentioned above. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 presents a literature review. Section 
2.3 describes the research methodology and Section 2.4 presents the results. In Section 2.5, 
the results are discussed and Section 2.6 draws some conclusions. 
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2.2 Explaining agricultural policy choices: Insights from the literature 
This section starts with a brief review of the evidence on the aggregated effect of 
agricultural policy choices in developing countries, with special reference to the case study 
countries, followed by an overview of the existing approaches to explain those policy 
choices. 
 
2.2.1 Patterns of agricultural policy choices 
The study by Krueger, Schiff, and Valdés (1991) quoted above showed that up to 
the 1980s, developing countries generally selected policy instruments that resulted in a 
taxation of their agricultural sector, while industrialized countries supported it. The study 
also revealed that developing countries tended to tax in particular export commodities, 
while at the same time supporting import-competing commodities, especially food crops. A 
follow-up study by Anderson (2009) revealed that this pattern has substantially changed 
since the 1980s. The study used the Nominal Rate of Assistance (NRA) as aggregate 
measure of the effect of a country’s policy choices. NRA is defined as the percentage by 
which government policies have raised gross returns to farmers above what they would 
have been without the government’s intervention (Anderson and Masters 2009: 11).4 The 
study showed that industrialized countries have substantially reduced their support to 
agriculture. Developing countries have generally stopped the taxation of export crops, but 
they continued to support important competing crops, though at lower rates than was the 
case in the 1980s. As a result, developing countries are, on the average, now also supporting 
their agricultural sector. The move from overall negative to positive rates of assistance 
to agriculture has been described as “overshooting”, i.e. moving from negative into positive 
assistance to agriculture, rather than stopping at zero rates. This “overshooting” is the 
consequence of using instruments such as input subsidies that were discussed in the 
introduction. This phenomenon is heavily criticized in the agricultural economics literature. 
Anderson and Masters (2009: 63) express this concern as follows: “A fundamental concern 
in agricultural policy over time as economies progress toward becoming middle-income, 
though, is overshooting. In response to rural poverty and inequality, many countries start 
protecting agriculture soon after they stop taxing it. This imposes large costs on 
consumers, and slows national economic growth.” 
 
4
 The NRA measurement is useful to compare the net effect of policies on prices and incentives across a range 
of commodities, years and countries (Anderson and Masters, 2009: 13). A negative NRA values mean a net 
taxation of farmers or subsidies to consumers. 
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There are, however, considerable differences between continents. In the period from 
2000 to 2005, the NRA for import-competing agricultural commodities was 1.6 percent in 
Africa as compared to 26.5 percent in South Asia (Anderson, 2009: 23). Agricultural policy 
choices in the two case study countries, Ghana and Uganda, have followed the general 
pattern, but they had already “overshot” far more than the average of Sub-Saharan African 
countries, the reason to select them as case study countries as indicated above. The NRA 
rates for import-competing commodities5 in the period of 2000 to 2004 were 35.8 percent in 
Ghana (Brooks et al., 2009) and 15 percent in Uganda (Matthews et al., 2009: 348) (see 
Appendix 2.4). 
Ghana started cocoa sector reforms as part of a general market liberalization 
program initiated in 1983, following a financial crisis. The reforms allowed private licensed 
companies to purchase cocoa from farmers, but the state cocoa marketing board remains 
the single exporter of cocoa in Ghana (Birner and Resnick, 2010). Since the reforms, there 
has been a gradual increase in the producer prices paid to cocoa farmers, but in the period 
from 2000 to 2004, the NRA to cocoa was still approximately 20 percent. However, while 
keeping the producer price below the world market price, the government has increased 
input subsidies aimed at increasing yields, e.g., through a ‘cocoa mass spraying’ program 
(Birner and Resnick, 2010). The support to import-competing products, which had reached 
NRA rates as high as 70 percent in the 1980s, was gradually reduced as a consequence of 
the structural adjustment program. It reached almost zero in 1992 (Brooks et al, 2009: 433). 
Since then, the support has been increasing, as indicated above. Most policy instruments 
implemented in recent years have focused on the provision of inputs. As mentioned in 
the introduction, Ghana introduced the Block Farms Program in 2007. In the same year, 
the government introduced the Agricultural Mechanization Service Centers (AMSEC) 
program. Under this program, private companies receive five tractors and complementary 
implements under highly subsidized conditions, supposedly to provide mechanization 
services to smallholder farmers (Benin et. al., 2012). This program takes into account 
that it would not be economic to provide tractors directly to smallholder farmers, since 
tractors do not pay off unless they are used at a certain scale. Therefore, a service 
provider model is pursued with this program. A National Food Buffer Stock program has 
been set up to purchase output from farmers at a guaranteed minimum price. Fertilizer 
 
5 Import competing commodities consist of tradable and mixed tradable farm products. The import competing 
commodities covered in the NRA estimation for Ghana were rice, maize and groundnut and for Uganda 
were rice, maize, bean and sugar (see Anderson and Masters, 2009: 348 and432). 
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subsidies, which had been abolished in the early 1990s, were also re-introduced on a large 
scale in the 2000s (Benin et al., 2012). 
Uganda initiated its Structural Adjustment Program in 1987, leading to a shift from a 
state-controlled to a liberalized market system. The government abolished all coffee taxes 
and introduced private sector participation in the purchase and export of coffee to the 
international market (Anderson and Masters, 2009). As in the case of Ghana, import- 
competing products have received increasing government support in recent years. Most 
notably, in 2006 the President of Uganda initiated the Prosperity for All (PFA) or ‘Bonna 
Bagagawale’ program, which provides highly subsidized inputs such fertilizer, improved 
seeds, livestock and tractors to farmers (MAAIF, 2011). A common feature of such 
programs is that inputs are supposedly provided on credit, but the repayment rates are very 
low (Rwamigisa et al., 2013). As mentioned in the introduction, the government introduced 
“Operation Wealth Creation” in 2015. 
 
2.2.2 Political economy explanations 
This section provides a brief review of the literature in agricultural economics and 
political science that has aimed to explain the patterns of policy choices identified above. A 
distinction is made between quantitative and qualitative research approaches. 
 
2.2.2.1   Quantitative approaches 
There is a substantial body of quantitative literature that has aimed to explain the 
observed patterns of agricultural policy choices and their changes over time. This literature 
has been extensively reviewed (Binswanger and Deininger, 1997, De Gorter and Swinnen, 
2002; Birner and Resnick, 2010; Swinnen 2010a, 2010b; Anderson et al., 2013); hence, a 
brief overview seems sufficient here. Prior to the publication of the new data set on 
distortions to agricultural incentives (Anderson, 2010), the political economy literature was 
concerned with explaining the “paradox” that developing countries taxed their agricultural 
sector while industrialized countries supported it. Early explanatory approaches focused on 
differences in the ability of rural and urban groups of society to overcome the collective 
action problem of organizing themselves as political interest groups and to exercise political 
pressure (De Gorter and Swinnen, 2002; Olson, 1965, 1990). A second major group of 
approaches to explain the “paradox” focused on the interaction of voters, or groups of 
voters, with politicians (politician–voter models or voter support models) (Becker, 1983; 
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De Gorter and Tsur, 1991; Swinnen, 1994). A further development in this literature was 
a class of models that explicitly capture interactions among politicians, for example, by 
modeling legislative bargaining under different constitutional rules (Henning and Struve, 
2007). 
The publication of the data set on distortions to agricultural incentives (Anderson, 
2009) gave the impetus for a new set of political economy studies that aimed at explaining 
the policy changes described above that were revealed in the new data set (Anderson, 
2010). These explanations feature some factors that have been relatively neglected in the 
earlier literature, including constitutional rules and, as indicated above, questions of 
ideology (Dutt and Mitra, 2010; Olper, 2007). As indicated in the introduction, these studies 
found rather complex relations between ideology and other factors, but they only 
considered a broad classification of between left- and right-wing ideologies, rather than 
policy beliefs about specific instruments (Swinnen, 2010a). 
One limitation of these explanatory approaches is that they rest on the “as -if” 
assumption. As pointed out by Birner and Resnick (2010: 1447), these quantitative models 
explain policy choices “as-if” politicians and interest groups behave as assumed in these 
models. This approach is related to the problem of “observational equivalence” identified in 
the review by De Gorter and Swinnen, (2002). The same policy choice can often be 
explained by different models. While this approach has been extremely powerful in 
explaining general patterns of change over space and time, quantitative political economy 
models are less suitable for developing policy recommendations for a specific situation, 
since it remains unclear to what extent model assumptions correspond to actual behavior. 
This is relevant with regard to the concern of “overshooting” explained above. Without a 
better understanding of the reasons why policy makers select the policy instruments leading 
to this result it will be difficult to develop strategies to address it. 
 
2.2.2.2   Qualitative approaches 
In contrast to quantitative approaches, qualitative approaches are less suited to 
explain overall patterns of change, but they can contribute to a better understanding of why 
policy-makers chose a particular policy instrument in a particular situation. Moreover, 
qualitative can identify factors that have been rather neglected in the quantitative literature. 
One factor that features strongly in qualitative research on agricultural policy making is the 
interaction of domestic policy makers with international development organizations (see, 
e.g., Van de Walle, 2001; Jayne et al., 2002; Harrigan, 2003). These studies show that such 
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interactions, which have not been captured in the quantitative literature quoted above, have 
a far-reaching influence on the choice of agricultural policies and their implementation—or 
lack of implementation. A typical pattern emerging from this literature is that governments 
often promise of a policy reform as a precondition to access donor funds, but under internal 
political pressure, such reforms are then only partially implemented, or reversed. This 
literature points to the limited usefulness of donor efforts to impose agricultural policy 
reforms. 
As indicated in the introduction, the role of policy beliefs, a topic well suited for 
qualitative research approaches has been relatively neglected in the literature on agricultural 
policy choices, with the notable exception of Krueger (1992). The Advocacy Coalition 
Framework (ACF) mentioned above has predominantly been applied to analyze the role of 
policy beliefs in environmental policy making (Weible et al., 2009). Birner et al. (2011) used 
an adapted version of the ACF, in combination with discourse analysis, to study agricultural 
policy reforms in India. The study indicated that divergent policy beliefs on the causal 
effects of input subsidies played a major role in explaining an impasse in policy reforms 
that persisted for more than a decade. A similar methodological approach has been 
applied by Rwamigisa et al. (2013) for the case of agricultural policy reform in Uganda. 
This study underlined the role of divergent policy beliefs between donors and domestic 
policy makers in limiting the success of a major agricultural extension reform initiative 
in Uganda. The present study builds on these studies, but further develops the 
methodological approach, as indicated in the next section. 
 
2.3 Research methods 
This section first describes the conceptual framework used for this study, followed 
by an explanation of the empirical research methods that were applied. 
 
2.3.1 Conceptual framework 
The term discourse refers to a set of ideas or beliefs expressed primarily using 
language (Van Dijk, 1998). It is a communicative process where a set of ideas and beliefs 
are expressed as a written or verbal product (Van Dijk, 1998). Following Van Dijk, (1998), 
this study applies discourse analysis to identify policy beliefs. The study of discourses also 
shows that actors who engage in the communicative process on the one hand typically have 
a positive self-representation of their own beliefs, goals, and values but on the other hand 
have a negative representation of the beliefs, goals and values of others (Van Dijk, 1998). 
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To identify story-lines and metaphors in discourses, the study also draws on Hajer’s 
approach of discourse analysis (see Hajer, 1995, 2006). The use of metaphors and story- 
line plays a key role in constructing discourses. A story-line expresses the facts of a 
phenomenon, and it has a starting point, middle and an end (Hajer, 2006). A metaphor 
represents an emblem of a general issue expressing it in a way everyone understands (Hajer, 
2006). An ensemble of story-lines, the actors that utter the story-lines and the practices 
through which the story-line are expressed form a discourse coalition (Hajer, 2006: 70). 
A discourse coalition is identified when actors share common story-lines in their discourses. 
The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) developed by Sabatier and Jenkins- 
Smith, (1999), informed the identification of discourse coalitions in this study6. The ACF 
concept identifies policy actors in a policy subsystem who share a particular set of policy 
beliefs and act together on the basis of their shared beliefs. A policy subsystem is defined 
as a field of policy analysis consisting of government, private sector, academia, civil society 
organizations, and others, who are actively concerned with a policy problem (Jenkins-Smith 
and Sabatier, 1994; Weible et al., 2009). Actors in the policy subsystem who share a set of 
normative and causal beliefs can be grouped into an advocacy coalition (Jenkins-Smith 
and Sabatier, 1994). A coalition identifies a problem and forms beliefs about the policy 
instruments that could be used to address the problem. A belief system, as mentioned 
in the introduction, includes implicit theories about how to achieve certain objectives, 
perceptions about the efficacy of policy instruments, value priorities, and perceptions of 
important causal relationships (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, 1994; Majone, 1980; 
Sabatier, 1988). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 The major epistemological difference between Hajer’s discourse analysis and Sabatier’s Advocacy Coalition 
Framework is well noted in this study. Hajer used an approach based on social constructivism where 
policy beliefs are assumed to be constantly changing, while Sabatier’s ACF applies a positivist 
interpretation given a set of testable assumption of the policy making process, where policy core beliefs are 
assumed to remain stable overtime. Following Rwamigisa, Birner, Margaret and Semana, (2013), this paper is 
based on positivist approach where agricultural policy beliefs are seen to exist in the real world not as social 
construction. However the paper integrates social constructivist approach to discourse analysis by examining 
how language use helps to discover the policy beliefs of the policy actors.   
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2.3.2 Sampling procedure and interviews 
To apply the ACF and discourse analysis, a set of qualitative in-depth interviews 
was conducted in the two case study countries, Ghana and Uganda. The sampling procedure 
for the respondents started with mapping the stakeholder organizations in the agricultural 
policy landscape. Based on this map, policy experts from the respective organizations 
involved in agricultural policy making were contacted and interviewed. The respondents 
were selected through purposive sampling and aimed at accessing policy expert opinion. 
Additional respondents were selected using snowball sampling and by applying the 
principles of “completeness” (including representatives from the entire spectrum of actors) 
and “dissimilarity” (including respondents with diverse perspectives) (see Blee and 
Taylor, 2002). The interviewees comprised four categories: interest groups, policy makers, 
knowledge providers and media. They included international, national, regional and local 
actors who are actively engaged in the agricultural policy processes in Ghana and 
Uganda. Participant observation of policy actors during an agricultural sector review 
workshop in Uganda and informal interaction with the policy actors was also applied. A 
total of 33 and 34 interviews were conducted in Ghana and Uganda, respectively (Table 
2.1). For each interview, the respondents were asked two broad initial questions, using a 
semi-structured interview approach. 
 
Table 2.1: Interviewed stakeholders in Ghana and Uganda 
 
Type Ghana Uganda 
Government agencies (Agriculture policy unit, 
extension and finance) 
7 7 
Academic (Agriculture and Political science) 3 4 
Think tanks (Research) 1 2 
Donor agencies and IFI 5 6 
NGO 4 4 
Political party representatives and Parliamentarians 5 4 
Interest groups (Civil society organization) 3 2 
Farmers (small and large scale) 2 3 
Traditional authorities 1 - 
Local government 2 2 
Total 33 34 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
 
Since the number of respondents in each category is relatively small, there are some 
limitations of drawing inferences from the sampled persons to other persons in the same 
category. However, the goal was not to derive statistically significant results on the policy 
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positions of all actors in the two countries, but to identify “typical” policy positions that 
feature in the policy discourse. For this purpose, the sample was considered sufficiently 
large, especially since efforts were made to cover the possible spectrum of positions within 
each category. 
In the first question, the respondent was asked to identify the challenges affecting 
the agricultural sector. In the second question, he or she was asked to identify possible 
policy instruments to address those challenges. Importantly, the questions were asked as 
open questions without prompting any answers. This approach made it possible for the 
respondents to identify challenges and policy instruments that they themselves considered 
important and to express what they considered relevant in their own words. Follow-up 
questions were asked to encourage the respondent to further explain his or her views. Over 
90 percent of the interviews were tape-recorded with permission from the respondent. Some 
respondents were re-contacted for a second time to validate the responses and others 
received the recorded transcripts by email for verification. 
 
2.3.3 Data analysis 
During the fieldwork, the in-depth interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed. 
Memo-writing was used to identify story-lines and additional actors to be interviewed as 
well as new sets of questions. This follows Hajer’s (2006) approach of identifying recurring 
patterns of speech through the story-lines. 
 
2.3.3.1   Identifying policy themes 
The transcripts from the fieldwork were uploaded into the NVivo 10 software for further 
analysis. The original texts were coded, and metaphors and story-lines were identified. 
Further coding was carried out to aggregate the initial codes into policy themes. A total of 
17 policy themes were identified from coding the transcripts7 (see appendix 2.3). The 
identified policy themes were assigned a binary value (where 1=yes if the theme appeared in 
the transcript of a particular respondent and 0=no if otherwise). A total of 608 transcripts, 
consisting of 30 interviewed respondents from each country were used to generate separate 
data sets. Official donor and government program documents and strategies were also 
analyzed as secondary sources. 
 
 
7 The 17 policy themes were those mentioned by the respondents in their discourses without prompting them 
during the interviews. 
8 The analysis was based on only 60 transcripts; the remaining 7 interviews were dropped from the analysis 
because the respondents did not permit recording of the interview 
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2.3.3.2   Factor and Cluster analysis 
For each country data set, a factor analysis with principal component extraction was 
conducted on the 17 policy themes, using oblique rotation. The factor analysis served to 
group the identified 17 policy themes into consistent groups (components), which are 
labeled policy beliefs. The results are presented in Tables 2.2 and 2.3. Furthermore, a two- 
step cluster analysis was conducted to explore how the different policy actors cluster around 
the 17 policy themes. The cluster membership was determined and cross-tabulated with a 
policy actor identification variable. The results are shown in Table 2.4. Combining the 
factor analysis and the cluster analysis served to determine the discourse coalitions and their 
policy beliefs. 
 
2.4 Results 
This section presents the policy themes from the factor analysis, explains the 
discourse coalitions based on the cluster analysis and the story-lines, and provides a detailed 
description of the policy actors’ discourses. 
 
2.4.1 Policy themes and policy beliefs 
Factor analysis was used, as indicated above, to identify the policy themes. The 
Kaiser-Mayer-Olkin (KMO) value of 0.55 for the Ghana results and of 0.57 for the Uganda 
results is higher than 0.50, which confirms that factor analysis is appropriate for the sample 
(see Field, 2009). The Barleltts test of sphericity (χ2 =261.6 and 278.5, p<0.001) is 
significant, which confirms that the correlation between variables is adequate for the factor 
analysis. Based on the Kaiser rule of selecting eigenvalues >1 (see Field, 2009), six and 
five principal components were extracted for Ghana and Uganda, respectively. These 
explain 79.0 percent and 71.7 percent of the variance, respectively. The rule of accepting 
factor loadings of absolute values more than 0.30 was applied. Tables 2.2 and 2.3 show the 
main policy themes with their factor loadings. The selection of the factor loadings followed 
Steven’s (2002) recommendations of using higher loadings for small sample sizes. 
As Tables 2.2 and 2.3 shows, for both countries, similar policy themes were 
identified, which refer to appropriate technology, input subsidy, low agricultural 
productivity, quality standards and market price support. In the two tables, each component 
identified by the Principal Component Analysis is named based on those variables (i.e. 
policy themes) that have the highest factor loadings in that particular component. 
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Table 2.2: Policy themes and policy beliefs (identified by factor analysis) for Ghana 
 
Policy beliefs 
 Variables Appropriate 
technology 
and input 
subsidy 
Quality of 
agricultura
l input 
Low 
agricultural 
productivity 
Market 
price 
support 
and 
storage 
Youth 
involvement 
in 
agriculture 
Rainfall- 
dependent 
farming 
and crop 
insurance 
1 Appropriate 
technology 
0.88 0.00 -0.23 -0.17 -0.14 0.15 
2 Inadequate 
access to 
credit 
0.78 0.01 0.30 0.17 0.04 0.13 
3 Fertilizer 
subsidy 
0.69 -0.14 -0.06 0.24 -0.11 -0.19 
4 Agricultural 
mechanization 
0.51 0.00 0.01 0.21 -0.49 -0.14 
7 Rainfall 
dependent 
agriculture 
0.39 -0.46 -0.20 0.16 -0.07 -0.31 
12 Public 
extension 
0.35 0.04 -0.07 0.72 0.16 0.14 
5 Counterfeit 
inputs 
-0.07 0.86 -0.04 -0.13 -0.16 0.01 
6 Quality 
standards 
0.15 0.76 0.03 0.30 0.23 -0.20 
15 Hoe and 
cutlass 
farming 
0.06 0.39 0.04 0.27 -0.68 -0.17 
13 Irrigation 
facilities 
0.27 -0.37 0.33 0.38 -0.06 -0.17 
8 Low 
agricultural 
productivity 
-0.07 -0.01 -0.89 0.26 0.16 0.10 
9 Private 
extension 
-0.17 0.00 0.87 0.06 0.10 0.21 
10 Lack of 
storage 
facility 
-0.07 0.00 -0.02 0.86 -0.20 -0.18 
11 Market price 
support 
-0.06 0.01 -0.13 0.86 -0.10 0.10 
14 Youth in 
agriculture 
policy 
0.19 -0.12 0.06 -0.06 -0.79 -0.02 
17 Inadequate 
land policies 
-0.19 -0.21 -0.01 0.27 -0.58 0.58 
16 Crop 
insurance 
0.23 -0.04 0.09 -0.01 0.11 0.89 
 Eigenvalues 5.49 2.42 1.80 1.46 1.31 1.04 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis; Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser 
Normalization. Rotation converged in 25 iterations. Factor loadings over 0.30 appear in bold. 
 
Source: In-depth interviews. 
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Table 2.3: Policy themes and policy beliefs (identified by factor analysis) for Uganda 
 
Policy beliefs 
 Variables Market 
price 
support 
and 
storage 
Approp
-riate 
technol
ogy 
Quality of 
agricultur
al input 
Inadequate 
land 
policies 
Low 
agricultural 
productivit
y and input 
subsidy 
1 Quality standards 0.86 -0.20 -0.02 0.08 -0.04 
2 Lack of storage facility 0.80 0.07 -0.08 0.02 0.03 
3 Hoe and cutlass farming 0.59 0.54 -0.13 -0.28 0.14 
4 Market price support 0.50 0.36 -0.09 0.03 -0.19 
5 Youth in agriculture policy 0.45 -0.08 0.25 -0.33 -0.36 
16 Public extension 0.39 0.10 -0.06 0.29 -0.60 
6 Rainfall dependent 
agriculture 
0.07 0.90 0.02 0.07 -0.04 
7 Irrigation facilities -0.05 0.88 0.06 -0.06 0.13 
8 Fertilizer subsidy -0.15 0.57 0.19 0.10 -0.45 
11 Counterfeit inputs 0.06 0.42 -0.54 0.40 0.02 
17 Agricultural mechanization 0.21 0.40 -0.04 -0.31 -0.46 
9 Private extension -0.16 0.30 0.84 0.09 -0.10 
10 Crop insurance 0.08 -0.05 0.65 0.19 0.53 
12 Inadequate land policies -0.05 0.05 -0.10 -0.87 0.01 
13 Appropriate technology 0.26 -0.15 0.22 0.08 -0.77 
14 Low agricultural 
productivity 
-0.11 -0.05 -0.06 -0.10 -0.71 
15 Inadequate access to credit 0.24 0.28 -0.18 -0.02 -0.64 
 Eigenvalues 5.82 2.16 1.76 1.34 1.13 
Note: Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis; Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser 
Normalization. Rotation converged in 15 iterations. Factor loadings over 0.30 appear in bold. 
 
Source: In-depth interviews. 
 
2.4.2 Policy discourse coalitions 
In both countries, two major clusters were identified through the cluster analysis. 
The cluster membership results were matched with transcripts of individual respondents. 
Following this matching, the identified policy themes were analyzed to identify the story- 
lines of each respondent in each of the two clusters. This analysis proved that the clusters 
share similar story-lines regarding low agricultural productivity of small farms. However, 
they differed between clusters regarding the story-lines for the policy themes of input 
subsidies, agricultural mechanization, market price support, youths’ involvement in 
agriculture and the role of the public and private sector in agricultural services provision. 
Obviously, there were also differences within clusters, but the variation was larger between 
than within clusters for these themes. Therefore, the relative similarity of story-lines within 
the clusters and differences between the clusters made it possible to identify two distinct 
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patterns of discourses. Following the conceptual framework described above, the actors 
within each cluster are referred to as “discourse coalitions,” because they share a similar 
policy discourse, reflecting similar policy beliefs. The two clusters are labeled “domestic 
discourse coalition” (in short domestic coalition) and “donor discourse coalition” (in short 
donor coalition). These labels have been selected because they reflect the composition of 
the majority of actors in the two coalitions. As further explained below, this label does not 
imply that all donors in the two countries were members of the donor discourse coalition, 
or that all domestic actors were members in the domestic discourse coalition. 
 
2.4.3 Actors in the discourse coalitions 
The composition of the policy actors in each coalition is shown in Table 2.4. Details 
on the frequency at which the different policy themes were mentioned by the actors in each 
cluster are presented in Appendix 2.3. The domestic coalition is dominated by policy 
actors from government ministries and agencies, interest groups, parliamentarians and 
political party representatives. International Financial Institutions dominate the donor 
coalition. The discourses of academic respondents from economics, agricultural economics 
and political science fields in Ghana were more aligned with the donor coalition. However, 
in Uganda, only the discourses of the political science respondents were more aligned with 
the domestic coalition, while the economists and agricultural economists were more aligned 
with the donor coalition. In both countries, non-governmental organizations were more 
aligned with the domestic coalition. 
 
Table 2.4: Participants in the discourse coalition (identified by cluster analysis) 
 
Ghana Uganda 
Policy stakeholder organizations Domestic Donor Domestic Donor 
 coalition coalition coalition coalition 
Government agency (agricultural policy 7 0 6  0 
unit, extension and finance)      
Academic (economics, agriculture, 0 3 2  2 
political science)      
Think tank (research) 0 1 2  0 
International finance Institutions/ Donor 0 5 0  6 
organizations      
Non-governmental organizations 3 2 3  1 
Political party representatives and 5 0 4  0 
parliamentarians      
Interest groups 3 0 2  0 
Local governments 1 0 2  0 
Total 19 11 21  9 
Total sample size  N=30  N=30  
Cluster distribution (%) 63.3 36.7 70.0  30.0 
Source: In-depth interviews.      
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2.4.4 Policy beliefs 
This section describes the policy beliefs held by the domestic discourse coalition and 
the donor discourse coalition. In line with the above definition, policy beliefs were 
derived from statements in the transcripts that referred to perceptions about problems facing 
agriculture in the respective country, policy instruments that were seen as suitable to solve 
these problems, as well as perceptions about the causal effects of these policy instruments. 
Appendix 2.1 describes the policy beliefs in more detail. The major story- lines, specific 
phrases and metaphors from the interviews are emphasized with italics in this table. Based 
on Van Dijk (1998, see above), the transcripts were also screened for statements that 
refer to the positive self-representation of members within one coalition and to the 
negative other-representation related to members of the other coalition. These are 
described in Appendix 2.2. In the following, direct quotes are used for the purpose of 
illustrating story-lines that were found to be predominant in the transcripts of the members 
of the respective coalitions. 
 
2.4.4.1   Agricultural policy beliefs in Ghana 
Appropriate technology: The “hoe and cutlass”9 nature of farming emerged as a 
dominant metaphor in the story-lines of the domestic discourse coalition. The coalition 
used the “hoe and cutlass” metaphor to describe the “traditional” or “old” farming system in 
Ghana. In the words of a former Member of Parliament: “So we think we can go to the 
field and use our hoe and cutlass and continue to farm to feed this nation, we are doing it 
and we are feeding the nation, is that enough? We need to develop agriculture and we need 
to transform agriculture and link it to industry and services and that is where it can become 
proper business.”10 
Using tractors was viewed as a necessary step to overcome the “hoe and cutlass” 
nature of farming and modernize the agricultural sector. A farmers’ association 
representative highlighted that “before agricultural modernization can take 
place...government must ensure that farmers’ access to tractors is addressed.”11 The 
importance of modernizing the agricultural sector was often linked with the perceived 
need to make agriculture attractive to the youth. This was expressed by a former Member of 
Parliament as follows: “The youth face drudgery when they go into farming, because  
 
9 This expression, describing the two most important hand tools in non-mechanized farming systems, was 
widely used by members of the domestic coalition. 
10 Interview with former Member of Parliament, Accra, September 10, 2012. 
11 Interview with farmer organization, Accra, September 26, 2012. 
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farming in Ghana is still largely dependent on hoe and cutlass making it unattractive to the 
youth, this is our concern.”12 
The donor discourse coalition did not deny the drudgery involved in non- 
mechanized farming. However, members of this coalition strongly differed from the 
domestic coalition in their policy beliefs with reference to the provision of tractors to 
farmers by government. In the donor coalition discourse, agricultural mechanization was 
seen as a private investment. The government should refrain from providing inputs like 
tractors. The donor discourse emphasized “sustainability”, pointing out that supplying 
tractors by the government was not a sustainable policy option. Moreover, the donor 
coalition considered political patronage, rather than a desire for modernization, as the 
underlying reason for the government’s mechanization policy. Reference was made to 
similar programs that had existed in the past.13 One respondent expressed this concern as 
follows: “The tractors have a political image, because they are big, when they say we have 
brought in tractors, when they say we have brought in 1000 tractors, you can make a big 
political statement of it.”14 
Political patronage was especially prominent among the academic respondents in the 
donor discourse coalition. One academic mentioned: “You know, the import of tractors and 
even their distribution system, it’s highly on patronage basis. If you are not a member of the 
party, if you are not close to somebody or the minister, you do not get a tractor. Even if the 
distribution is done on commercial terms, you still see some political maneuvering here 
and there to access them. Unfortunately, if people get it on those terms or these 
political terms, they do not pay.”15 
 
Low agricultural productivity and input subsidy: A perceived need for the provision 
of fertilizer input subsidies by the government was another strong policy belief expressed in 
the discourse of the domestic coalition. Fertilizer subsidies were seen to be essential for 
increasing agricultural productivity.16 The problem was emphasized by a former Member of 
Parliament as follows: “Low productivity; productivity is a major problem in every 
aspect of our agriculture.”17 
 
 
 
 
12 Interview with former Member of Parliament, Accra, September 10, 2012. 
13 Interview with donor organization, Accra, October 19, 2012. 
14 Interview with academic, Accra, September 11, 2012. 
15 Interview with academic, Accra, September 11, 2012. 
16 Interview with academic and politician, Accra, September 10, 2012. 
17 Interview with former Member of Parliament, Accra, September 10, 2012. 
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In the discourse as well as official documents of donors, one can find a general 
agreement with the argument that low productivity is a major challenge affecting 
smallholder farmers. For example, the World Bank’s Country Assistance Strategy states: 
“Agriculture (…) is constrained by low-productivity farming practices, poor infrastructure 
(e.g. roads, irrigation, and ICT), land tenure uncertainties, gender inequities, and uncertain 
access to inputs.” (World Bank, 2007: 8). 
In spite of this agreement on the problem of low productivity, the two coalitions 
differed in their policy beliefs regarding the role of fertilizer subsidies. A government 
official pointed out: “We know for most of our crops, we are doing fairly below 60 percent 
productivity and we have the potential to reach that 100 percent productivity. … generally 
yields are low, because people are not adopting the technology and it is expensive to adopt. 
This is the reason for the fertilizer subsidy; we also thought that we need some other 
complementary inputs. Although it is expensive, we added the seeds as well in order to 
increase yield.”18 
In the story-line of the domestic discourse coalition, the high cost of improved 
seeds and fertilizer was highlighted as the main reason for the lack of adoption of these 
technologies by farmers. According to a government official, “this fertilizer subsidy is 
actually something that farmers are asking for. They cannot afford the price of fertilizer and 
government is only subsidizing the price of fertilizer by half.”19 Another government official 
also mentioned that “giving fertilizer subsidy is demand-driven by farmers because they 
cannot afford it. But government wants to increase food production and develop the 
agricultural sector. If the sector develops, industry will develop and we can create more 
jobs and alleviate rural poverty, this is what we want for our people.”20 In contrast, in the 
story-line of the donor coalition, the government fertilizer subsidy was labeled as market 
distorting and prone to corruption. 
Market price support: Members of both coalitions indicated that market prices play 
a significant role in stimulating domestic food production, but they differed in their policy 
beliefs regarding the need or justification of government intervention to influence prices. 
The domestic discourse coalition tended to view market price support as vital to stimulating 
production, while the donor discourse coalition highlighted that such a policy instrument is 
distorting the market. The domestic coalition also considered market price particular policy  
 
 
18 Interview with official of MoFA, Accra, September 5, 2012. 
19 Interview with government official, Accra, September 6, 2012. 
20 Interview with Politician, Kadjebi-Akan, October 1, 2012.
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instrument], we should target price support…What a farmer wants is a good price. So it  
can encourage him to expand his area of cultivation and adopt new technology. If you 
give him seed and fertilizer and he grows and the yield is high and there is no assured 
market price, you have not done much.”21 In the words of a farmer who had won an award 
for good farming practices: “As a farmer, those two things [input subsidy and market 
price support] are needed. When you have the inputs and you don’t have the market, it’s 
a problem and also if you have the market and you don’t have the inputs to widen your 
farm, that’s also a problem, so those things have to move together.”22 Members of the 
domestic discourse coalition also referred to the ‘good old era’ of the Ghana Food 
Distribution Company and the ‘good new era’ of the National Buffer Stock program as a 
price stabilizing instrument. 
The story-lines of the donor discourse, in contrast, described government price 
stabilization policies as “killing private sector initiative.”23 As in case of input subsidies, a 
popular term in the donor coalition to criticize price support policies was the perceived 
lack of “sustainability” of this instrument. A representative of a development organization 
mentioned: “The government should pull out from this business of telling the world that 
maize should be sold at 70 GH cedis (19 USD). If you do that, you discourage the private 
sector; this is because the business of producing maize becomes government business.”24 
Youth involvement in agriculture: In the domestic discourse coalition, low 
involvement of the youth in agriculture was a major story-line, while youth was not 
mentioned in the donor discourse coalition. In the domestic discourse coalition, the 
participation of the youth in agriculture was expressed as key to increasing production and 
modernizing agriculture. A former Member of Parliament said: “Our farmers are ageing and 
are not being replaced … I think the National Youth in Agriculture program which was 
started about 5 to 6 years ago seems to be doing well. It is attracting a lot of young men 
and women into farming.”25 
 
 
 
 
 
21 Interview with MoFA official, Accra, September 5, 2012. 
22 Interview with farmer, Kadjebi-Akan, September 28, 2012. 
23 Interview with agricultural NGO, Accra, September 26, 2012. 
24 Interview with agricultural NGO, Accra, September 26, 2012. This figure refers to the consumer  price. 
25 Interview with former Member of Parliament, Accra, September 10, 2012. 
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In the story-lines of the donor coalition, the relevance of such programs was 
questioned and they were interpreted as being motivated by political patronage. For 
example, a representative of a donor organization said: “The youth in agriculture program is 
not necessary, because there is already 60 percent of the rural population involved in 
farming.”26 
 
2.4.4.2   Agricultural policy beliefs in Uganda 
In spite of some variations, similar patterns could be observed in the policy 
discourses of the domestic and the donor coalition in Uganda. 
Appropriate technology: Similar to the case of Ghana, the continuous use of the hoe 
for farming was a central concern in the domestic discourse coalition. A representative of a 
farmers’ organization pointed out that “the hand hoe is very tedious, it is not effective in 
opening lands in terms of trying to catch up with the season, because it will take one 
individual over 15 days to open up an acre of land, the same one acre of land can be 
opened by oxen plough within two days …but if you use a tractor, you need about 45 
minutes to open up an acre.”27 As in the case of Ghana, government support to 
mechanization was seen a necessary policy instrument to address the problem of low 
productivity that was perceived to be caused by lack of mechanization. 
Although dependence on the hoe was acknowledged by the donor coalition in 
Uganda as a hindrance to increasing production, as well, the story-line of this coalition 
focused on the role of private sector investment in promoting mechanization. Concerns 
were also raised regarding the profitability of mechanization under current conditions. A 
donor organization representative pointed out that “mechanization is very expensive and 
small farmers cannot maintain it.”28 
Low agricultural productivity and input subsidy: As in the case of Ghana, the story- 
lines of both coalitions highlighted low productivity as a main concern. For the domestic 
discourse coalition, dependence on rainfall, changing weather conditions and declining soil 
fertility were frequently mentioned as major reasons for low productivity. A representative 
of a non-government organization pointed out that “the weather is a big issue in Uganda 
problems of inputs were highlighted as contributing to low agricultural productivity. This is 
well reflected in the following statement by a representative of a farmers’ organization:  
 
26 Interview with donor organization, Accra, October 19, 2012. 
27 Interview with farmer organization, Kampala, November 9, 2012. 
28 Interview with donor organization, Kampala, November 11, 2012. 
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now. The changes in weather have been affecting agriculture in Uganda; temperatures are 
now higher than ever before. So, to me, why can’t the government provide irrigation 
systems at subsidized rates...?”29 Referring to declining soil fertility, a respondent said: 
“Production is generally low, there is low agricultural production in the whole country, and 
the soil is no longer rich in nutrients.”30 High costs of agro-chemicals as well as quality 
“Our farmers do not use agro-chemicals and fertilizer because of high cost and 
unavailability. Even where it is available, there is a lot of counterfeit. I think Uganda is 
leading among the countries on the planet that have low fertilizer use, it is about 1.5 kg/ha. I 
think a bag of 50kg fertilizer costs between 120,000 and 150,000 UGX (41 to 51 USD) 
and very few farmers can afford that.”31 
Similar to the case of Ghana, the donor discourse acknowledged that low 
agricultural productivity and limited use of modern inputs were challenges affecting the 
sector. Regarding productivity, a representative of a donor organization expressed this 
concern as follows: “This [i.e. agricultural productivity in Uganda] is probably the lowest in 
the world.”32 At the same time, the production potential was seen as rather high by 
members of the donor coalition. As one respondent in the donor discourse coalition pointed 
out: “Natural productivity in Uganda is still higher than anywhere else, they get two rains 
per year, and the soil is still good though not as good as it was in the past.”33 As in case of 
mechanization, members in the donor coalition were critical of suggestions to promote 
irrigation. As one respondent explained, irrigation facilities were “too expensive for farmers 
to manage”.34 
Market price support: Regarding this policy instrument, the discourse patterns were 
also similar to Ghana. The discourse of the domestic coalition is well reflected in the 
statement of one respondent, who mentioned that the prices offered to farmers are very 
discouraging, yet “price is very important, it stimulates production......If you should look at 
any jumping in production levels of any crop, price would be a very big factor though we 
don’t respect these guys as business men, but the farmers are business men.”35 The era of 
the producer cooperatives was highlighted in the domestic discourse coalition as “the best 
years” of high food production and assured income for farmers. 
 
 
29 Interview with agricultural NGO, Kampala, November 21, 2012. 
30 Interview with NGO, Kampala, October 29, 2012. 
31 Interview with farmer organization, Kampala, November 9, 2012. 
32 Interview with donor organization, Kampala, November 6, 2012. 
33 Interview with donor organization, Kampala, November 9, 2012. 
34 Interview with donor organization, Kampala, November 9, 2012. 
35 Interview with donor organization, Kampala, November 21, 2012. 
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Expectedly, the story-line of the donor discourse coalition was different. Their 
discourse was concerned with the need for creating a regulatory framework for the private 
sector to invest. Members in this coalition criticized Uganda’s ministry of agriculture for 
not developing such a framework. The criticism was that the Ministry focused on 
implementing productivity programs, whereas, in the view of the members of the donor 
coalition, what farmers needed more urgently were output markets.36 This is reflected in 
the following statement: “Farmers are not getting the premium price for beans and maize 
because the ministry of agriculture has not facilitated the process of setting up different 
grades. But the private sector is willing to pay a price according to grades, so price support 
is not necessarily a solution because it can easily get out of control. Rather, restructure the 
market, farmers are amazing guys, they know when there is an opportunity for them to take 
advantage.”37 
 
2.4.4.3   Positive self-representation and negative other-representation 
The two coalitions did not only have different policy beliefs on contested issues 
such as input subsidies and mechanization, their discourses were also characterized by 
positive self-representation and negative other-representation. As indicated above, this is a 
typical feature in competing discourse coalitions. A Member of Parliament reflects the 
negative other-representation in the domestic coalition in the following statement: “I see 
that these bodies [international donor organizations] are not really very committed to our 
internal processes and that they should generate more sustainable policy analysis and drive 
solutions. They just create dependencies from a technical point of view, that dependency 
does not necessarily fit into our context for demands, so we keep being avenues of 
experimentation and that is something which I don’t understand - why up to now, fifty 
years after independence down the road, after the independence, we have failed to come to 
terms.”38 
The following statement can illustrate the negative other-representation prevailing in 
the donor discourse: “There are a lot of those government officials with that perspective of 
subsidizing agriculture, but they want to make money out of that. I have never heard of a 
government official who supports a service provision without an intention of getting their  
 
 
 
 
36 Interview with donor organization, Kampala, December 20, 2012. 
37 Interview with donor organization, Kampala, December 20, 2012. 
38 Interview with Member of Parliament, Kampala, December 5, 2012. 
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have figures at all in any of their policy documents.”40 The same respondent highlighted 
the perceived positive role that the donors, in his view, played in engaging policy actors 
and providing them with evidence-based policy options to feed into the decision making 
process.41 In contrast, the positive self-representation of the domestic coalition focused on 
their ability to better understand internal processes and on their capacity to be in control of 
their own policies.42 
 
2.5 Discussion 
The purpose of this analysis, as pointed out in the introduction, was to contribute to 
the contested debate on agricultural policy choices in African countries, especially the 
debate regarding the resurgence of input subsidies and other government interventions in 
support of agriculture. As shown in Section 2, in the literature, this phenomenon is also 
referred to as “overshooting”, that is the move of developing countries from taxing to 
subsidizing their agricultural sector. The analysis focused on two countries, Ghana and 
Uganda, who have moved from taxing to supporting the agricultural sector much further 
than other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, as pointed out in Section 2. Motivated by 
Krueger’s (1992) seminal analysis of the narratives that explained agricultural policy 
choices in the pre-structural adjustment period, this paper focused on the policy beliefs that 
policy actors have regarding specific policy instruments that result in “overshooting.” 
In explaining the shift from the taxation to the subsidization of agriculture in 
developing countries, the quantitative economic literature reviewed in Section 2 has focused 
on political incentives to stay in power (see contributions in Anderson, 2010). It can be 
derived from that literature that economic development and democratization in African 
countries have increased the political incentives to subsidize the agricultural sector (e.g., 
Bates and Block, 2010). The qualitative literature has highlighted the opportunities that 
subsidies provide for rent-seeking (e.g., Jayne et al., 2002) and for using clientelistic 
networks to stay in power (e.g., Van de Walle, 2001). 
The analysis of policy discourses conducted in this paper complements this literature 
by examining the role of an additional factor, which helps to explain agricultural policy 
choices: the role of policy beliefs, that is the implicit theories and perceptions that actors 
 
 
 
39 Interview with donor organization, Kampala, November 9, 2012. 
40 Interview with donor organization, Kampala, November 9, 2012. 
41 Interview with donor organization, Kampala, November 9, 2012. 
42 Interview with Member of Parliament, Kampala, December 5, 2012. 
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have on the need of using different policy instruments and the causal effects of using such 
instruments. These policy beliefs are expressed in the discourses of the actors involved. A 
discourse analysis has been conducted to identify discourse coalitions, their major story-
lines and their underlying policy beliefs. One has to take into account that in a discourse, 
actors use arguments not only to express their beliefs, but also to justify their own 
position and possibly also to disguise their own interests (Van Dijk, 2004). The economics 
literature on agricultural policy choices has, for a long time, implicitly assumed that policy 
beliefs and discourses only serve this function and have, therefore, been largely ignored in 
the analysis of policy choices (see Section 2). Phrased differently, beliefs and discursive 
arguments were seen as endogenous to the actors’ economic and political interests, which 
are captured in the respective political economy models. The more recent quantitative 
literature, however, has revealed that policy beliefs and ideologies matter, as discussed in 
Section 2. Yet, this literature has only dealt with broad ideological orientations (left versus 
right). 
The analysis of the discourses presented above shows that it is worthwhile to pay 
more attention to policy beliefs. The discourses of the actors who have been identified as 
belonging to the domestic discourse coalitions in both Ghana and Uganda reveal a very 
strong belief that minimum prices and improved physical access to inputs such as fertilizer 
and machinery services are essential to improve agricultural productivity. Of course, this 
argument may easily be dismissed as a disguise for the political interest in serving larger 
farmers, who are more likely to benefit from such subsidies. This was the main position of 
the donor discourse coalition in both countries, as shown above. Economists who are 
content with the “as if” nature of the explanations of political economy models (see Section 
2) may easily dismiss these policy beliefs for similar reasons. 
However, from the perspective of practical policy making, it might be very useful 
to pay more attention to the policy beliefs of domestic actors, and not to dismiss them so 
easily. If the only goal of policy-makers was to stay in power, they could use numerous 
other policy instruments to reward clientelistic networks that are much easier to implement 
than, for example, a block farm program or a buffer stock program. Moreover, there is no 
contradiction in accepting, on the one hand, that domestic policy makers genuinely believe 
in the need for better access to inputs and mechanization, and on the other hand, 
acknowledging that such policy instruments also have political advantages for those 
pursuing them. What seems rather problematic is the view, expressed in the donor discourse 
as shown above, that policy-makers only pursue those instruments to stay in power or 
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that bureaucrats are only in favor of such instruments because they offer scope for 
corruption. 
For the policy dialogue that donors are pursuing in their efforts to change 
government policy, it makes a big difference on whether or not they accept that domestic 
policy makers have a genuine concern about increasing agricultural productivity. This will 
have consequences for the discursive strategies that donors want to adopt to make the case 
for their position. The dominant story-line of the domestic discourse coalition can be 
summarized as follows: “Productivity is low due to limited access of smallholders to inputs 
and lack of guaranteed prices. The proposed policy instruments (block farming, fertilizer 
and tractor subsidies, and price stabilization through buffer stocks) are essential to address 
these problems, and hence productivity will be increased. Agriculture will become more 
attractive to the youth and serve as an engine of growth.” The response of the donor 
coalition, as is obvious from the above analysis, mainly present what in narrative policy 
analysis is called a “non-story” (Roe, 1994): The narrative of the donor discourse coalition 
mainly focuses on explaining why this strategy is difficult (governance problems, political 
capture), and why it will not be successful. 
If the donor discourse coalition would accept the genuine concerns of domestic 
policy makers, it would be easier to engage in a productive policy dialogue on alternative 
policy instruments to address these concerns. Such a dialogue could lead to a joint 
identification of open questions, which may require research to be resolved. A review of 
the literature on productivity increase in Sub-Saharan African agriculture is beyond the 
scope of this paper. However, there are obviously substantial knowledge gaps on how to 
achieve “sustainable intensification” in Sub-Saharan Africa. Some concerns in this regard 
that feature strongly in the domestic discourse coalition, such as mechanization in Africa, 
have been grossly neglected for decades by donors and researchers alike, and have only 
recently received some attention (Diao et al., 2014). 
The call for a more productive dialogue between donors and domestic policy 
makers, which is derived from the analysis presented here, is in line with the conclusion by 
Jayne and Rashid (2013). They assume that African government will continue to run input 
subsidy programs for some time to come, and that, therefore, efforts should be made to 
make these programs more effective. Our point is that donors, rather than opposing those 
programs as a matter of principle, could play a more pro-active role in working with 
governments to make them more effective. This is also important since donors, in spite of 
their critique, are often co-financing such programs under budget support or under 
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initiatives such as the CAADP investment plans, which do not necessarily specify in detail 
the types of policy instruments for which the funds are being used. The findings about 
positive self- and negative other-representations show that both coalitions would need to 
take steps toward a greater appreciation of each other’s positions for a fruitful dialogue to 
emerge. Obviously, both the domestic and the donor coalitions hold strong policy beliefs 
on topics related to agricultural development that are not easy to resolve, otherwise, 
solutions would have been more widely implemented already. 
 
2.6 Conclusions 
The study identified divergent policy beliefs between domestic policy makers on 
the one hand, and development agencies on the other hand. It is a widely held policy belief 
among domestic policy makers that providing physical access to modern inputs is 
indispensable for moving smallholders out of their current “hoe and cutlass” nature of 
farming. The study suggests that the policy choices of domestic policy makers are deeply 
influenced by their policy beliefs regarding the question: What does it take to develop 
smallholder agriculture? While domestic policy actors believe transforming smallholder 
agriculture requires public intervention to provide modern subsidized inputs, the donor 
coalition believes that these interventions are market distorting and have only patronage 
and self-interest motives. The discourse analysis showed that the two coalitions also both 
have strong positive self-perceptions and negative other representation, which makes a 
fruitful policy dialogue difficult. The fact that one could find such striking similarities in 
the findings in the two case study countries suggests that the discursive strategies may be 
of wider relevance in other countries, as well. The discourse analysis suggests that there 
are almost two different worlds of policy discourse, which are hardly connected: a 
“domestic world” and a “donor world”. 
The analysis provided in this paper suggests that paying attention to the role of 
policy beliefs in agricultural policy making has important practical implications. 
Understanding why governments adopt their agricultural policies is essential for a fruitful 
policy dialogue. In particular, these findings draw attention to the need to better understand 
the types of evidence that could help to bridge the gap between the policy beliefs prevailing 
in the “domestic world” and the “donor world”. 
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3 AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY DEBATES: 
 WHO HAS THE BETTER STORY? 
 
Jonathan Mockshell and Regina Birner 
 
Abstract 
 
While there is renewed interest to promote agricultural development, there is a 
lively policy debate on the appropriate instruments to achieve this goal. While some actors 
argue that agricultural development requires strong government support and input subsidies, 
others criticize those state-focused instruments and favor market-oriented approaches. 
Applying a narrative policy analysis approach, this paper addresses the question: Who has 
a better story-line? The study aims to contribute to a better understanding of contested 
policy debates using the case of Senegal as an example. The study applies the Advocacy 
Coalition Framework, and combines quantitative cluster analysis with qualitative narrative 
policy analysis. Transcripts of in-depth interviews conducted with policy stakeholders in 
Senegal are the primary data source. The empirical analysis reveals that, there are two 
coalitions with opposing policy narratives: a large “agricultural support” coalition and a 
small “agricultural support critique” coalition. The story-line of the agricultural support 
critique emphasizes that, the government provision of input subsidies is ineffective while 
story-line of the proponents of such policies consider support essential to promote 
agricultural development. The analysis of the narratives suggests that, the agricultural 
coalition has a convincing story-line with a clear beginning (low productivity caused by 
lack of inputs), middle (providing subsidized inputs) and end (increased productivity). In 
contrast, the agricultural support critique essentially presents “non-stories” (focusing on 
what should not be done without providing a convincing alternative story-line of what 
should be done). Based on the proposition that a more consensus-oriented approach will 
ultimately lead to more effective agricultural policies, the study explores strategies to 
achieve a “discursive turn” and examines the role of policy brokers in this context. 
 
Keywords: Agricultural support policies, Narrative policy analysis, Advocacy coalition  
framework, Cluster analysis, Senegal 
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3.1 Introduction 
Since the 2000s, there has been a renewed interest among African governments, 
donor agencies, civil society and the scientific community to promote agricultural 
development in Africa. Such renewed interest is evident in the Comprehensive Africa 
Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), the Alliance for a Green Revolution in 
Africa (AGRA) and the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition initiatives. Yet, 
there are disagreements regarding the policy instruments that should be used to promote 
agricultural development in Africa. This remains a long standing unresolved contested 
debate among governments and donor agencies (see Harrigan, 2003; Jayne, Govereh, 
Mwanaumo, Nyoro, and Chapoto, 2002). The return to the establishment of parastatals 
organizations in African agriculture and the resurgence of input subsidy policies indicate 
the current state of affairs. As Jayne and Rashid (2013) observe, the use of input subsidies 
in agricultural development is likely to remain into the foreseeable years. The fertilizer 
and seed input subsidy program in Malawi is a well kwon example. In Ghana, examples 
include the government-sponsored Agricultural Mechanization Service Centers, the Block 
Farms Program, the national buffer stock program and fertilizer input subsidy programs, 
which are all driven by the government. The maize market intervention program of the 
Zambia Food Reserve Agency and the Prosperity for All programs in Uganda also reflect 
widespread policy preferences for government intervention. The current popularity and 
implementation of these policies among Africa governments amid donor agencies concerns 
raises an important question: Why do countries select such policies even though they did 
not have a good record in the past and are heavily criticized by funding agencies? 
In the scholarly literature, these government-favored policies have received praise 
from proponents and criticism from opponents. In the political economy literature, such 
policy choices are often considered as “overshooting” (of a trend to remove the taxation of 
the agricultural sector that had existed in developing countries before) and as 
“distortionary”. These conclusions are usually based on macro-level data and on theoretical 
economic models to explain the aggregate patterns in agricultural policy choices (see 
Anderson, 2009a, 2009b). The dominant political economy analysis, both quantitative (De 
Gorter and Tsur, 1991) and qualitative approaches (Bates, 1981; Van de Walle, 2001), apply 
the rational choice approach. Studies based on the rational choice paradigm often attribute 
policy outcomes to efforts to gain political support (Swinnen, 1994), influence of lobby 
groups (Bates and Block, 2010) and neo-patrimonial interpretations (Van de Walle, 
2001). 
 69  
 
Although these studies have generated significant results to explain the aggregate 
effect of different policy instruments on the economy, they are limited in resolving the 
long- standing contested debates of agricultural development policies. These studies do not 
consider the policy contexts that are important to understand why certain policies are 
adopted in society. 
This study aims to contribute to an understanding of the agricultural development 
policy context through an empirical analysis of the contested agricultural policy debates. 
Specifically, the prevailing “stories” and “non-stories” of policy actors are examined. The 
empirical analysis is based on the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) (Weible et al., 
2009), and complemented with Narrative Policy Analysis (NPA) (Roe, 1994). The 
Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) has been applied to study the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) of the European Union based on expert interviews (Feindt, 2010). The 
narrative policy analysis approach was used in studies on public policy, environmental 
policy, management and law (Feldman et al., 2004; Hampton, 2009). In the context of the 
agricultural sector, Feindt and Kleinschmit (2011) analyzed frame elements and policy 
actors in the media coverage of the BSE (mad cow disease) crisis in Germany. Despite the 
diverse applications of the ACF and narrative policy analysis approaches in analyzing 
contested policy issues in developed countries, there is limited empirical research in 
developing countries, especially in the field of agricultural development policies. 
The analysis is based on in-depth interviews conducted with government ministries 
and agencies, donor and civil society organizations, research organizations and think tanks 
involved in the Senegalese agricultural sector. As Elgin and Weible (2013: 114) observed: 
“noticeably absent from the tools and techniques in policy analysis are methods for 
understanding political context, including the beliefs, networks, resources, and activities of 
policy actors”. Inspired by this observation, the study combines a quantitative cluster 
analysis technique to identify policy coalitions and a qualitative analysis to examine 
coalition narratives. The study is structured as follows. The next section presents the ACF 
and narrative policy analysis concepts. The case study background and research design are 
presented in Sections 3.3 and 3.4 respectively. Sections 3.5 and 3.6 present the policy 
narratives from in-depth interviews and discussions respectively. 
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3.2 The Advocacy Coalition Framework and Narrative Policy Analysis 
The study is based on the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) developed by 
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993), and complemented with the 
Narrative Policy Analysis (NPA) approach developed by Roe (see Roe, 1994). The ACF 
was developed as an alternative to the top-down and bottom-up approaches in the policy 
implementation literature and provides a dynamic model to explain the policy process 
(Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, 1994; Weible et al., 2009). It examines the policy process 
through concepts applied to a policy subsystem consisting of different policy coalitions, 
where members of each coalition share policy beliefs (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). 
The concept of policy beliefs is fundamental in the ACF as the formation and type of 
the coalition depends on the belief system. A policy belief refers to implicit theories 
about how to achieve certain goals, perceptions about the effectiveness of policy 
instruments, value priorities, and perceptions of important causal relationships (Jenkins- 
Smith and Sabatier, 1994; Majone, 1980; Sabatier, 1988). In the ACF, beliefs are classified 
into (i) deep core beliefs, which are difficult to change (ii) core beliefs that change more 
easily than the deep core beliefs, and (iii) secondary beliefs, which can be changed most 
easily (Sabatier and Weible, 2007). In a policy subsystem, the coalition members with 
similar beliefs interact and engage in a significant degree of coordination to influence 
policy (Elgin and Weible, 2013; Weible et al., 2009). A broad range of policy actors 
consisting of government officials, interest groups, researchers and private sector actors 
concerned with a policy problem form beliefs about possible solutions and coordinate their 
activities in a policy subsystem (Weible, 2007). 
Policy beliefs are generally expressed by the advocacy coalitions through competing 
narratives or stories in the form of public discourses, written documents, newspapers, 
internet blogs, social media, videos etc. (McBeth, Shanahan, Anderson, and Rose, 2012). 
As Shanahan, Jones, and McBeth (2011: 536) observe, “stakeholders use words, images, 
and symbols to strategically craft policy narratives to resonate with the public, relevant 
stakeholders and governmental decision makers, with the aim of producing winning 
coalitions.” While the ACF seeks to offer a tool and a theory to explain the dynamic 
processes of policy learning, policy change and coalition formation (Weible, 2007), the 
narrative policy analysis approach serves the critical purpose of unveiling the perceptions, 
goals and value priorities that actors deploy in a dynamic policy landscape (Shanahan et al., 
2011). Apart from few studies (see Jones and McBeth, 2010; McBeth et al. 2007; 
Shanahan et al., 2011), narratives remain an underspecified component of the ACF. There 
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are no clear guidelines in the ACF on how to identify policy beliefs and the fundamental 
role of stories or narratives is not recognized43 (Shanahan et al., 2011). The narrative policy 
analysis approach offers a systematic procedure to identify policy beliefs of actors through 
their narratives, which is useful to complement the well- developed ACF. 
The field of narrative policy analysis is broad and derives from literary arts, 
linguistics and psychology (Bridgman and Barry, 2002; Hampton, 2005; Van Eeten, 
2007). Narrative policy analysis draws on literary theory that focuses on analyzing language 
use. These approaches capture the political, economic, social and cultural realities that have 
to be explained (Fischer, 2003: vii-viii). A comprehensive review of this literature is 
provided by Van Eeten (2007) and Jones and McBeth (2010). The literature highlights two 
main methodological orientations in narrative policy analysis: a positivist and a 
poststructuralist. The positivist orientation to narrative policy analysis applies a systematic 
analytical approach and often formulates a set of testable hypotheses  (Jones et al., 2013; 
McBeth et al., 2007; Shanahan et al., 2011). In these studies, narratives are characterized 
by (i) the context or setting where the policy problem is defined; (ii) the plot or sequence 
of events; (iii) characters or policy actors; and (iv) policy solutions or the moral of the issue 
(Jones and McBeth, 2010; Prior et al., 2012). Until recently, narrative policy studies have 
often taken a poststructuralist orientation based on language use as the unit of analysis 
(Fischer, 2003; Van Dijk, 2004). The poststructuralist school of thought includes 
interpretative narrative analysis (Feldman et al., 2004; Yanow, 2000), the narrative 
elements approach (Stone, 2012), discourse analysis (Hajer, 2005) narratives as frames and 
reframing (Schöne and Rein, 1994), and narratives as stories and non-stories (Roe, 1994). 
The narrative policy analysis approach of Roe (1994) has been used in several narrative 
policy studies (see Berg and Hukkinen, 2011)44. Since, this study aims at constructing the 
different policy narratives from in-depth interviews and not to test hypotheses, the 
interpretive narrative policy analysis approach of Roe (1994) is followed. This method is 
particularly useful for policy problems characterized by uncertainty, complexity and 
polarization.  
 
 
 
43 Shanahan et al., (2011: 536) highlights the epistemological difference between post-positivist approach to 
narrative policy analysis and positive approach of ACF as possible reasons for the less inclusion of narratives 
in the ACF. 
44 This study acknowledges the epistemological differences between the ACF (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, 
1994) and narrative policy analysis (Roe, 1994). The study is largely based on positivist assumptions that 
policy beliefs of the actors are stable overtime. However, the narrative policy analysis complements the ACF 
by offering a systematic approach to trace the policy narratives of the coalitions. 
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Complexity follows from the intricacies of the problem and the interrelatedness of 
the policy issues, while polarization refers to the concentration of groups around the 
policy issues (Roe, 1994). These attributes justify the use of narrative policy analysis 
and contribute to identifying “stories” and “non-stories” as constructed by contending 
policy actors (Roe, 1994; Yanow, 2000). Roe's (1994: 3-4) systematic approach follows 
four steps: (i) The policy analyst identify the conventional narratives (story) of interest 
that dominate the issues in question. “Stories” are characterized by a beginning, middle and 
end, or a sequence of events (plots). (ii) The policy analyst identifies the “non-stories”. They 
are criticisms or run counter to the dominant conventional story. (iii) The analyst compares 
the stories and non-stories identified to generate a “meta-narrative” told by the comparison. 
(iv) The analyst determines how the meta-narrative recasts the issue to make it more 
amendable to policy making. In this study the narrative policy analysis complements the 
ACF by tracing the narratives that the policy coalitions deploy in the policy subsystem. 
 
3.3 The Senegalese agricultural sector and policy landscape 
Since independence in the 1960s, agricultural development policies have been 
central to the Senegalese development agenda. Yet, annual growth in agricultural value 
added has been erratic (below 5 percent in recent times) and characterized by declining 
performance in total cereal production, and declining land and labor productivity (see 
Appendix 3.1). Overall, the sector remains underdeveloped and confronted with numerous 
challenges (Stads and Sène, 2011). This situation is particularly disturbing for an 
economy that depends on agriculture and a sector that supports the livelihood of most rural 
population. Owing to these challenges, the sector has witnessed several policy reforms 
aimed at promoting agricultural development in the past and in recent times. The post- 
independence (1960-80s) era policies were characterized by state investment in the 
provision of agricultural inputs, credit and regulating the output market (Masters, 2007; 
Oya, 2006). Due to fiscal crisis and management challenges, state interventions were 
abandoned in the early 1980s (Oya, 2006). This development also marked an ideological 
shift from state interventionist agricultural policies to market sector-led polices promoted by 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. There was a move toward 
liberalization of the agricultural input and output markets through the “Nouvelle Politique 
Agricole” (new agricultural policy) launched in 1984. Apart from the presence of 
International Financial Institutions and other donor organizations coming into the 
agricultural policy arena, there was an inflow of private sector enterprises, non-
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governmental organizations and civil society organizations in the policy arena. 
In view of relatively little success in developing the agricultural sector, a 
consultation process involving multi-stakeholders was initiated in the 2000 to develop the 
“Loi d’Orientation Agro-Sylvo Pastorale” (LOASP) (Resnick and Birner, 2010). The 
LOASP was a grand vision for the agricultural sector and aimed at providing a vision to 
modernize the sector and reduce rural poverty (Oya, 2006; Resnick and Birner, 2010). To 
complement the LOASP, there was the “Grande Offensive Agricole pour la Nourritur et 
l’Abondance” (GOANA) lunched after the 2008 food crisis, which aimed at improving 
domestic food production, reduce food importation and attain self-sufficiency. Under the 
GOANA, state subsidies covered provision of irrigation facilities, subsidized fertilizer (50 
percent reduction of price) and seeds (75 percent reduction) (Stads and Sène, 2011). 
The Programme National D’Investissement Agricole (PNIA) is the current 
agricultural development policy document of Senegal covering an implementation period of 
2011-2015. It was developed through a multi-stakeholder consultation process involving 
national policy makers, donors and civil society organizations. It aimed at capturing diverse 
policy interests in the agricultural policy subsystem (GOS, 2012). The PNIA aligns itself 
to the Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Programme (CAADP) (Plan 
d’investissement, 2011-2015). Similar to the initial agricultural development program, the 
PNIA aims at promoting economic development, achieve food security and poverty 
reduction by 2015 (GOS, 2012). Although the PNIA is the output of a broad stakeholder 
consultation process with eight broad policy objectives, it is generally silent on the policy 
instruments to be used to realize the outlined policy objectives. Observations show that state 
interventions for seed and fertilizer are still the preferred policy choices implemented by the 
government. These policy shifts and the differences in the policy preferences of the 
different actors in the Senegalese agricultural policy subsystem provide a good case study 
for this empirical analysis. 
 
3.4 Research methods 
This section outlines the research design, including the data collection methods and 
the analytical approach used in the study. The combination of a quantitative cluster analysis 
and a qualitative narrative policy analysis aims to make a methodological contribution to 
the existing policy analysis literature. 
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3.4.1 Data collection and interview approach 
To examine the underlining narratives of the contested agricultural policy debates, the 
authors applied Yanow's (2000: 26-39) approach of “accessing local knowledge” through a 
combination of in-depth interviews, participant observations, informal interactions and 
document analysis. The actors involved in agricultural policy making were identified through 
a stakeholder map and categorized into interest groups, think tanks, knowledge providers, 
donors and government policy-makers. The interviewees were selected through purposive 
sampling. Based on this approach, a total of 27 formal in-depth interviews (see Table 3.1), 
eleven informal interviews and two participant observation workshops were undertaken. 
Additional respondents were identified based on the qualitative research principle of 
‘completeness’ (covering the broad spectrum of actors) and ‘dissimilarity’ (respondents with 
diverse perspectives) (Blee and Taylor, 2002). Data triangulation was employed to check 
internal validity and to select additional respondents (Golafshani, 2003). 
The in-depth interviews with stakeholders were conducted using a semi-structured 
interview approach. This follows the recommendation of Roe (1994: 158-62) to use open 
ended questions and without prompting the respondents to facilitate free expressions. The 
interview questions comprised of five broad initial questions framed around challenges 
affecting the agricultural sector, opportunities existing in the sector, vision of the agricultural 
sector, policy instruments and the role of policy actors. All formal in-depth interviews 
were recorded with the consent of the respondents. The interviews lasted for an average 
duration of one hour. The majority of interviews were conducted in French and few in 
English. All recorded interviews were transcribed verbatim for further analysis. All 
interviews were conducted between January 15 and March 6, 2014 in Senegal. 
 
Table 3.1: Interviewed stakeholders 
 
Type Senegal 
Government agencies (Agriculture policy unit, extension and finance) 6 
Academic (Agricultural Economics and Political science) 3 
Research and think tanks 5 
Donor agencies and IFIa 4 
Political party representatives and Parliamentarians 2 
Interest groups (civil society organization) 5 
Local government 2 
Total 27 
 
aInternational Financial Institutions. 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
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3.4.2 Data analysis 
The data analysis process consisted of a content analysis of the transcripts, a two- 
step cluster analysis and interpretative narrative policy analysis. 
 
3.4.2.1   Content analysis of transcripts 
All transcripts were uploaded into the NVivo 10 software for a detailed content 
analysis of each transcript45. The five broad interview questions were used to guide the 
content analysis. Two independent teams, who had regular discussions during the coding 
process to check for inter-coder reliability, conducted this phase. The categories consisted of 
challenges affecting the agricultural sector, vision of the agricultural sector, role of the 
actors and the policy instruments. Total of 25 policy themes relating to the contested 
agricultural policy debates were identified in the transcripts of the respondents. As indicated 
above, the respondents identified those themes without prompting or using lead questions 
(Appendix 3.1). 
 
3.4.2.2   Quantitative data generation and cluster analysis 
Transformation of the qualitative data into a quantitative data set was necessary to 
identify the policy coalitions and coalition members. To transform the data, each policy 
theme identified through the content analysis was assigned a binary value (where 1=Yes if 
the policy theme appeared in the policy narrative of a particular respondent without 
prompting and 0=No if otherwise). A total of 23 transcripts were coded to generate a data 
set using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) software. 
A two-step cluster46 analysis was conducted to explore how the policy actors’ cluster 
around the policy themes identified from the in-depth interviews. The cluster membership 
was determined and cross-tabulated with a policy actor identification variable from the data 
set. The cluster analysis is useful for identifying the number of groups and the group 
composition, and represents the different coalitions based on the policy themes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
45 The analysis was based on only 23 transcripts; the remaining four interviews were not recorded. 
46 A two-step cluster determines the cluster number automatically compared to the K-means and hierarchical 
clustering where the number of clusters must be specified in the analysis. 
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3.4.2.3   Examining the policy story-line 
After determining the coalitions and coalition membership, the policy narratives 
were determined following Roe's (1994) approach of identifying stories and non-stories. 
An interpretive narrative policy analysis approach was employed to identify the stories and 
non-stories of the policy actors (see Feldman et al., 2004: 154-155). The identified policy 
themes were grouped according to constraints and policy instruments. The content and 
structure of the story-line that underlies the identified policy themes were examined in 
detail using the transcripts. During the analysis, several logical plots of policy themes and 
structure of the narratives were carefully examined. The broad interview questions on 
challenges affecting the agricultural sector, policy instruments and vision of the agricultural 
sector were used to guide this process. Based on the definition of stories as having a 
beginning (challenges of the agricultural sector), middle (policy instruments) and end (result 
of implementing policies), or being characterized by a plot of events, a narrative analysis 
matrix was designed to trace and construct the story-lines. The narrative policy analysis 
matrix constructs a plot of identified problems and their causal relationships with policy 
instruments, or traces a policy argument through a premise and conclusion based on the 
transcripts for each policy actor. 
The systematic analysis of the identified themes and structure of the narratives 
resulted in the identification of stories and non-stories that constitute the contested 
agricultural development policy debate. Typically, a story-line can range from few 
sentences, paragraph, a few paragraphs to a whole page in length. For example, a 
respondent’s “fertilizer input subsidy narrative” is constructed by identifying the beginning, 
middle and end of the narrative from the interview transcript as follows: The story starts 
with the problem of depleting soil quality affecting agricultural productivity (beginning 
of story). The problem is said to persist due to high cost of inputs, and the inability of 
farmers to buy fertilizer and other complementary inputs (beginning of story). Fertilizer 
input subsidy provision is recommended for improving soil quality (middle of story). 
Providing fertilizer input subsidy would contribute to improving soil nutrient and 
agricultural productivity (end of story). This will increase farmers’ income; promote 
agricultural and rural development (end of story). A detailed analysis of each transcript 
was undertaken, and the aggregate policy narratives are presented in the next section. 
According to this analysis, the individual story-lines are explicit (they were stated in the 
interviews) but the aggregate narrative is implicit (no single individual stated the whole
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story-line of problems and policy instruments) (see Roe, 1994: 92-93). A summary of the 
narrative analysis matrix is presented in Appendix 3.2. 
 
3.5 Policy narrative coalitions and coalition members 
From the results of the cluster analysis, two coalitions were identified. They are 
labeled as “agricultural support” and “agricultural support critique”47. Table 3.2 shows the 
identified coalitions and stakeholder members in the agricultural policy landscape. The 
agricultural support coalition is larger than the other coalition. 17 interviewees belong to 
this coalition, which is dominated by actors from government ministries and agencies 
(Ministry of Agriculture), academics and interest groups. Six interviewees belong to the 
coalition focusing on agricultural support critique. These coalition members come from 
international financial institutions, think tanks and research organizations. The results of the 
cluster analysis are displayed in Appendix 3.3 and 3.4. A silhouette48 measure of 0.6 
(cluster results) > 0.5 (average measure) indicates that the cluster result is of a “good fit” 
with the two coalitions. This result also suggests that the agricultural support narrative and 
the agricultural support critique narrative are different across coalitions but similar within the 
coalitions. Thus, the views of the policy actors on the policy issues show a high level of 
polarization among the two coalitions on relevant policy instruments in the agricultural 
sector. The next section examines the narratives of the agricultural support and agricultural 
support critique. 
 
Table 3.2: Classification of policy actors 
 
Policy actors Agricultural support Agricultural support 
critique 
Government ministries and agencies  7 1 
Academic 2 0 
Research and think tanks 1 2 
International Finance Institutions 1 3 
Political party representatives 2 0 
Interest groups (civil society organization) 4 0 
Cluster sizes 17 (74%) 6 (26%) 
Cluster quality (Silhouette measure of 
cohesion and separation) 
0.6 
 
Source: Authors' compilation, N=23. 
 
 
47 The names agricultural support and agricultural support critique are used because it reflects the narrative 
structure of the actors forming the individual coalitions. 
48 The silhouette measures cohesion within the clusters and separation among the clusters. The measure provides 
an indication of cluster “goodness of fit”. It ranges from -1 (poor) to +1 (good). 
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3.5.1 The agricultural support and agricultural support critique narratives 
As discussed in the previous section, an interpretive narrative policy analysis 
approach was employed in identifying the agricultural policy stories and non-stories (see 
Feldman et al., 2004; Roe, 1994). Based on the detailed analysis of interview transcripts as 
outlined in the last section, 63 stories and 24 non-stories were identified in the interviews 
of the agricultural support and agricultural support critique coalitions respectively. The 
policy stories and non-stories within the coalitions had a similar story-line but differed 
across the coalitions. The sections below present the stories and non-stories of the two 
coalitions. 
 
3.5.2 Agricultural support stories 
A central story in the agricultural support narrative regards low agricultural 
productivity coupled with other agricultural sector constraints. The narrative is 
contextualized in a Story- line of the agricultural sector characterized by low productivity 
and the need to address this problem. This story-line has an appeal to most policy 
stakeholders, especially government actors, civil society organizations and political party 
representatives. The proponents in the coalition construct the agricultural support narrative 
in a “cause and effect” style. The story-line identifies problems of poor soil fertility, low 
input quality, high cost of inputs, unavailability of appropriate technologies and rainfall- 
dependent agriculture as fundamental constraints contributing to low agricultural 
productivity (Table 3.3). As a solution to this problem, the narratives highlighted the 
potential benefits of government investment in modern farm inputs, irrigation facilities, 
and the provision of input subsidies (for fertilizer and seed) to increase agricultural 
productivity. At the same time, import protection was recommended to facilitate the 
development of the domestic market. In the story-line of the agricultural support coalition, 
such policy instruments will contribute to poverty reduction, increase farm income, provide 
employment for the youth, improve food security, and promote rural and economic 
development. 
 
3.5.2.1   The story of depleting soil fertility and input subsidies 
A recurring theme in the agricultural support coalition story-line was the role of 
poor soil quality and low fertilizer application in contributing to low agricultural 
productivity. A major policy theme in the agricultural support coalition was the inability of
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farmers to purchase fertilizer and other complementary inputs due to high cost, quality 
problems and insufficient quantities on the market. This story-line can be illustrated by the 
following quote from a farmers’ organization representative: “There are no good seeds…so 
seeds come from everywhere, everyone brings what he wants. The ISRA was helping 
farmers, but for about 10 years now we do not have certified seeds. If we don’t have good 
seeds, we cannot have a good harvest....also there is the problem with depleting soil nutrient 
and we need fertilizer (R1)49.” A government official expressed this concern as follows: 
“Besides that, there is also a problem of availability of certified seeds, thus germination is 
not always guaranteed (R19).” To address these problems, the agricultural support 
coalition recommended a fertilizer and seed input subsidy to improve soil quality and 
increase productivity. This recommendation is cast in a wider moral story of farmers 
being poor and unable to access agricultural inputs from the market. The story-line has a 
very systematic “problem and solution” plot. The study found that it has high acceptability 
across the different stakeholders, as evidenced by the wide range of actors and frequency at 
which this particular story-line was identified (see Table 3.3). In the view of the proponents 
of agricultural support, subsidies for fertilizer and seeds will contribute to increasing soil 
fertility, and as a consequence to increase output. Therefore, they will increase 
agricultural productivity and food security. 
 
3.5.2.2   The story of rainfall-dependent agriculture and irrigation infrastructure 
This story-line highlights the dependence of Senegalese agriculture on rainfall, 
which is also seen as a major factor contributing to low agricultural productivity (see Table 
3.3). A government official expressed this concern as follows: “Currently, our agriculture is 
confronted with climatic hazards, especially in the northern region, which affects 
agricultural productivity (R6).” Similarly, a representative of a farmers’ organization 
mentioned that “now there are other factors of production such as water because if 90 
percent of our agriculture depends mainly on natural rainfall, then this is a haphazard type of 
agriculture (R3).” 
The rainfall-dependence narrative is framed in broad climate change context by the 
agricultural support coalition. The strategic reference to a global phenomenon increases the 
acceptance and credibility of the rainfall dependency story-line among policy makers. The 
limited exploitation of the Senegal River and other natural water sources was emphasized 
 
 
49 “R” is used to represent “respondent”; therefore “R1” means respondent number 1. These labels are used 
throughout the paper to protect the anonymity of the respondents. 
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as “under exploitation of water resources” by the agricultural support coalition. Similar to the 
depleting soil story-line, the coalition emphasized the government’s role through construction 
of irrigation facilities to support agriculture production. A respondent mentioned: “we have 
the state; it has the important role to play in terms providing irrigation… (R8).” The broad 
reference to rainfall dependent agriculture and climate change sets the pace for the proposed 
government intervention through irrigation infrastructure by the agricultural support 
coalition. In the view of the coalition, such interventions will enable farmers to increase crop 
cultivation throughout the year. 
 
3.5.2.3   The story of primitive versus modern farm equipment 
The use of the “hoe and cutlass” instead of modern farm equipment was a recurring 
theme in the agricultural support narrative, as indicated by the high frequency of this theme 
(see Table 3.3). This story refers to the low use of improved technology as a major constraint 
to increasing agricultural production. In this story-line, the current farming system is 
depicted as “primitive” and characterized with the use “hoe and cutlass”. The solution is 
seen in the need to “modernize” the agricultural production system through tractor use. 
The drudgery in using hand tools (hoe and cutlass) for farming and the inability of farmers to 
purchase tractors are the dominate policy themes in this story-line. Members of the 
agricultural support coalition associated the use of primitive farming equipment to the 
unavailability of tractors and other modern inputs. A government official described the 
problem as follows: “The government supports producers but this is not adequate… the 
state is currently reviewing it policies to support producers in this direction but this is 
insufficient, especially equipment relating to tractors (R6).” According to a representative of 
a farmers group: “The government should support the manufacturing of new farm machines 
and sell them to farmers as factories that manufacture these machines are not 
available…... also the government has to train our artisans so they can produce some parts 
since this will make the prices affordable for farmers (R22).” 
The agricultural support coalition also associated a perceived disinterest of the youth 
in farming and the migration of rural people to the urban areas with lack of modernization in 
farming. As one respondent said: “I have told you earlier that we cannot feed the nation 
without agriculture. Agriculture in most cases can bring many jobs for young people if 
we take care of it properly. Many young people do not have jobs today and agriculture can 
help create jobs for them. It can bring development; reduce poverty if conditions are 
favorable and we have the right tools to work. This is almost everything I found as being 
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opportunities for Senegalese agriculture (R1).” 
 
Table 3.3: Agricultural support policy themes 
 
 
Policy themes Number of respondents Frequency of occurrence 
Low agriculture growth is caused by: 
Rainfall-dependent agriculture 11 42 
Depleting soil fertility 9 38 
Primitive farm equipment 11 47 
Lack of value addition 14 22 
Lack of market access 11 34 
Unavailability of finance 8 17 
Solving the agricultural problems 
requires: 
Investment in water harvesting technologies 13 25 
Investment in value addition of 
primary products 
8 17 
Modern farm equipment 6 18 
Input subsidy provision: fertilizer and seed 9 53 
Growth in agricultural production will 
lead to: 
Increased farm income 14 40 
Better food security and food sovereignty 7 16 
Reduction in rural poverty 15 35 
Youth employment opportunities 6 22 
Note: The numbers show the frequency of each policy theme in the entire narrative and number of 
actors. N=23. 
Source: In-depth interviews. 
 
3.5.3 Agricultural support critique non-stories 
Similar to the agricultural support coalition, the coalition that formulated an 
agricultural support critique also highlighted the fundamental problem of low agricultural 
productivity (see Table 3.4). This coalition identified underlying reasons such as problems of 
low market prices, inadequate access to credit, declining soil fertility, unavailability of 
improved seeds, climate variability and reliance on rain-fed agriculture. Regarding 
agricultural modernization, the narrative started with the use of primitive farming equipment 
such as hoe, which contributes to low agricultural productivity. As a representative of a 
donor organization mentioned: “Since the agricultural sector is characterized by low capital 
investment, I think it is also a constraint to modernization, farm equipment is 
rudimentary, particularly in the groundnut basin. Access to adequate farm equipment is 
very worrying and thus the difficulty in promoting a modernized agriculture. I will take the 
example of irrigation, based on fairly restrictive irrigation equipment; farmers are confined to 
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very limited portions of land and production, although land is not a problem (R21).” 
Although the agricultural support critique identified the same fundamental problems 
affecting the agricultural sector as did the agricultural support coalition, their narratives 
emerged out of a series of criticisms, especially against the agricultural input subsidy 
program. Examining the structure of the argument, these were essentially non- stories. In the 
narratives of the agricultural support critique, efficient use of limited resources, 
unsustainability of input subsidy policies and the distributional challenges of input 
subsidies were main policy themes. An official expressed these points as follows: “There 
are problems of resource allocation, when you take a sector like agriculture, much of the 
resources have been directed to subsidies of seeds and fertilizer but we have very low 
productivity, impacts are still low. We spend this large amount of money, which could have 
been invested in building irrigation facilities …there is a huge potential to develop 
agriculture in the Kédougou region but the financial resources are not forthcoming, the 
priorities are mainly targeted toward seed and fertilizer subsidies (R15).” 
The problem that input subsidies might crowd out private investment is a similar 
critique, which is directed against government input subsidy programs. According to the 
members of the agricultural support critique coalition, fertilizer inputs are private goods 
that require private investment rather than government investment. In this story-line, 
government investment in fertilizer creates a disincentive for private investment. A 
representative of a research organization expressed this concern as follows: The “government 
should avoid crowding out investment. That is if the government invests in places where 
the private should invest. I, as a private person, I am not going to have any incentive to 
invest, because the government is already doing what I should do. For example, providing 
fertilizer to farmers, fertilizer is something I should buy normally if my activity is profitable. 
If the government is providing fertilizer, where am I going to invest my money? So 
government spending should bring a crowding in effect and not a crowding out effect (R20).” 
The problem of poor targeting is another concern in the story-line of the agricultural 
support critique coalition. In the view of the coalition members, fertilizer and seed subsidies 
are diverted to benefit government officials, and they mostly benefit large-scale farmers 
rather than small farmers and thus making input subsidy policy options ineffective policy 
instruments for agricultural development. In the view of some opponents of government 
input subsidies, such support measures are mainly implemented for political reasons. A 
policy researcher said: “Many governments are taking such a subsidy approach; they are 
politically efficient but not economically efficien
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not an economic mode (R20).” 
A representative of a donor organization recommended: “Why don’t you 
(government) develop a strong agricultural credit market, so that farmers can go there and 
access this credit at a subsidized rate, this will allow the fertilizer and seed market to 
develop rather than government intervention… in any case there is really much to do in 
terms of funding and it needs to be more rational for greater efficiency in the long run. Try to 
set up an efficient financial system that will replace these agricultural subsidies that dry the 
budget of the Ministry of Agriculture out, but do not provide any expected results (R21).” 
The coalition emphasized the need for the private sector to lead investment rather than 
government input subsidy provisions. 
 
Table 3.4: Agricultural support critique policy themes 
 
Policy themes Number of respondents Frequency of occurrence 
Low agricultural growth is caused 
by: 
Rainfall dependent agriculture 4 11 
Depleting soil fertility 3 6 
Primitive farming equipment 2 11 
Lack of investment by smallholder 
farmers 
2 4 
Why are subsidies not the solution? 
Input subsidy provision by the 
government is not a sustainable 
solution. 
6 17 
Subsidies are costly. 5 15 
Subsidies benefit mostly large farms 
not the small farms. 
3 8 
Subsidies cause crowding out of 
investment. 
1 3 
Subsidies are politically efficient but 
not economically efficient. 
1 2 
Provide subsidized credit through 
banks 
1 2 
Note: The numbers show the frequency of each policy theme in the entire narrative and number of 
actors. N=23. 
Source: In-depth interviews. 
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3.6 Discussion and conclusions 
The analysis presented in the last section suggests that examining the prevailing 
stories and non-stories of policy coalitions provides insights into the policy beliefs of actors 
in the agricultural policy landscape. In the case study of Senegal, the finance ministry was a 
member of the agricultural support critique coalition, while the agricultural ministry was a 
member of the agricultural support coalition. This suggests that there are differences in 
policy beliefs among domestic policy makers, which also confirms the findings of Jayne 
and Rashid (2013). These authors showed that domestic opponents of input support policies 
have generally been confined to the ministries of finance. Kanbur (2001) focuses on the 
finance ministry and civil society. The identification of a “donor coalition” and “domestic 
coalition” by Mockshell and Birner (2013) also points to the differences in policy beliefs. 
In line with the ACF, members with similar policy beliefs within the identified 
coalitions will interact and engage in a significant degree of coordination to influence 
policy outcomes (see Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999; Sabatier and Weible, 2007). The 
composition of the coalition provides insights into the resources that a coalition may have 
and the potential impact of efforts to promote different policy beliefs in the policy process. 
Politically influential and powerful interest groups with relatively limited financial resources 
author the agricultural support stories. In contrast, financially influential and powerful 
interest groups author the agricultural support critique narrative. 
As outlined in the last section, the agricultural support narrative and the agricultural 
support critique narrative differ in their narrative structures. A general narrative strategy of 
the agricultural support coalition is to refer to issues that are well known. This may be seen 
as an effort to increase credibility and gain narrative hegemony. The agricultural support 
coalition also frames its arguments in the context of wider nationalist and global debates of 
agricultural modernization and food sovereignty. Policy concerns regarding agricultural 
productivity problems are captured in food security story-line, which paints a moral image 
that increases the acceptability and credibility of input subsidies. Thus, the agricultural 
support coalition provides a more convincing story-line with a beginning, a middle and 
an end (Roe, 1994). 
The agricultural support critique coalition uses a different narrative strategy. It 
highlights the consequences of input subsidy policies favored by the government. This 
strategy aims to increase acceptability and credibility of the alternative policy proposal not 
to subsidize the agricultural sector. This coalition made frequent rhetorical references to 
possible negative consequences, which are captured in statements such as: “Subsidies are 
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an expensive component of the government budget”; “There is lack of transparency 
regarding the fertilizer and seed input subsidy distribution”; “Subsidies crowd out private 
investment”; “Subsidies do not reach the poor”; “Subsidies are politically efficient but not 
economically efficient.” Such statements highlight the negative consequences of providing 
input subsidies. The use of counter-arguments to criticize the agricultural support stories 
presents a weaker form of argument in the policy debate. In the agricultural support critique 
narrative, there are no clear policy suggestions to solve the identified problems of low 
productivity. All that these stories do is criticize agricultural support policy instruments. 
Therefore, the agricultural support critique narrative fits Roe's (1994) description of non-
stories, as they lack a beginning, middle and end. As Roe (1994) points out, the non-stories 
only complicate matters and increases policy uncertainty. 
These narratives are still important in policy making, even though they are non- 
stories. The concerns about low productivity are valid and strengthen the agricultural 
support narrative. As of now, the coalitions’ tend to engage in discursive war to gain 
hegemony and institutionalize their preferred policy preferences. An alternative approach 
would be to achieve a “discursive turn” through policy-oriented learning. Policy-oriented 
learning could target the coalitions; examine the coalition’s policy beliefs and the 
coalitions’ resources in the policy process. A discursive turn helps to reduce policy 
uncertainty, resolve the long standing contested policy debates and promote agricultural 
development. For example, a discursive turn could focus on reduced and targeted subsidies, 
as a middle ground between the two coalitions. 
To initiate such a discursive turn as a prerequisite of policy change, the discursive 
nature of the agricultural support story-line and agricultural support critique need to be 
carefully examined in their policy context. Policy design should then accommodate the 
differences in policy beliefs and acknowledge the criticisms in the design and 
implementation of policies. Such measures could provide a way forward to promote 
agricultural development. The role of policy brokers with significant presence in developing 
countries such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the International Food 
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) could be critical to provide evidence- based research and 
advocacy to support policy oriented learning within and among the coalitions. The 
annual meeting of the Regional Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System 
(ReSAKSS) could also provide forums to engage different policy stakeholders and facilitate 
policy belief updating among and within the coalitions. 
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Overall, the analysis presented in this study suggests that complementing the 
Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) with Narrative Policy Analysis is a useful approach 
to explore the agricultural policy subsystem and better understand the prevailing 
agricultural policy choices in developing countries. The novelty of the research design 
presented here lies in the combination of quantitative cluster analysis to identify policy 
coalitions and qualitative narrative policy analysis to examine stories and non-stories. Most 
importantly, the findings suggests that an examination of the stories and non-stories of 
policy actors involved in the contested debates is critical to understand the policy ideas of 
different stakeholders and why certain policies are more preferred and promoted by 
different coalitions. 
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4 AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY MAKING: 
 WHAT ARE THE POLICY PROCESSES AND WHO ARE 
 THE INFLUENTIAL ACTORS 
 
Jonathan Mockshell and Regina Birner 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Despite renewed efforts to develop the agricultural sector in Africa, there are 
divergent policy beliefs among policy actors. Using a case study in Ghana as an example, 
this paper examines how divergent policy beliefs translate into policy programs. The 
analysis focuses on two important agricultural policy programs: The Block Farms Program 
and the agricultural investment program developed under the Comprehensive Africa 
Agriculture Development Program called the Medium Term Agriculture Sector Investment 
Plan (METASIP). The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) guided the analysis. A 
discourse analysis approach and a participatory mapping tool called Process Net-Map were 
the main analytical tools applied. The empirical results reveal two divergent policy 
processes: (1) the METASIP policy process, which involved broad stakeholder consultation, 
but considered donors as the most influential policy actors in the process; and (2) the policy 
process leading to the Block Farms Program, which did not feature donors as actors in the 
policy process, and was less consultative. A fundamental difference between the two 
programs relates to the policy orientation: The Block Farms Program takes a public sector 
approach, while METASIP stresses private sector participation in agricultural service 
provision. Thus, this case study indicates that basic differences in policy beliefs between 
donors and domestic policy makers translate into different policy programs through parallel 
policy processes. 
 
 
Keywords: Agricultural development program, policy processes, policy beliefs, Ghana 
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4.1 Introduction 
Agriculture remains the most important sector for reducing poverty and employs 
60-80 percent of the economically active population in many African countries. Yet, 
progress in the agricultural sector in Africa has been relatively poor compared with other 
regions in the world. Fundamental to this common problem is the set of policies adopted 
by national governments, which largely depend on the policy process, as well as the 
implementation and evaluation of policy programs. In many African countries, the phrase 
“good policies on paper and bad implementation strategies” is often used to suggest the 
disconnection between policy programs and implemented programs. This disconnection is 
partly due to the complexity of the policy landscape and the role of competing beliefs among 
policy actors during the policy process (James Keeley and Scoones, 1999; Whitfield, 2012). 
Consider the cases of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and the more recent 
Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP) policy processes. 
These approaches have focused on the “ideal” types of processes (Cabral and Scoones, 
2006) or the text book type of policy process. This “ideal” type of policy process has 
focused more on what the policy process should be than on what is the actual policy 
process (Cabral and Scoones, 2006). 
Past PRSP processes aimed to make policy processes broad-based and participatory. 
The PRSP processes served as a request for developing countries to access loans from 
major internationals donors (Molenaers and Renard, 2006). Such processes sometimes led to 
disappointment, as policy outcomes from the participatory process were not implemented. 
This was especially the case when the initial PRSP processes ignored the role of the 
parliament in the policy process (Hubli and Mandaville, 2004). The lack of success in the 
PRSP process also led to initiatives such as the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 
2005 and the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) in 2008, which highlighted the need for 
partner countries to take effective leadership and coordinate their development policies 
(OECD, 2010). Ownership, alignment, harmonization, results, and mutual accountability are 
key principles of both the Paris Declaration and the AAA (OECD, 2010). With the 
wave of democratization in Africa in the early 1990s, international development 
organizations, particularly the World Bank, championed participatory policy processes as a 
requirement in designing country PRSP (Resnick and Birner, 2010). Recent efforts have 
also promoted participatory and evidence-based policy processes. Often these policy 
processes are based on pre-defined principles of broad stakeholder participation and the 
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alignment of policies to existing frameworks, which have been the strategy of the 
Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP) in recent times. Yet, it 
is acknowledged among scholars that broad participatory policy processes do not 
automatically guarantee a desired policy outcome (Mohammed, 2013; Resnick and Birner, 
2010). 
In a policy domain, the policy process is influenced by competing policy positions, 
politics, and influential policy actors who are part of a policy network (Keeley and Scoones, 
2003). The policy networks promote their ideas and interests in a policy process with their 
political resources: social capital, human capital, and financial resources (Sabatier and 
Weible 2007). Policy networks are described as the micro units in the policy process, 
which helps to deconstruct and understand the complexities of the policy process. Some 
scholars have applied policy network analysis in the fields of authoritative policy making 
and public administration (Sandström and Carlsson, 2008). Several studies have contributed 
to the theoretical understanding of policy networks through social network analysis (Rhodes 
and Marsh, 1992; Thatcher, 1998), and there is a growing number of empirical studies 
in this field (Blom-Hansen, 1997; Dredge, 2006). Although policy networks form a 
fundamental component of the policy process, there is limited empirical work analyzing 
these issues, especially the agricultural policy domain of developing countries. However, 
most empirical studies have focused on Europe and North America. There is also a limited 
number of studies that analyze the complexities of policy processes in developing countries 
(Ragasa and Babu, 2011). Understanding the existing policy processes, who the influential 
policy actors are, and what their roles are, is vital to improving the policy process and 
promoting agricultural development. This paper analyzes the agricultural policy process 
and examines competing discourses using, as case study examples, two important programs 
in Ghana: the Medium Term Agricultural Sector Investment Plan (METASIP) program and 
the Block Farms Program. Based on the ACF, a participatory mapping tool called Process 
Net-Map was used to analyze the agricultural development policy processes in Ghana. The 
next section provides a background on agricultural sector policies in Ghana. Section 4.4 
presents the ACF. The research methods are presented in Section 4.5. The empirical 
findings and policy strategies are presented in Sections 4.6 and 4.7, respectively. 
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4.2 Agricultural policy concerns and policy processes in Ghana 
Ghana’s economy is largely dependent on the agricultural sector and its cocoa 
export revenues. Since independence, special initiatives have promoted agricultural 
development through various Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). Ghana has also 
signed up to the CAADP program, aiming to achieve a 6 percent growth rate in agricultural 
productivity and investing 10 percent of its national budget in the agricultural sector. Such 
initiatives led to the design of the METASIP. The PRSPs development is also required to 
be participatory and have a wide stakeholder consultation at the national, regional, and 
district levels. Common policy concerns found in both the METASIP document and the 
Food and Agricultural Sector Development Policy (FASDEP) relate to low agricultural 
productivity. These include the constraints of rainfall-dependent agriculture, low use of 
modern inputs, low levels of mechanization in production and processing, high post- harvest 
losses, limited agricultural financing, inadequate market access, inadequate extension service 
delivery, and poor livestock management. 
 
4.3 Government agricultural policy strategies 
The government of Ghana is implementing four special programs, namely the Block 
Farms Program (or Youth in Agriculture), Buffer Stock Program, Agricultural 
Mechanization Service Centers Program, and Fertilizer Input Subsidy Program. The 
programs aim at increasing agricultural productivity and modernizing the agricultural sector. 
The Agricultural Mechanization Service Centers Program was introduced to make 
mechanization services timely and affordable to farmers. The program provides credit to 
qualified private sector companies at a price and interest rate subsidized by the government. 
It complements the Block Farms Program and offers tractor services to private farms. 
Private companies receive a package of five tractors and corresponding implements. 
The companies are expected to deposit 10 to 17 percent of the loan value and repay the 
remaining amount over a period of five years (Benin et al., 2012). 
The Fertilizer Subsidy Program and the National Food Buffer Stock Program were 
integrated and implemented simultaneously. The Block Farms Program is designed to 
employ economies of scale and to lower unit cost of inputs and service delivery. It targets 
large tracts of land in different locations and specific crops, depending on their 
comparative advantage. Target beneficiaries (rural youths and other farmers) are provided 
with subsidized fertilizer and certified seeds through the fertilizer subsidy program and 
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mechanization services on credit through the agricultural mechanization service centers 
program. Beneficiaries are expected to repay the credit in kind after harvest. The National 
Food Buffer Stock program was created to purchase the output from farmers. It sets a 
guaranteed minimum price before production and fixes a maximum price during the lean 
season to control price hikes (Benin et al., 2012). The focus on the youth by the program is 
part of the youth in agriculture program of the government. This approach of supporting 
smallholder agricultural development with modern inputs is a deviation from the market- 
oriented approach described in the FASDEP II and the METASIP. 
 
4.4 The Advocacy Coalition Framework and discourse analysis 
The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) developed by Sabatier and Jenkins- 
Smith provides concepts that are relevant for explaining policy processes (Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith, 1993). In the ACF, a policy sub-system is the unit of policy analysis; it 
comprises government, private, academia, and civil society organizations, as well as donor 
agencies and non-governmental organizations that are actively concerned with policy 
problems (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, 1994). Actors in the policy subsystem that share a set 
of normative and causal policy beliefs can be grouped into an advocacy coalition (Jenkins- 
Smith et al., 2014; Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, 1994). The coalition identifies a problem and 
forms beliefs about possible instruments to address the problem. The belief system includes 
implicit theories about how to achieve certain objectives, perceptions about efficacy of 
policy instruments, value priorities, and perceptions of important causal relationships 
(Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, 1994; Majone, 1980; Sabatier, 1988). In general, a policy 
belief system can be classified into: (i) deep core beliefs, which are difficult to change; 
(ii) policy core beliefs referring to solutions that may change; and (iii) secondary beliefs, 
which are policy beliefs that are easy to change (Birner, et al., 2011;Weible, 2007). Policy 
beliefs influence the policy processes through different advocacy coalitions that exist in the 
policy subsystem. 
During the policy making process, policy actors express their concerns and policy 
ideas through discourse. “Discourses are an ensemble of ideas, concepts and categories 
through which meaning is given to social and physical phenomena, which is produced and 
reproduced through an identifiable set of practices” (Hajer, 2006: 70). A discourse is made 
up of structures embedded in language use and should be traced by the analyst (Hajer, 
2006). The use of metaphors and story-lines plays a key role in constructing discourses. A 
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story-line expresses the facts of a phenomenon; it has a starting point, a middle, and an end 
(Hajer, 2006). Metaphor is an emblem of a general issue expressing it in a way everyone 
understands (Hajer, 2006). Discourses help to group policy actors into a number of discourse 
coalitions (see Chapter 1.3) if: (i) the actors share a set of normative or casual beliefs, and 
(ii) the actors engage in a degree of coordinated activity over time (Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith, 1999). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Conceptual framework 
Source: Adapted from Birner et al. (2011: 22) and Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier (1994: 181). 
Policy beliefs, 
Resources, and 
Interests 
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4.5 Research methods and data collection 
This section describes the research methods, data collection procedure, and analysis 
used in this paper. 
 
4.5.1 Process Net-Map approach 
The Process Net-Map was employed to examine the policy processes of the 
agricultural programs. This approach is useful in mapping a policy process in a 
participatory manner (see Birner, Cohen, and Ilukor, 2011). Although a guideline might 
provide specific instructions for a policy process, in reality, an actual process might be 
different from a predefined guideline. The Process Net-Map provides a systemic procedure 
for mapping policy processes. This approach helps to find both formal and informal actor- 
networks and influential actors in a policy process. Since the Process Net-Map combines 
qualitative in-depth interviews and visuals, it provides a rich form of data. The Process 
Net-Map was used in mapping the Block Farms Program and the METASIP program of 
the government of Ghana. 
 
4.5.2 Procedure for implementing the Process Net-Map 
The mapping of the Block Farms Program and the METASIP policy processes 
using the Process Net-Map approach involved three main phases (see Schiffer, 2007). In 
phase one, the respondents were asked to list all the participants involved in the policy 
process. Next, the respondents were asked to describe the sequence of the policy process 
and the role of the actors in the policy process. The interviewer mapped each step of the 
sequence with arrows and numbers. Next, the level of influence of each actor in the policy 
process was identified. The level of influence is defined as the stakeholders’ ability to drive 
the policy process and policy outcome using technical information and provision of funds. 
The level of influence was defined by asking the respondents to place towers of different 
heights on the actors they perceived to have exerted influence (i.e. pushing for a particular 
policy choice) during policy making. In addition, the respondents were asked to explain 
their reasons for the ranking. The Process Net-Map approach is exhibited in Figure 4.2. 
Two Process Net-Maps were produced for each policy process. 
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Figure 4.2: Process Net-Map approach 
Source: Authors. 
 
4.5.3 Sampling procedure and interviews 
Purposive sampling was applied in selecting the respondents. The aim of getting 
“expert opinion” guided the selection of the respondents for the Process Net-Maps. Each 
Process Net-Map was completed in about three hours. The Snowballing approach was 
used to select additional respondents for in-depth interviews. These respondents were 
international, national, regional, and local government actors who are actively engaged in 
the agricultural policy landscape in Ghana. For each interview, the respondents were asked 
two broad initial questions framed around the policy process, role of actors, role of finance, 
and level of influence of the actors in the process. This approach made it possible for the 
respondents to express themselves in their own words. Triangulation was employed to 
cross-check information from respondents to obtain diverse opinions. Most of the interviews 
were tape-recorded with permission from the respondents. Table 4.1 shows the actors 
involved in the Process Net-Map and the in-depth interviews conducted. 
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Table 4.1: Interviewed stakeholders 
 
 Block Farms 
Program policy 
process (number of 
participants) 
CAADP policy 
process (number of 
participants) 
Total number 
of interviews 
Group interviews using the 
Process Net-Map 
17 6 23 
Individual interviews without 
the Process Net-Map 
3 12 15 
Note: Two Process Net-Maps were produced for each program. Source: 
Authors. 
 
4.5.4 Stakeholder maps analyses 
The Process Net-Maps were consolidated into a single map for the CAADP policy 
process (METASIP program) and the Block Farms Program. For each of the Process Net- 
Maps, the average situation was considered in the consolidation of the maps. In this case, 
similarities between the actors and the links were also studied. 
 
4.5.5 Discourse analysis 
During the fieldwork, the interviews were recorded and transcribed. Memo-writing 
was used to identify the main themes. The transcripts from the field were uploaded into 
NVivo 10 software. The original texts were coded; metaphors and story-lines were 
identified. 
 
4.6 Results 
Based on the ACF described in the previous section, this section presents results 
from the Process Net-Maps and discourses of the policy actors. 
 
4.6.1 CAADP policy process 
This section describes the CAADP policy process that led to the design of the 
METASIP program. The role of policy actors and their levels of influence are described. 
 
4.6.1.1   Actors and roles 
Figure 4.2 illustrates the policy process that led to the development of the METASIP 
program and the subsequent signing of the CAADP. During the CAADP round table 
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process, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) secretariat and 
donor organizations contacted the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MoFA) to develop a 
sector policy that aligns to the CAADP framework. A CAADP steering committee was set 
up in consultation with MoFA, and subsequently a CAADP focal person from the Policy 
Planning and Monitoring Division (PPMED) of the MoFA was appointed. The MoFA 
appointed consultants to prepare a draft policy program. The consultants were provided with 
technical support from the National Development Planning Commission, the University of 
Ghana, the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and donor organizations. 
Next, the MoFA initiated broad stakeholder consultations at the national, regional, and 
district administrative levels of the country to present the draft document and to discuss 
other policy options. The major stakeholders in the consultation process included 
government ministries and agencies, traditional authorities, civil society organizations, non-
governmental organizations, financial institutions, local government, and the parliamentary 
select committee on agriculture. The signing of the CAADP compact marked the final stage 
of the process that led to the METASIP. The donors provided financial assistance for the 
technical and consultation processes. 
 
4.6.1.2   Influence levels of actors 
In this context, influence level is defined as the ability of actors to use technical 
information to drive and push for a particular policy choice in a policy process. Knowing 
the perceived influence level of the actors helps in understanding the power structures in 
the policy process and identifying the potential weaknesses in the consultation process. 
From Figure 4.3, the donor organizations were perceived as exerting the highest level of 
influence and driving the policy process (influence level = 6). The higher influence score 
assigned to the donors is based on their ability to provide data and other forms of evidence 
(e.g. success cases from other countries) to influence the policy process. Next, the 
ECOWAS, which initiated contact to national policy actors, was ranked as the second most 
influential actor in the policy process (influence level = 5). The international research 
organizations, specifically IFPRI, provided data and results to guide the policy process, and 
was assigned an influence level of 4. The academic institution (University of Ghana) and 
MoFA were both assigned an influence level of 3. Academic institutions provided expert 
information and the Ministry of Agriculture coordinated the consultation process. The 
Parliamentary Select Committee on agriculture was assigned an influence level of 2; as 
 100  
 
was the case with other stakeholders, they were mainly consulted to comment on the final 
METASIP document. The National Development Planning Commission, Farmer-Based 
Organizations (FBOs), Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and non-governmental 
organizations had the lowest influence (level 1 to 2) in the policy process. 
 
 
1. Discussion of CAADP framework with MoFA (CAADP country round table process) 
2. Provided technical expertise to MoFA and assisted in developing METASIP 
3. Provided financial assistance to MoFA for the consultation process  
4.Consultation process and developing  METASIP   
5. Signing of CAADP compact based on the draft 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Process Net-Map of the CAADP policy process (METASIP program) 
 
Source: Authors. 
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Figure 4.4: Influence level of actors in the 
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4.6.2 Block Farms Program policy process
 
4.6.2.1   Actors and roles 
The government of Ghana reintroduced the Block Farms Program in 2009 to
agricultural production and promote food security. Figure 4.5 illustrates the policy
of the Block Farms Program. The past Minister of Agriculture (Hon. Kwesi Ahwoi) initiated 
the program. The whole policy process was simple and the
the cabinet level. The initial
Block Farms Program idea with the President (John Evans Atta
Minister consulted the Ministry of Food and Agriculture to develop
to the office of the President. The proposed Block Farms Program
Parliamentary Select Committee for Agriculture to discuss and allocate
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program as part of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture budget. The Youth in Agriculture 
Secretariat was established in Accra by the Ministry of Food and Agriculture to coordinate 
and implement the program. The Finance Ministry allocated funds for the program 
through the Ministry of Agriculture. 
 
 
 
1. Minister discussed the concept with the President in 2009 
2. Minister consulted the Ministry of Agriculture to draft a proposal for the program  
3. Proposal is submitted to the Office of the President by the Minister 
4. The Office of the President submitted the proposal to the Parliament  
5. MoFA established a Youth in Agriculture Program Secretariat  
6. Funds for implementing the program is channeled through MoFA  
 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Process Net-Map of the Block Farms Program 
 
Source: Authors. 
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4.6.2.2   Influence level of the actors 
The President and the Minister of Agriculture were perceived as the most influential 
in the Block Farms Program (influence level = 3) since they were the main drivers of 
the program. The President’s commitment to the program also led to the quick allocation 
of budget for the implementation of the program. The role of Parliament, especially the 
Parliamentary Select Committee for Agriculture was crucial in approving and allocating 
financial resources to the program (influence level = 2). The Ministry of Agriculture had 
an influence level of 1, as they were mainly involved in coordinating the program, while 
the Finance Ministry did not have any influence in the policy process. 
 
4.6.3 Discourse of the policy processes 
Content analysis of the in-depth interviews reveals some differences between the 
CAADP (METASIP program) and the Block Farms Program policy processes. The 
fundamental differences relate to the stakeholder consultation process, the role of finance, 
evidence-based policies, policy beliefs, policy alignment, the role of Parliament, process 
compliance, the role of the agricultural ministry, and political parties. Table 4.2 highlights the 
major differences between the two policy processes. 
 
Table 4.2: Fundamental differences in the policy processes 
 
Indicators CAADP/METASIP Block Farms Program 
Stakeholder consultation Wide stakeholder participation Consultation at the ministerial 
level 
Evidence based policies Situation analysis based on data, 
models and best practices 
Situation analysis based on 
domestic policy concerns 
Role of Parliament Consulted like other 
stakeholders 
Responsible for approval and 
budget allocation 
Policy beliefs Private sector led focus for 
service provision and 
developing institutions 
Government sector focus for 
service provision and Public 
Private Partnership 
Political parties No involvement Derived from party manifesto 
Role of finance Proposed finance from donors Government finance 
Policy alignment and 
process compliance 
CAADP alignment and process 
compliance 
Political party manifesto 
alignment and domestic process 
compliance 
Ministry of Agriculture Coordinator of policies and 
organizing stakeholder 
workshop 
Implement program 
Source: Authors. 
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4.6.3.1   Stakeholder participation 
The CAADP policy process emphasizes the role of wide stakeholder consultations. 
This is captured in the words of an expert hired to support the development of the 
METASIP program, who said: “The effort to consult was very good.”50 Another 
respondent expressed: “The value addition of the CAADP policy process is that it has 
increased the level of stakeholder consultation, which was not there in the past.”51 On the 
contrary, an agricultural policy expert said: “But I do find some limitations in the level of 
participation because at the regional level you cannot bring everybody. We always asked 
for a cross-section of people to come including farmers. We do not know the basis of 
selection of those stakeholders, sometimes farmers came but because of the language 
barriers, especially woman farmers, their contribution was limited. The format of the 
consultation was such that it was limiting the participation of some people.”52 A leader of a 
farmers’ association critical of the stakeholder consultations process expressed: “You see, 
they are aware of identified groups like ours. However, when it comes to the consultation 
processes, because they know we will talk, criticize, and say something, they do not invite 
us. They go [to the villages] and take farmers who will come and sit through without 
saying a word.”53 Another respondent mentioned that “[Sometimes] stakeholders are only 
invited to participate in the policy process after the final policy document has been 
developed; they just come to endorse what has been prepared.”54 
Contrary to the wide stakeholder consultation of the CAADP policy process, the 
Block Farms Program process was “narrow” and decisions were taken at the ministerial 
level of government.55 In the case of the Block Farms Program, after “political will” was 
created at the executive branch of government, the proposed program was submitted to the 
Parliament for debate, approval, and budget allocation.56 However, in the case of CAADP, 
the Parliament was consulted as a stakeholder in the policy process. The parliament did 
have to debate or allocate resources for the implementation of the METASIP. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
50 Interview with academic, Accra, September 11, 2012. 
51 Interview with MoFA official, Accra, October 12, 2012. 
52 Interview with academic, Accra, September 11, 2012. 
53 Interview with Farmer Association, Accra, September 10, 2012. 
54 Interview with NGO, Accra, August 31, 2012. 
55 Interview with MoFA official, Accra, September 11, 2012. 
56 Interview with MoFA official, Accra, November 16, 2012. 
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4.6.3.2   Roles of evidence-based policies and knowledge 
The donor organizations highlighted their contribution in developing countries. 
Accordingly, an official of a donor organization expressed: “We engage as much as possible 
with policy makers in government, the donors and the private sector; lobby organizations, 
commodity platforms and we lobby for policy changes. Providing them with evidence and 
examples where policies are not working even in other countries. We advise based on 
examples from other countries and [provide] documentation and data from other places 
which is always useful for the policy makers.”57 
In a general sense, domestic policy makers’ view of the donors’ role is mixed. 
Some respondents view them as supporting the design of domestic policies with their 
experience and knowledge. Others view them as promoters of “external interests” and 
“drivers of the policy process”. Accordingly, an official of an NGO expressed: “I think the 
role that donors’ play is to guide us. We are still a young country and we may not know 
everything. They have a deeper and richer experience not only of their own country, but 
other countries that were at the place we are now but have gone ahead. Therefore, they 
really contribute to guiding us but we should also conceptualize the idea even before we 
bring them. What is it that we want as a country? How can we get that thing? It should not 
be that they drive us to develop the METASIP. If they drive us to develop this and they 
step aside when it comes to implementation, it is difficult. Otherwise, if they drive us to do 
this they must also drive us to implement it. That does not show maturity as a nation.”58 
The respondent further mentioned: “We must come out with our concept, this is what we 
want and this is how we want to get there, but we need support in this area or that area. For 
example, if we talk about agricultural statistics and data collection, how are we able to 
estimate that Ghana for 2011, we were producing or we have produced 100, 200 or 500 or 
800 (000) MT of maize. How correct is this? How do they do it in their own country? What 
techniques, what tools do they use for this work?”59 Concerning data in producing evidence-
based policies, an academic researcher mentioned that donors drive the policy process 
because they are experts and have a rich source of data, which the Ministry of 
Agriculture does not have.60 The respondent further mentioned that the consultation process 
is wide and includes farmers, but questioned, “To what extent are their views 
reflected? and Whose views are reflected? That is why we say that whoever has the data 
 
57 Interview with donor organization, Accra, October 12, 2012. 
58 Interview with NGO, Accra, August 31, 2012. 
59 Interview with NGO, Accra, August 31, 2012. 
60 Interview with academic, Accra, September 9, 2012. 
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turns to dominate the final outcome.”61 Accordingly, an official from an NGO said: “Donors 
propose projects and finance them depending on their interest.”62 An academic 
respondent also mentioned, “Policy formulation is driven by the donors but policy 
implementation is [driven] by policy makers”.63 
 
4.6.3.3   Roles of policy alignment and power relations 
Although the METASIP program and Block Farms Program aim at agricultural 
sector development, the METASIP is private sector oriented for service delivery, and 
focuses on developing institutions, while the Block Farms Program has a state-oriented 
approach. The Block Farms Program approach offers input to farmers and is linked to other 
government program endeavors, such as providing mechanization services to farmers and 
price support through a national buffer stock program. These differences are also evident 
during policy making. This is captured by the words of a policy consultant, who said that 
during the consultation process: “People were also asking for price support but the strong 
views of the donors and so on, said that we cannot have this kind of price support. So it 
was not brought in the policy document.”64 A respondent concluded, “Our policies are 
negotiated and the negotiations are based on the political power of the entities around the 
negotiation table.”65 This respondent also added, “The question is on what do they negotiate 
and what is your power? How strong are you? Taking farmers’ associations for example, 
who are these farmers’ associations?”66 
 
4.7 Discussion and policy strategies 
The analysis presented in the previous section revealed two divergent agricultural 
policy processes. A donor-favored policy process as described in the case of the CAADP 
policy process and a domestic-favored policy process as shown in the case of the Block 
Farms Program. The CAADP policy processes that led to the design of the METASIP 
program followed a wide stakeholder participation approach. Prior to consultations, a 
situation analysis was conducted by research organizations to provide evidence to guide 
 
 
 
 
 
61 Interview with academic, Accra, September 9, 2012. 
62 Interview with NGO, Accra, August 17, 2012. 
63 Interview with academic, Accra, September 9, 2012. 
64 Interview with academic, Accra, September 1, 2012. 
65 Interview with academic, Accra, September 9, 2012. 
66 Interview with academic, Accra, September 9, 2012. 
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policy making. Funding for the consultation process was provided by donor organizations. 
On the other hand, the Block Farms Program involved a narrow decision-making process 
and situation analysis was based on domestic policy concerns. The Block Farms Program is 
government funded and implemented by the Ministry of Agriculture. In line with the 
ACF discussed in Section 4.4, the difference in policy processes can be traced back to the 
differences in policy ideas or the role of competing policy beliefs. A fundamental difference 
between the two programs is the policy orientation. The Block Farms Program aims at the 
provision of agricultural services through public funding, whereas the METSIP program has 
a private sector focus. These differences could potentially affect political will to implement 
certain policy programs. Thus, it is essential to promote a more consensus- oriented 
approach to bridge the gap between the two divergent policy processes. This can include 
deliberative strategies (see Habermas, 1984, 1989), policy-oriented learning (Sabatier and 
Weible, 2007), and building new coalitions (see Birner, Gupta, and Sharma 2011: 193-
206). The Habermasian approach shows that reaching a consensus is a vital component 
of the communication process (Habermas, 1984; Rydin, 1999). 
Potential of deliberative democracy: The interviews show that most actors feel they 
were only asked to endorse the final METASIP program document, and were not part of 
the consultations process. To deal with these weaknesses in the current stakeholder 
consultations processes, deliberative strategies should increase acceptance and legitimize 
policy outcomes. In line with the ACF applied in this study, “deliberations may aim at 
reaching a consensus for practical action without requiring a consensus in core beliefs or 
central policy beliefs” (Birner, Gupta, and Sharma, 2011: 201). This approach places 
emphasis on collective decision-making to reach a legitimate policy outcome that is 
acceptable to the policy actors based on mutual understanding (Gastil and Levine, 2005). 
The concepts of citizen jury and consensus conferences have proven successful in 
reaching consensus in developed countries (Gastil and Levine, 2005), and could help 
improve the policy processes in developing countries. 
Promote policy-oriented learning: Policy-oriented learning is associated with 
changes in the belief system of policy actors or policy networks. Policy learning by the 
policy actors is promoted not only through the understanding of problems and the associated 
solutions, but also through the use of political strategies for achieving objectives (Jenkins-
Smith et al., 2014: 198). The concept of policy-oriented learning can play an important role 
in bridging the gap between the donor-favored and the domestic-favored policy process. 
 108  
 
Scientific and evidence-based research generated by research organizations can provide 
information to promote policy learning. Policy brokers can play a vital role in using 
research to promote learning across the coalitions. International organizations such the 
Food and Agriculture Organization and the International Food Policy Research Institute can 
serve as potential policy brokers to conduct research and promote learning. Such learning 
will seek to examine the differences in policy concerns and to promote understanding of the 
policy issues across the coalition. 
Building new coalitions: In the METASIP policy process, the donors are considered 
to be the most influential policy actors, but they were not mentioned in the policy process 
of the Block Farms Program. The President was identified as the most influential actor in 
the Block Farming program. This suggests that political will plays an important role in the 
implementation of policy programs. Without adequate political will, the best policies will 
not necessarily be implemented. In some cases, policies will only be partially implemented. 
Building new coalitions has the potential to bring the two policy processes together and 
facilitate the sharing of policy ideas. Some policy actors might not necessarily change their 
policy beliefs in the short run, but could agree to some of the issues raised by other policy 
actors based on mutual understanding. As Rydin (1999) argues, dialogue among actors is 
essential to achieving consensus and fostering togetherness. Platforms that are already in 
existence, such as the Agricultural Sector Working Groups (ASWG) meetings and the 
annual agricultural sector review workshops, can serve as potential forums to dialogue, 
promote policy learning, update policy beliefs, and build new coalitions to promote policy 
change. The annual meetings of the Regional Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support 
System (ReSAKSS) can seek to promote policy-oriented learning and deliberations. 
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Abstract 
 
The Community Animal Health Workers (CAHWs) system has been promoted as 
an alternative solution to providing animal health services in marginal areas. Yet, access to 
quality animal health services remains a fundamental problem for livestock dependent 
communities. This paper uses the concepts of accessibility, affordability and transaction 
costs to examine the perceptions of livestock keepers about the various animal health service 
providers. The empirical analysis is based on a survey of 120 livestock-keeping 
households in the Tolon-Kumbungu and Savelugu-Nanton districts in the Northern Region 
of Ghana. A multinomial logit model was used to determine the factors that influence 
households’ choice of alternative animal health service providers. The results show that, 
the government para-vets are the most preferred type of animal health service providers, 
while CAHWs are the least preferred. Reasons for this observation include high transaction 
costs and low performance resulting from limited training. In areas with few or no 
government para-vets, farmers have resorted to self-treatment or to selling sick animals for 
consumption, which has undesirable health implications. This paper finds that, the 
CAHWs’ system is insufficient for providing quality animal health services to the rural poor 
in marginal areas. Therefore, market-smart’ alternative solutions requiring strong public 
sector engagement to support livestock farmers in marginal areas and setting minimum 
training standards for animal health service providers merit policy consideration. 
Key words: Animal health services, Community Animal Health Workers 
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5.1 Introduction 
Livestock keeping supports the financial, human and social capital needs of about 
70 percent of the world’s poor in developing countries through direct income provision for 
farming activities, medical care, finance and education, as well as serving as a social 
safety-net (FAO, 2011). Yet, poor livestock keepers in marginal areas often lack access to 
affordable clinical and preventive animal health services (Awa and Achukwi, 2010). 
Diseases such as contagious bovine pleurapneumonia (CBPP) and peste des petits ruminants 
(PPR) among others continue to affect livestock production and inflict losses to livestock 
keepers (Awa and Achukwi, 2010; FAO, 2011). Providing quality and sustainable animal 
health services to livestock dependent communities is a key to reducing economic losses and 
human health risks associated with animal diseases. 
To provide quality and sustainable animal health services, most governments in 
developing countries promoted private practices and discontinued the automatic 
employment of veterinarians (service providers with a university degree in animal health 
training) and of para-vets (service providers with a diploma or certificate in animal health 
training). However, private practice is limited to some urban areas and in the intensive 
production systems, but not in livestock dependent marginal areas. As a result, the 
Community Animal Health Workers (CAHWs, community members with limited training) 
have been promoted to fill the gap in providing animal health services to the poor (Awa and 
Achukwi, 2010; Randolph et al., 2007). Although the CAHWs succeeded in improving 
access to animal health services in some marginal areas, there are growing concerns that 
their qualifications and the quality of the services that they provide are subpar (Lamichhane 
and Shrestha, 2011). 
The privatization policy interventions in developing countries have created a 
livestock service delivery environment in which a limited number of government employed 
para-vets are working alongside CAHWs and private para-vets. This study examines 
livestock keepers’ perceptions of the various service providers in Ghana. The multinomial 
logit model (MNLM) was used to determine the factors that influence households’ choice of 
alternate service providers. The MNLM has been widely used in human health research 
(Kuunibe and Dary, 2012; Zhu et al., 2010) but to the best of our knowledge no studies have 
applied it to animal health. This could be attributed to the fact that several studies in animal 
health decisions have been focused on binary choices, rather than nominal choices, for 
which the MNLM is very useful. Although our interest was in the use of CAHWs, which 
would permit the use of a binary model, Cheng and Long (2007) argue that restriction of 
 113  
 
choices when they exist is unacceptable in applied research. 
 
5.2 Materials and methods 
 
5.2.1 Study area 
The study was conducted in the Tolon-Kumbungu and Savelugu-Nanton districts of 
the Northern Region of Ghana. The region and districts were purposively selected because 
of the importance of livestock to livelihoods there. In addition, the CAHWs system was 
successfully implemented in this region: there are two trained CAHWs per community. The 
proximity of the districts to Tamale (the regional capital) makes it practical for some 
trained para-vets to work in the districts. Each district has about five government employed 
para-vets. 
 
5.2.2 Sampling technique 
A two-stage cluster sampling technique was employed because no sampling frame 
existed at the district level. A list of the names of communities in each district was obtained 
from the respective district assembly. Based on the Water and Sanitation (WATSAN) 
mapping report there were 278 communities in the Tolon-Kumbungu district and 149 
communities in the Savelugu-Nanton district at the time of the study (WATSAN, 2009). 
First, four communities were randomly selected from each district. Second, 15 
livestock households were randomly selected from each community. A total of 120 
livestock households were interviewed using a structured questionnaire from the eight 
randomly selected communities in the two districts. The questionnaire was designed to 
generate information on household perception about livestock health service delivery 
indicators such as affordability, access to service providers, access to drugs and transaction 
cost of service delivery. Information on households’ demographics and farming activities 
were also generated. The quantitative data was complemented with three focus group 
discussions in three communities of the two districts, Moglaa, Libga and Zokuga. The data 
was collected between May and July of 2011, with assistance from a translator and three 
trained enumerators. The enumerators are all natives of the region, speak the local language 
and, at the time, were final year agricultural science students from the University of 
Development Studies, Nyankpala. 
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5.3 Data analysis 
 
5.3.1 Perception of service delivery systems 
Farmers were presented with six livestock service delivery indicators: physical 
access to service providers, access to drugs from service providers, access to animal health 
information, cost of drugs from service providers, cost of livestock services and overall 
performance. The indicators follow the components of the scoring framework used by 
Mcleod and Wilsmore (2002). ‘Access’ refers to willingness of providers to supply 
service and the time taken to find a health care provider. For each indicator, farmers were 
asked to rank (1=highest to 4=lowest) the government para-vets, private para-vets, 
CAHWS and self-treatment (STS). After ranking, the respondents were asked to explain 
the reasons behind the preferred choice of ranking. A Kendall’s rank analysis was 
performed using the SPSS software. The Kendall’s coefficient of concordance (W) was used 
to test the agreement among the ranks of the indicators (Gearhart et al., 2013). 
 
5.3.2 Financial loss to livestock keepers 
The method for estimating financial loss or loss in profitability due to livestock 
diseases followed the concept of Garrett et al. (2013) and Milberg and Hallgren (2004) 
in assessing yield loss or yield reduction in livestock and crops. This study uses a 
similar approach to estimate the profit loss to farmers due to contagious bovine 
pleurapneumonia (CBPP) in cattle and peste des petits ruminants (PPR) in goats and sheep 
as expressed in Equation 1 below. 
   loss in value 100×
−
=
h
sh
P
PP
     (1) 
Ph refers to the price of a healthy animal and Ps refers to the price of a sick animal sold by 
livestock farmers. The Ps and Ph values were obtained from livestock keepers. 
 
5.3.3 Econometric approach 
Pre-testing of the questionnaire revealed that if their livestock become ill farmers 
have some options from which to choose. They either treat the animal by buying the drugs 
(self-treatment), or they seek the services of a CAHW or a private para-vet (PPV), or a 
government para-vet (GPV). A farmer’s choice of a particular service provider depends on 
his utility index, which is a function of farmer specific characteristics. Since choices are 
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nominal rather than binary, the study employed an MNLM. Its computation is simple and 
the parameter estimates are easy to interpret (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010). Because MNLM 
is only appropriate when the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA)67 assumption is 
not violated, the Hausman test was performed. The results revealed that the IIA was not 
violated. Equation 2 shows the dependent variable (CHOICE) and independent variables, 
where β is the vector of parameters to be estimated. Table 5.1 describes the independent 
variables used in the econometric model. The dependent variable has four categories (PPV, 
GPV, STS and CAHW), with GPV set as the reference. Although, any of the four 
alternatives can be selected as the references category, GPV was automatically selected in 
the model because is the most frequently used system. The model is normalized by setting 
coefficients of the reference alternative (GPV) to zero. Therefore, the results are interpreted 
by comparing other alternatives to GPV use. The model was estimated with STATA 12 
software. 
 
 CHOICE = + AGE + OBJECTIVE + EDUC + LAND + INCOME +4 50 1 2 3
D ISTANCE + CARE + COST + TLU + OFFINCOME
76 8 9 10
β β β β β β
β β β β β
 
Table 5.1: Description of variables used in econometric model 
 
 Description Measurement Mean 
AGE Age of household head Years 48.12 
OBJECTIVE Objective for keeping 
livestock 
1=Cash income 0=Otherwise 0.61 
EDUC Formal education attained by 
household head 
Number of years 1.80 
LAND Land size of household Number of acres 14.30 
INCOME Income from sale of livestock Household income for last 12 months 
(GHS) 
922.25 
DISTANCE Distance to service provider Distance in kilometers 7.73 
CARE Care intensity Number of hours spent in treating 
livestock 
2.12 
COST Cost of animal health 
services 
Sum of transport, drug cost and labor 
cost (GHS) 
16.49 
TLUa Tropical livestock unit Bull= 0.7 cattle=0.6, goat or sheep=0.1, 
chicken= 0.01 
6.33 
OFFINCOME Off-farm income 1= Household has off-farm income 
0=Otherwise 
0.37 
 
Note: Ghanaian cedi (GHS); a Figures based on International Livestock Center for Africa (ILCA) 
indicators. 
Source: Authors. 
 
 
67 The assumption of IIA is that the choice of a given alternative over the other is not affected by the presence of 
other alternatives (Hilbe 2009: 396). 
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5.4 Results 
 
5.4.1 Livestock farmer and service provider characteristics 
The average age household head is 48 years old, and 96 percent of household heads 
are male. Only 10 percent of the farmers have primary level education and 85 percent have 
no formal education. Most respondents (92.5 percent) keep livestock and grow crops as 
their main occupation. Almost every household keeps the local breed of poultry, sheep and 
goats with a mean flock size of 29, 14 and 12 respectively, while 46 percent of the farmers 
own an average of 11 cattle. Livestock is mainly kept under a semi-intensive production 
system. With a daily income of US$1.25 per day, 61.7 percent of the households are below 
the poverty line. While 50 percent of households below the poverty line have a cash 
income motivation for keeping livestock, only 22 percent of those above the poverty line 
have cash income as their main reason for keeping livestock. 
Government para-vets were the most used service providers by livestock keepers 
(Table 5.2). The proportion of farmers who self-treated livestock was higher than those 
who used the services of CAHWs. On average, the government and private para-vets travel 
about eight kilometers to reach farmers in their communities. Focus group discussions 
revealed that most para-vets, especially the private para-vets, operate shops that sell 
medication for animals. 
 
Table 5.2: Livestock service delivery systems used by livestock keepers 
 
Service providers Percentage 
Government para-vets 57 
Private para-vets 16 
CAHWs 12 
Self-treatment system 15 
Total 100 
 
Source: Authors. 
 
5.4.2 Perception of livestock service delivery systems 
The government para-vets were perceived as the best performing animal health 
service providers relative to the other service providers. The CAHWs’ system was ranked as 
the least accessible (Table 5.3).The government para-vets had the highest rank in terms of 
accessibility to service providers and access to animal health information. For cost of
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drugs, the private para-vets had the highest rank. For treatment cost, self-treatment was 
ranked highest. 
 
Table 5.3: Perception of animal health service delivery systems (Rank analysis) 
 
Perception 
Indicators 
Government 
para-vets 
Private 
para-vets 
Community 
Animal Health 
Workers 
Self- 
treatment 
System 
Kendall'sW
a 
Physical access 1 2 3 - 0.56 
Access to drugs 1 2 4 3 0.35 
Access to information 1 2 3 - 0.33 
Cost of drugs 2 1 4 3 0.22 
Cost of services 2 3 4 1 0.55 
Overall performance 1 2 4 3 0.47 
 
Note: 1=Highest rank to 4=Lowest rank, W=0.54 and p-value=0.00 for all livestock service delivery. 
W value represents the degree of agreement. 
Source: Authors. 
 
5.4.3 Financial loss to producers 
Some farmers noted that once early symptoms have been identified and when it is 
too difficult to access qualified service providers, they sell their livestock in order to 
salvage their household income. Table 5.4 shows the financial losses from the most prevalent 
diseases: CBPP in cattle and PPR in small ruminants (sheep and goats). There is a marginal 
difference between the treatment cost for small ruminants and the livestock values. Table 
5.5 shows the cost of treating CBPP and PPR. Since CBPP and PPR are viral diseases, the 
cost components include the cost of controlling other related bacterial infections like 
pneumonia. 
 
Table 5.4: Financial loss to livestock keepers due to diseases 
 
Value of: Livestock 
value (GHS) 
Difference value 
(GHS) 
Costs of 
treatment (GHS) 
Loss in 
livestock value 
( percent) 
Healthy sheep 69 
22.0 18.4 32** 
Sick sheep (PPR) 47 
Healthy goat 66 
22.5 18.4 33** 
Sick goat (PPR) 44 
Healthy cattle 859 
412 54.9 48* 
Sick cattle (CBPP) 447 
Note: loss value = difference value/value of healthy livestock, *significant at 10 percent and 
** significant at 1 percent.  
Source: Authors. 
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Table 5.5: Cost of livestock treatment 
 
Cost components Average cost of treating 
sheep and goat affected 
by PPR (GHS) 
Average cost of treating 
cattle affected by CBPP 
(GHS) 
Transport cost for 3 days 
(Fuel and oil cost) 
13.0 30.0 
Labor per animal for 3 days 3.0 12.9 
Cost of drugs per animal for 3 days 2.4 12.0 
Total 18.4 54.9 
 
Note: Cost components are based on three treatment days for visit of government para-vets. 
Source: Authors. 
 
5.4.4 Factors influencing farmers’ preference 
Table 5.6 shows results of the multinomial logit regression. The model is statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level Prob> Chi <0.001. Results show that compared to GPV 
use, the likelihood of PPV use was lower for farmers who had some level of education, 
cash objective for keeping livestock, income from livestock production, large land sizes and 
higher treatment cost. Farmers who had off-farm income were likely to use PPV compared to 
GPV use. 
 
Table 5.6: Determinants of animal health service providers (Multinomial logit model) 
 
 PPV service provider CAHW service provider Self-treatment of livestock 
 Coef Z Coef Z Coef Z 
AGE 0.031 1.29 -0.061** -2.02 - 0.041 -1.39 
OBJECTIVE -2.144** -2.30 -2.419** 2.20 -1.833* -1.74 
EDUC -0.197** -2.35 -1.657 0.01 -0.183* -1.84 
LAND -0.076*** -2.81 -0.102** -2.32 -0.107** -2.50 
INCOME -0.001** -2.51 -0.000 -1.47 -0.000 -0.81 
DISTANCE 0.060 0.52 0.198 1.46 0.015 0.11 
CARE -0.729** -2.35 -0.247 -0.67 -0.432 -1.21 
COST -0.130** -2.49 -0.197*** -2.89 -0.241*** -3.44 
TLU 0.061 1.03 0.106 1.51 0.041 0.57 
OFFINCOME 2.134** 2.29 1.411 1.18 2.129** 2.03 
CONS 5.482 2.81 1.656 0.69 3.536 1.58 
Number of obs=119 
LR Chi2 (33)=60.25 
Prob>Chi=0.0009 
Pseudo R2=0.2201 
 
Note: GPV is the reference category. ***,**,*, refers to significance level at 1 percent, 5 percent and 
10 percent respectively. 
Source: Authors.
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Compared to GPV use, the likelihood of CAHW use was lower for farmers’ older 
in age and who had: higher treatment cost, cash objective for keeping livestock and large 
land sizes. High treatment cost decreases likelihood of farmers self-treating livestock 
compared to GPV use but availability of off-farm income increases likelihood of self- 
treatment compared to GPV use. Results show that compared to GPV use, likelihood of 
self-treatment of livestock was lower for farmers who had cash motives, some level of 
education and large land sizes. 
 
5.5 Discussion 
 
5.5.1 Perception of service provider attributes 
The government para-vets (GPVs) are the most preferred and more widely used 
animal health service providers by livestock keepers than CAHWs and private para-vets 
(PPVs). This is consistent with Leonard et al. (2013) review, which shows that, clients 
demand for service providers with superior competence. The better performance of GPVs 
(as indicated by farmers’ rankings) compared with CAHWs and private para-vets could be 
associated with the fact that government para-vets easily consult veterinarians who 
supervise them. Also, PPVs were perceived to be more cost effective than GPVs and 
CAHWs in terms of drugs, because most of the PPVs operate animal drug shops, thus 
retailing to other service providers. The CAHWs were ranked as having the highest 
operating costs and being the least accessible. This is attributed to the fact that CAHWs do 
not often have drugs available and livestock keepers have to pay the transportation cost of 
CAHWs to buy drugs from the nearest town and pay for treatment charges. Yet, livestock 
keepers could call GPVs on their mobile phones, and have them come with drugs to treat 
sick animals or take advantage of their presence in the community when they visit other 
farmers. These results contradict the popular view that the presence of CAHWs will 
necessarily translate into better access and affordable service delivery. Catley et al. (2004) 
expressed this view in the past and recently by Lamichhane and Shrestha (2011). 
 
5.5.2 Financial losses 
The high costs of treatment and the limited number of government employed para- 
vets have contributed to the significant losses that livestock keepers incur as a result of 
CBPP and PPR diseases. As Rich and Perry (2011) noted livestock disease disrupt markets,
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reduce household asset base and increases vulnerability of livestock dependent households. 
Discussions with farmers revealed that when they anticipate losing all of their livestock 
because no qualified service providers are accessible and the cost of service delivery is too 
high, they resort to selling their sick livestock rather than treating them, thus creating an 
informal market for sick livestock. The distress sale of sick livestock after identifying early 
disease symptoms is an attempt to salvage household income. Although this practice 
appears rational, it has undesirable implications. Human health complications could result 
from consuming unhealthy livestock products. Beyond human health impacts, the distress 
sale of sick livestock could plunge livestock dependent households into a poverty cycle. 
Distress sale of livestock is associated with increased poverty, thus policy strategies should 
aim at protecting the livestock assets of the poor. 
 
5.5.3 Preference of service providers 
The higher a livestock keeper’s age and education level, the less likely they are to 
use CAHWs and PPVs, and the more likely they are to use government para-vets. This 
finding suggests that, all things being equal, advancing in either age, and increasing years of 
education decrease CAHWs and PPVs use compared to GPV use. This observation 
agrees with findings by Lamichhane and Shrestha (2011) in the Kaski District of 
Nepal. Their results show that an increase in age and higher education level increases 
demand for qualified service providers. CAHWs will need to acquire superior knowledge 
through adequate training in animal health care and refresher courses to remain valuable and 
active in the community. Livestock keepers that own more land and have higher incomes are 
also less likely to use CAHWs and PPVs compared to GPVs use. Land and income are 
measures of wealth, therefore farmers with more land and income could have the capacity to 
seek more qualified services. This concurs with findings of Irungu et al. (2006) in Kenya 
and Lamichhane and Shrestha (2011) in Nepal. 
Findings from this study show that, there is a trend toward government para-vets 
use compared to other service providers. While the CAHWs may be useful in implementing 
disease control programs such as vaccination exercises, they are insufficient in meeting the 
animal health needs of farmers in marginal areas. Therefore, ‘market smart’ alternative 
solutions involving strong public sector engagement in training more para-vets are essential, 
while at the same time synergies between the private and public sectors must be harnessed. 
Training more qualified para-vets and establishing them in strategic communities could 
reduce costs and provide sustainable services to livestock dependent communities. These 
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trained staff should be linked to private input dealers so they can get inputs at affordable 
prices. Alternatively, the poor could be targeted through a livestock service delivery voucher 
system. Government regulation in setting minimum standards for training of para-
professionals and regular supervision by veterinary staff should also be enforced. 
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Abstract 
The liberalization of clinical veterinary services in Kenya introduced new service 
providers into the animal health service sector. This study examines the perceptions of 
livestock farmers regarding these service providers and analyses the factors that influence 
their choice of alternative service providers in Kakamega County. The empirical analysis 
shows that private animal health assistants were perceived to provide better services than 
alternative providers because they are more accessible and offer services on credit. Results 
from a multinomial logit model reveal that more educated, wealthier and older farmers are 
more likely to use government services. The study concludes that it is imperative to better 
target the poor and to integrate private service providers into government animal health 
programs. 
 
Key words: Veterinary service provision, Privatization, Poverty, Public health, Kenya 
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6.1 Introduction 
Livestock plays a significant role in the livelihoods of livestock producers in 
developing countries, as it is a source of high-quality food, income and draught power. 
However, animal diseases constitute a major threat to livestock production (FAO 2011; 
Forman et al., 2012). Well-managed and effective veterinary services are crucial for 
protecting the livelihoods of livestock farmers and also for limiting the public health risks 
posed by zoonotic diseases (Forman el al., 2012), thereby reducing the disease burden on 
the human population (Grace et al., 2012). The current trends of agricultural intensification 
and environmental change have led to an increased risk of zoonotic disease emergence 
(Jones et al., 2013), while the capacity of developing countries to deal with zoonotic 
diseases remains limited (Halliday et al., 2012). Hence, it is imperative to improve veterinary 
service provision. 
As in other developing countries, efforts to reform veterinary service provision in 
Kenya in the early 1990s resulted in the privatization of most veterinary services, especially 
clinical services. This reform abolished the automatic recruitment of veterinary graduates by 
the government (Oruko et al., 2000), but retained the services of government- trained animal 
health paraprofessionals. The main objectives for retaining the paraprofessionals were (a) to 
provide animal health services to poor livestock producers who could not afford private 
services, and (b) to continue the surveillance of zoonotic diseases (Oruko et al., 2000). Next 
to government animal health assistants are privately practicing animal health assistants, 
who have formal veterinary training. There are also service providers operating in Kenya, 
who do not have any formal training (non-trained service providers). They are commonly 
referred to as “quacks”. This study examines farmers’ perceptions of these different types of 
service providers and analyses the factors that influence their choices among the three 
different types of service providers. 
 
6.2 Materials and methods 
The study was conducted in Kakamega North District in Western Kenya, which was 
purposively selected because livestock plays an important role there. The study employed a 
two-stage cluster sampling technique to select a total of 128 livestock-keeping households. 
Data on household characteristics, perceptions and use of service providers was collected 
using a structured questionnaire. Livestock keepers’ perceptions of different service 
providers were assessed using performance indicators, following a scoring framework 
developed by Mcleod and Wilsmore (2002), which was recently used by Mockshell et al. 
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(2014). A multinomial logit model (MNLM) was applied to identify the factors that 
influence the farmers’ choices among the three different types of service provider68. 
 
6.3 Results 
Private animal health assistants (PAHAs) were overall ranked higher than 
government animal health assistants (GAHAs) and non-trained service providers (NTSPs). 
They were ranked as number one with regard to the following performance criteria: 
accessibility; attitude; access to information and service provision on credit (Table 6.1). 
However, in terms of treatment cost, PAHAs were perceived to be more expensive than 
GAHAs and NTSPs. With regard to the cost of drugs, GAHAs were perceived to be more 
expensive than PAHAs and NTSPs. 
 
Table 6.1: Farmers’ perception of different types of animal health service providers 
 
Perception attributes Government 
Animal Health 
Assistant 
(GAHAs) 
Private 
Animal 
Health 
Assistant 
(PAHAs) 
Non-Trained 
Service 
Provider 
(NTSPs) 
Kendall'sWa 
Accessibility of service 
provider 
Attitude of service 
provided 
Access to information 
Service provided on credit 
Cost of drugs  
Treatment cost 
Overall rank 
2 1 3 0.68 
2 1 3 0.64 
2 1 3 0.43 
2 1 3 0.82 
3 2 1 0.59 
2 3 1 0.44 
2 1 3 0.86 
 
Note: 1=Highest rank to 3=Lowest rank, W=0.73 and p-value=0.00 for all livestock service delivery. 
W value represents the degree of agreement. NTSPs refer to service providers without formal 
training in animal health service delivery. 
Source: Authors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
68 Farmers’ who self-treated livestock are part of the non-trained service provider category in the MNLM 
analysis. Further analysis was undertaken to disaggregate self-treatment and only non-trained service providers 
into separate categories, there was no significant difference between the two results. The probability of farmers 
who self-treated livestock to perform similar services for other farmers underpins the aggregation. Three 
service providers with university degree in animal health training are part of the private animal health assistant 
category. 
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The results of multinomial logit regression model (Table 6.2) show that the 
likelihood of choosing GAHAs over PAHAs was higher for older livestock farmers; for 
those with formal education; for those who keep livestock for a cash income; and for those 
who have a higher farm income and off-farm income. Farmers with larger herds were also 
more likely to use GAHAs than PAHAs. The analysis suggests that an increase in the cost 
of treatment increases the likelihood of using GAHAs over PAHAs. Livestock keepers 
who have a lower off-farm income are more likely to use NTSPs than PAHAs. The cost of 
service provision and the distance to the service provider increased the likelihood of using 
NTSPs rather than PAHAs. This may be due to the fact that farmers located in more 
remote areas have to rely on NTSPs and pay higher prices because remote areas are less 
likely to be served by private service providers. The likelihood of using NTSPs compared to 
PAHAs was also found to be higher for livestock keepers with a higher number of Tropical 
Livestock Units, but the coefficient for this effect was rather small. 
 
Table 6.2: Results of multinomial logit analysis 
 
 
Variables 
Government Animal Health 
Assistant (GAHA) 
Non-trained Service Provider 
(NTSP) 
 Coefficient Z Coefficient Z 
Age 1.619** 2.11 -1.493 -0.13 
Cash objective 2.562** 2.49 -2.862** -2.49 
Education 0.184* 1.73 0.501 0.12 
Land 0.023 0.52 -0.018 -0.40 
Distance -0.213** -2.17 0.021* 1.74 
Client care -0.604 -0.78 -0.343 -0.29 
Cost 1.135* 1.95 0.813** 2.13 
TLU (Herd size) 1.42** 1.55 0.033*** 2.91 
Farm income 0.008* 1.82 0.045 0.02 
Off farm income 2.58*** 3.54 -1.903** -2.44 
Constant 6.236 3.52 2.250 0.129 
Number of obs = 128 
LR Chi2 (19) = 202.71 
Prob > Chi2 = 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 = 
0.6485 
    
 
Note: PAHA (Private Animal Health Assistant) is the reference category, TLU=Tropical Livestock 
Unit. *, **, *** refers to significance level at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent. 
Source: Authors. 
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6.4 Discussion 
The results from this study show that PAHAs were the preferred service providers 
because they are perceived to be more accessible, offer services on credit, charge lower 
prices and provide better client care as compared to GAHAs. These results are in contrast 
with a study by Mockshell et al. (2014), who found that in the Northern region of Ghana, 
GAHAs were perceived to be more accessible and to offer services at lower prices than 
PAHAs. This difference may be due to the fact that livestock production in Kakamega 
County is semi-intensive with a high potential of dairy production, whereas Northern Ghana 
is a semi-arid region with a low potential for dairy production. The demand for private 
veterinary services has been found to be higher in semi-intensive and intensive systems 
(Oruko and Ndung’u, 2009), and in countries with stronger veterinary legislation that 
discourage NTSPs (Ilukor et al., 2014). These factors provide incentives for the training of 
private animal health assistants and hence increase their availability. 
The results from the multinomial logit reveal that educated and older livestock 
farmers as well as those with higher farm and off-farm income and larger herds are more 
likely to use the services of GAHAs as compared to PAHAs. This finding suggests that 
GAHAs have the tendency to serve richer livestock keepers rather than poorer ones. This 
could be due to the fact that experience, wealth, income and education are important social 
capital assets that improve access to agricultural services, as was found, for example, by 
Hoang et al. (2006) for the case of Vietnam. A longer distance to the service provider and 
higher treatment costs were found to reduce the likelihood of using GAHAs versus PAHAs, 
and to increase the likelihood of using NTSPs versus PAHAs. These results are consistent 
with findings by Ahuja (2004) and Oruko and Ndung’u (2009), who found that long 
distances and high transaction costs deter livestock keepers from demanding private 
veterinary services. 
These findings have serious implications because they imply that richer households 
are more likely benefit from government animal health programs. Poor farmers, in contrast, 
have to rely more on non-trained service providers, who are less able to provide quality 
services, resulting in a higher probability of loss of livestock, and also in a reduced capacity 
to control zoonotic diseases. Therefore, it is imperative for policy makers to encourage 
government services to better target the poor and to promote the integration of private 
animal health service providers into government animal health programs. Pursuing such 
pro-poor policy options will contribute to providing affordable and quality services, which 
is essential for improving the livelihoods of livestock farmers and for improving public 
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health by better controlling for zoonotic diseases. Such policies are also relevant for other 
developing countries that privatized their veterinary services. 
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7 DISCUSSION 
This thesis aimed at contributing to a better understanding of the debates in 
African agricultural policy making, with a view to identify potential policy strategies 
that could help to overcome these disputes. Based on the analyses conducted in Chapters 2 
through 6, and using the conceptual framework developed in Chapter 1 as guidance, the 
discussion of the main findings below examines the following five questions: (1) Who 
are the main actors in the policy landscape? (2) What are the major contested agricultural 
policy issues that feature in the policy debates in the four case study countries? (3) What 
are the main policy beliefs of the different policy actors? (4) How do policy beliefs 
influence policy outcomes? (5) What was the outcome of implementing market-oriented 
policy reform prescriptions, taking animal health services as an example? In the 
second part of this chapter, the limitations of the case studies are discussed. 
 
7.1 Beyond self-interest: The role of agricultural policy beliefs 
The agricultural economics literature on the political economy of agricultural 
policy has been based on the rational choice paradigm. As discussed in the introductory 
chapter, the literature has considered the roles of interest groups, patron-client relationships, 
competitive elections, donor influence, and political ideology in explaining agricultural 
policy choices. However, the role of policy beliefs has been largely neglected in the 
literature. A policy belief system includes aspects of value priorities, perceptions of 
important relationships, perceptions of the magnitude of a problem, and perceptions of the 
efficacy of policy instruments. (Sabatier, 1988: 132). Policy beliefs are expressed through 
discourse. Actors could also use discourse to justify their policy positions and possibly to 
disguise their own interests (Van Dijk, 2004). The economics literature implicitly assumes 
that policy belief and discourse only serve this function (i.e., they justify policy positions 
and self-interest). Put simply, policy beliefs have been considered as endogenous to actors’ 
economic and political interests; they are captured in political economy models and thus 
can be overlooked (see Chapter 1.3.1). Recent quantitative analysis has revealed that policy 
beliefs matter, however, the literature has only considered broad ideological orientations 
(left wing versus right wing) (see Chapter 1.3.1). The analyses performed in this thesis 
complement the existing explanations. Therefore, this thesis contributes to the literature 
explaining agricultural policy choices in Africa and draws attention to the role of 
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agricultural policy beliefs in the policy process. The discussions below, based on findings 
from different case studies, highlight the role of policy beliefs in policy processes. 
The results from the three case studies considered in Chapters 2 through 4 suggest 
that agricultural policy beliefs of actors play an important role in policy formulation and 
policy adoption. Analysis of policy actors’ discourse from Ghana, Uganda, and Senegal, 
presented in Chapters 2 and 3, identifies two main discourse coalitions. In each case study 
country, the coalitions have divergent policy beliefs and differ in coalition membership. 
Based on the coalition composition, they are labeled either “donor discourse coalition” or 
“domestic discourse coalition”. In all three case studies, the results reveal that the finance 
ministry and international financial institutions are members of the donor discourse 
coalition, while the agricultural ministry, parliamentarians, and political party 
representatives are in the domestic discourse coalition. These results are consistent with the 
findings of Jayne and Rashid (2013) in selected Sub-Saharan African countries. They 
explained that domestic opponents of input support policies have generally been confined to 
the ministries of finance. This result is also supported by a study by Birner et al. (2011) in 
India, which found that the ministry of finance has been a strong proponent of market- 
oriented fertilizer reform. The presence of international financial institutions in the donor 
coalition emphasizes their increasing role in domestic agricultural policy making. In many 
African countries, international financial institutions interact with policy actors to shape 
domestic policies. Such interactions could generally explain the similarities in policy beliefs 
of international financial institutions and ministries of finance. This relates particularly to 
maintaining fiscal discipline and strengthening the capacity of the ministries. On the other 
hand, members of parliament and ministries of agriculture position themselves as advocates 
of farmers’ welfare; they have the mandate to ensure domestic food security and develop 
smallholder agriculture. This view of domestic policy makers influences their policy beliefs 
and plays a role in their policy choices, as found in Chapters 2 and 3. 
The similarity in policy beliefs between political actors and ministries of agriculture 
is likely due to their interaction. Technocrats in the ministries of agriculture engage with 
political actors, and translate the policy ideas of politicians into agricultural programs. The 
results from Chapters 2 through 4 suggest that the ministries of agriculture engage with 
political actors by coordinating government supported agricultural programs. The 
implementation of such government-supported programs indicates a “primacy of domestic 
politics”. This finding is consistent with the study by Lele and Jain (1991) on donor aid 
experience in Africa. They argued that despite strong donor influence on capital 
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accumulation, African governments have managed to pursue their own sociopolitical 
objectives in choosing and undertaking strategic investments (Lele and Jain, 1991: 593). 
This observation by Lele and Jain (1991), and the findings in Chapter 4 of this study 
relating to the implementation of government preferred policy programs, are also supported 
by Poulton (2014). The author argued that there is still a “primacy of domestic politics”, 
and referred to cases in Malawi and Kenya, where despite donor influence, the 
governments still implemented their own policies (Poulton, 2014). The results of this 
study, which are further explained below, suggest a fundamental role of policy beliefs in 
influencing decision makers’ policy choices. 
The two coalitions have fundamental differences in policy beliefs regarding what is 
needed to develop smallholder agriculture. The discourse analysis results discussed in 
Chapters 2 and 3 suggest that the two coalitions have similar policy beliefs regarding low 
agricultural productivity problems, but they have divergent policy beliefs on which policy 
instruments are appropriate for solving the problems. Dependence on rain-fed agriculture 
and its effect on agricultural production was acknowledged by the domestic and donor 
coalitions in the Ghana and Senegal case studies. While commonly acknowledging low 
agricultural productivity and other challenges affecting the agricultural sector, the two 
coalitions in all three case studies had divergent policy beliefs about which instruments 
should be used to address the problems. The main conflicting policy beliefs were on the 
provision of fertilizer and seed input subsidies, mechanization, and youth involvement in 
agriculture. On the one hand, the members of the domestic coalition believe that providing 
physical access to modern inputs is essential for moving smallholders out of their current 
“hoe and cutlass” style of farming, and for increasing agricultural productivity. On the 
other hand, the members of the donor coalition believe that government interventionist 
programs distort market, favor large farms, and crowd out private sector investment. The 
donor coalition made frequent references to possible consequences of government input 
subsidy programs as captured in statements: “Subsidies are an expensive component of the 
government budget”; “There is lack of transparency regarding the fertilizer and seed input 
subsidy distribution”; “Subsidies do not reach the poor”; “Subsidies are politically efficient 
but not economically efficient.” These statements reflect the policy beliefs of the donor 
coalition. 
The results in Chapters 2 and 3 also reveal a domestic coalition story-line and 
donor coalition non-stories in the agricultural policy debates. The analysis of the narratives 
indicates that the domestic coalition has a story-line with a clear beginning (low productivity 
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caused by a lack of inputs), middle (providing subsidized inputs), and end (increased 
productivity). In contrast, the donor coalition essentially presents “non-stories” (focusing on 
what should not be done without providing an alternative story-line of what should be 
done). In narrative policy analysis, “non-stories” typically increase the complexity of a 
problem rather than offer solutions (Roe, 1994). These findings are supported by Harrigan 
(2003), who also found conflicting and changing policy positions between the World 
Bank and the Malawian government. According to Harrigan's (2003) study, while the 
Malawian government maintained a pro-interventionist stance regarding the 
implementation of input subsidies, the World Bank advocated for the removal of fertilizer 
and credit subsidies (Harrigan, 2003). These divergent policy beliefs between the donor and 
domestic coalitions have potential implications on policy formulation, and translate into 
different policy choices and programs adopted by policy makers. 
The analysis in Chapter 4 reveals that the Block Farms Program follows a state- 
oriented approach, while the METASIP program from the CAADP policy process follows a 
market-oriented approach. A similar case is observed in Uganda by Joughin and Kjær 
(2010), who found that the government had moved toward pro-interventionist ideologies in 
recent years, despite embracing liberalization in the past. The “Prosperity for All” program 
(Rwamigisa et al., 2013), and the most recent “Operations Wealth Creation” program, are 
government-driven initiatives to provide improved inputs to farmers in Uganda (see Chapter 
1.2). In the case of Senegal, Stads and Sène (2011) found that smallholder farmers receive 
subsidized fertilizer and other forms of government support. The implementation of the 
different programs in the case study countries suggests a trend toward “overshooting” 
agricultural policies, which is a move from taxation to subsidization of the agricultural 
sector (Chapter 1.2). This finding is consistent with a recent study by Jayne and Rashid 
(2013) who found that input subsidy programs have become a preferred policy option in 
many African countries. However, inputs subsidies and other government- supported 
programs have been criticized in the agricultural economics literature. Anderson and 
Masters (2009: 63) express this concern: “A fundamental concern in agricultural policy over 
time as economies progress toward becoming middle-income, though, is overshooting. In 
response to rural poverty and inequality, many countries start protecting agriculture soon 
after they stop taxing it. This imposes large costs on consumers, and slows national 
economic growth.” Similar concerns regarding resurgence of input subsidy programs in 
Africa is evident in the donor coalition discourse. 
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In many African countries, the fertilizer input subsidy program in Malawi (see Jayne 
and Rashid, 2013) and the global food price crisis of 2008 are often cited as catalysts of 
the resurgence of input subsidies. The global food price crisis shifted the attention of 
national governments and donors to the agricultural sector after the sector had been 
neglected and given limited support over several decades (Mittal, 2009). Major international 
organizations, such as the World Bank, acknowledged the need to improve smallholder 
agricultural productivity in the 2008 World Development Report (World Bank, 2008), and 
encouraged the provision of market-smart input subsidies (Morris, Kelly, Kopicki, and 
Byerlee, 2007). This indicates a possible shift from liberalize input subsidy ideas to market-
smart input subsidy ideas by donors (cf. Chang, 2009). As many African countries were 
affected by high costs of food imports, the global food price crisis in 2008 gave impetus to 
support the agricultural sector through input subsidies to improve domestic food security 
(Jayne and Rashid, 2013; Mittal, 2009). The crisis might have contributed to a change 
in policy beliefs of domestic policy makers and donors. On the ground, one can observe that 
donors indirectly support input subsidy programs through budget support, yet the results in 
Chapters 2 and 3 reveal that the donor coalition criticizes the government input subsidy 
programs. As many African governments have not largely changed their policy beliefs 
relating to the provision of input subsidies, it seems that the prevailing input subsidy 
programs will remain a preferred policy choice. This finding is in agreement with Jayne and 
Rashid (2013: 547), who noted that input subsidy programs are likely to remain on the 
African policy landscape for the foreseeable future. However, in the case of economic crisis, 
or other external problems, some governments might change their policy beliefs as 
necessary to attract resources that are hinged on donor conditionality (cf. Binswanger and 
Deininger, 1997: 1982; Jayne et al., 2002: 1973). A typical case relates to animal health 
market reform that was initiated in many African countries as part of the broad 
structural adjustment program in the 1980s. This reform was initiated to deal with the 
fiscal crisis facing developing country governments and to reduce the financial burden of 
state-run support programs like input subsidies and veterinary services. 
So far, the discussions of the various case studies suggest that governments did 
not change their policy beliefs in the related smallholder agricultural input subsidy 
programs. This finding is consistent with the study by Jayne et al. (2002) on the 
experience of food and input market reform in eastern and southern Africa. The authors 
found that policy actors mostly remained unconvinced of the fundamental principles of 
the liberalization policies, and market reforms were not implemented, partially 
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implemented, or reversed after some time (Jayne et al., 2002). This conclusion of 
incomplete market reforms in the crop input and output market sector by Jayne et al. (2002) 
is largely supported by the findings of the case studies in Chapters 2 through 4 as pointed 
out in the preceding discussions. However, the case studies in Chapters 5 and 6 suggests 
that the livestock market reforms based on donor policy prescriptions to reduce government 
involvement and move toward cost recovery and privatization of animal health service 
delivery were implemented in both Ghana and Kenya. This finding is supported by Leonard 
(2000), who argued that the liberalization policy has been fully implemented in the 
livestock sector in most developing countries. A similar observation of privatization of 
animal health service provision was made by Irungu et al. (2006) in Kenya, and by Turkson 
and Brownie (1999) in Ghana. They both found that liberalization policies allowed new 
players, such as private veterinarians, private animal health assistants, and community 
animal health workers, to participate in the provision of animal health services. This is 
consistent with the findings of the case studies in Chapters 5 and 6 that suggest that there are 
new service providers in the animal health service delivery industry. 
Findings from the Ghana case study indicate that the animal health service delivery 
system is characterized by a lack of private practice in marginal areas. The services of a 
limited number of government para-vets are the most preferred services by livestock 
keepers in marginal areas. This concurs with Turkson's (2003) study on the profile of 
veterinarians and veterinary practice in Ghana. The author attributed the decreasing number 
of veterinarians and para-veterinarians to the government policy that denies automatic 
employment for graduates in animal health (Turkson, 2003). Although Community Animal 
Health Workers were promoted to fill the gap in animal health service delivery, the analysis 
reveals that their services were the least preferred by livestock keepers. This is due to 
perceived high costs of service provision, limited training in animal health care, and low 
quality performance. In places where there are no government para- vets, most livestock 
keepers have resorted to self-treatment. This finding is also supported by Turkson (2001), 
who reported the misuse of isometamidium chloride (Samorin) by some cattle keepers 
for curative reasons in Ghana. Such practices have serious undesirable human health, 
environmental, and economic implications. The results from a high-potential dairy area in 
Kenya show that private animal health assistants are preferred over government animal 
health assistants by dairy livestock keepers. However, similar to the case of Ghana, poor 
households have challenges accessing qualified animal health service providers in marginal 
areas, resulting in a higher probability of loss of livestock and a reduced capacity to 
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control zoonotic diseases. These results are consistent with findings by Cheneau, Idrissi, 
and Ward (2004), who found that private practice is concentrated in urban, peri-urban, and 
high-potential farming areas, leaving marginal areas without proper veterinary supervision. 
Similarly, Leonard et al. (2013) observed that the rural poor, and especially those who 
live in remote areas, have difficulty obtaining animal health services. In intensive systems 
and high-potential dairy areas, the results suggest that private animal health assistants were 
more likely to serve better-off famers than poor farmers. As many poor livestock keepers’ 
in rural areas do not have access to animal health services, these results indicate both 
government and market failure in the sector. 
While the cost sharing and privatization policies (market-oriented policies) were 
considered a solution to addressing government failure in the provision of animal health 
services (see Oruko and Ndung’u, 2009; Oruko et al., 2000), the results from this 
study suggest that the liberalization of livestock services had different effects in the 
case of Ghana and Kenya. Furthermore, liberalization affected different components of 
animal health service delivery. This result is in agreement with findings by Oruko and 
Ndung’u (2009), who found that clinical services and the distribution of animal drugs 
were at the forefront of liberalization. A study by Cheneau et al. (2004) on the strengths and 
weaknesses of veterinary systems argued that privatization of animal health services has 
had a positive impact since distribution of drugs by the private sector has increased small 
farmer access to drug suppliers. The authors also found that the emergence of informal 
drug markets has negatively affected the quality of drugs provided (Cheneau et al., 2004). 
Further, a study by FAO (2002) emphasized that the critical areas of surveillance, early 
warning, laboratory diagnostic services, disease control, assurance of quality, and safety of 
animal products became secondary issues after the liberalization of animal health services. 
These experiences of animal health market reforms may well have been a contributing 
factor to why domestic policy makers did not change their policy beliefs regarding 
government intervention in support of smallholder farming. 
Overall, the discussion suggests that agricultural policy beliefs play a critical role in 
policy formulation, policy adoption, and policy implementation as indicated in the various 
cases studies. This thesis argues that a better understanding of the role of agricultural 
policy beliefs in the “donor world” and the “domestic world” can move the debate about 
appropriate agricultural policy choices beyond the current impasse. Donors have been less 
successful in preventing domestic policy makers from implementing input subsidy 
programs. With the “primacy of domestic politics”, that is domestic policy makers 
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implementing their preferred policy programs amid donor concerns of overshooting 
policies, coupled with conflicting policy beliefs, progress in developing African agriculture 
will remain slow. Thus, it is essential to remove the current stalemate that has hindered 
fruitful dialogue between donors and domestic policy makers on ways to make agricultural 
development programs work better for sustainable agriculture intensification. 
 
7.2 Limitations of the study and recommendations for future work 
The empirical results discussed in the previous chapters applied a range of analytical 
techniques to the individual case studies. Chapters 2 through 4 applied both a qualitative 
research design and mixed methods, and Chapters 5 and 6 applied a quantitative research 
design. This section discusses the limitations of each study approach and provides some 
recommendations for future work. 
 
7.2.1 Limitations of the study approaches 
This study applied a range of methods in Chapters 2 through 4: discourse analysis, 
narrative policy analysis, process influence maps, principal component analysis, and cluster 
analysis. The combination of discourse analysis and principal component analysis in 
Chapter 2 to identify policy beliefs is unique in this literature, as is the use of cluster 
analysis applied in Chapters 2 and 3 to identify policy actors. This approach makes an 
important methodological contribution to the analysis of policy choices in a dynamic policy 
environment. However, the data collection and analysis approaches applied in Chapters 2 
through 4 have some limitations. 
The primary data used for the analyses in Chapters 2 through 4 was based on 
qualitative in-depth interviews. Respondents were selected through purposive sampling that 
included a combination of convenience, snowballing, judgment, and quota sampling to 
identify policy experts (respondents) (see Onwuegbuzie et al., 2007). The purposive 
sampling approach applied in this study could have been affected by selection bias, as not 
all potential respondents had equal opportunity to be interviewed. However, measures were 
undertaken to minimize this risk. The qualitative research principles of “completeness” 
(including representatives from the entire spectrum of actors) and “dissimilarity” (including 
respondents with diverse perspectives) (Blee and Taylor, 2002) were applied. Further, 
triangulation was applied to ensure validity in the sampling process (see Oliver-Hoyo and 
Allen, 2006), by including a wide range of actors (representing the government, the 
private sector, civil society, academia, donors, think tanks, and farmers) from different 
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geographic locations. 
The in-depth interview questions used for Chapters 2 through 4 were open-ended to 
allow the respondents to freely express their views. This approach resulted in some 
limitations for this study. While some respondents were able to answer the initial questions, 
others required additional explanations that might have influenced their responses. 
Additional explanations could not be avoided; they were necessary for the less experienced 
respondents. Transcripts of the in-depth interviews served as the main primary data source 
for the analysis in Chapters 2 through 4. The coding of the transcripts for the analysis in 
Chapters 2 and 4 was completed by one person, while the coding for Chapter 3 was 
completed by two teams. Ideally, the coding would have been done by two teams to 
ensure inter-code reliability (investigator triangulation) (cf. Guion, Diehl, and McDonald, 
2011). To compensate, the coding of the transcripts in this study was carefully reexamined 
several times. The results of the coding were also presented in workshops to country policy 
experts, who are knowledgeable in the policy landscape, for reliability checks. 
The Process Net-Map applied in mapping the CAADP and Block Farms Program 
policy processes in Chapter 4 is based on the views of participants from the Ministry of 
Agriculture in Ghana. In an ideal situation, actors from other organizations would have 
been involved in the mapping process. Due to the difficulty of gathering all the 
stakeholders together, it was not possible to have all key actors involved in the participatory 
mapping process at the time of the fieldwork. However, follow-up in-depth interviews 
were conducted with other stakeholders to complement the Process Net-Map. 
In Chapters 5 and 6, the two case studies on animal health service delivery were 
based on household surveys conducted in Ghana and Kenya. Although there is no agreed 
sample size for running the multinomial logit analysis employed, a larger sample size 
could have provided more robust results. The limited sample was due to geographically 
dispersed livestock households and resource constraints at the time of the field research. A 
rigorous analysis on cost of animal health service provision of the various service providers 
was not performed due to incomplete cost data. This analysis would have been useful for 
comparing the various service providers. 
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7.2.2 Recommendations for future work 
The interview questions on the contested agricultural policy debates presented in 
Chapters 2 through 4 were based on broad open-ended questions on agricultural sector 
challenges. The results from this study could be further explored with a larger sample size. 
The identified policy themes in Chapters 2 through 4 could serve as initial policy statements 
to design a questionnaire. This could lead to the application of alternative methods, such as 
the Q-methodology approach, which could be used to identify major policy themes, 
shared beliefs, and coalitions using quantitative methods (Watts and Stenner, 2005). 
Follow-up studies could build on this approach by examining specific questions related 
to seed and fertilizer input subsidies, irrigation, land policy, agricultural mechanization, and 
youth involvement in agriculture. Since the presentation of the discourse analysis results is 
based on quotes from the in-depth interviews, future studies could apply a mixed analysis 
approach, where secondary data could be used to strengthen some of the arguments. Such 
data sources could include the LSMS-ISA69, HarvestChoice, and FAOSTAT. This could be 
used to consider issues related to agricultural productivity measures, fertilizer use, 
improved seed use, rainfall patterns, access to tractors, mechanizations services, etc. 
Detailed qualitative analysis on the institutional and policy landscape of animal 
health service delivery in the case study countries would be a useful accompaniment to this 
study. Future studies should also consider rigorous and in-depth analysis of specific animal 
health service delivery systems. It would also be useful to analyze how experiences with 
the liberalization of animal health services have influenced policy makers’ beliefs on 
market-oriented reforms. Future studies should use a larger sample and expand the 
geographic coverage. Intra-country comparisons would also provide useful information for 
proper targeting of livestock reform policies. Such studies, for example, could be a 
comparative analysis of animal health service delivery systems in the southern and northern 
regions of Ghana, or a comparative analysis of animal health service delivery systems 
in a high dairy potential area and in the Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASAL) in Kenya. 
As the livestock studies could not estimate the cost of service provision, future studies 
could go beyond this analysis and examine the total cost of animal health services 
performed by various service providers, and the types of livestock diseases, the livestock 
breeds, and the ages of livestock that were treated. 
 
 
 
69 Living Standards Measurement Study-Integrated Survey on agricultural dataset from the World Bank. 
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8 CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
 
The previous chapter discussed the main findings from the thesis in the broader 
context of the literature. This chapter draws conclusions from the discussions and presents 
some policy implications. 
 
8.1 Overall conclusions 
This thesis identifies divergent policy beliefs between domestic policy makers and 
donors. The case studies reveal that the policy choices of domestic policy makers are 
deeply influenced by their policy beliefs. While domestic policy actors believe that 
transforming smallholder agriculture requires government intervention to provide modern 
subsidized inputs (fertilizer, seeds, mechanization, etc.), the donor coalition believes that 
these interventions are market distorting and have only patronage and self-interest motives. 
The case studies suggest that the policy beliefs of donors and domestic policy makers are 
not easily reconciled, especially since the studies also found a tendency among policy 
actors on both sides to have a positive self-representation and a negative other 
representation (cf. Van Dijk, 2004), which easily leads to “blame games”. 
In order to achieve their development goals, donors should understand domestic 
policy makers’ beliefs in the need to increase access to modern inputs or increase 
smallholders’ access to animal health services. However, there is also no contradiction for 
one to accept that input subsidy programs could bring political advantages to governments 
offering them. What is rather problematic is the donor coalition’s view that input subsidy 
programs are only implemented to reward political clients or to offer room for corruption. If 
such policy programs function purely for political interest, then domestic policy makers 
could use other means, such as direct transfer, rather than implement a block farm or 
mechanization programs. As Stigler (1975: ix) wrote, “Until we understand why our society 
adopts its policies, we will be poorly equipped to give useful advice on how to change 
those policies”. Therefore, understanding why governments adopt certain policies, and 
paying more attention to the role of policy beliefs in agricultural policy making has 
important practical implications in policy formulation, adoption and implementation. It is 
vital to broaden the scope of understanding as to why countries adopt certain policies by 
taking a step beyond self-interest interpretations of agricultural policy choices. This fosters 
not only “good economics”, but also “good politics”. This will provide opportunities to 
 141  
 
reconcile the two worlds that are hardly connected and to identify alternative policy 
instruments through dialogue. 
8.2 Strategies to bridge the gap between the two worlds 
The contested policy debates have contributed to how the two discourse coalitions 
view each other. The results in Chapter 2 suggest that the coalitions have a strong positive 
self-representation and a negative other-representation, which makes a fruitful policy 
dialogue difficult. Van Dijk (2004) observed that positive self-representation and negative 
other representation is not only a general characteristic of group conflicts and the ways 
opposing groups interact, but also influences the way opposing groups talk about each 
other. In light of the existing policy debates, it is clear why analyses solely based on 
rational choice and patronage interpretations have been limited in explaining long-standing 
controversial agricultural policy debates. To bridge the gap between the two worlds of 
agricultural policy-making identified in this study, alternative policy strategies based on a 
more consensus-oriented approach are essential. These strategies include deliberative 
democracy, policy-oriented learning, and building new coalitions to foster more dialogue 
between the donor coalition and the domestic coalition (see Birner et al., 2011). Earlier 
strategies based on the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for 
Action, as well as more recent CAADP round table processes, have contributed to policy- 
making processes in Africa. These policy processes, which have aimed at promoting 
participation, ownership of policies, policy harmonization, and multi-stakeholder 
consultations, have contributed to policy processes and outcomes at the country- and 
regional levels (see Diao et al., 2013; Kolavalli et al., 2013). The strategies outlined below 
complement such existing initiatives and draw attention to the need for policymakers to 
focus on reaching a mutual understanding. 
 
8.3 Policy strategies 
Based on the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) presented in Chapter 1.3.4, this 
section discusses potential policy strategies to connect the two worlds. 
 
8.3.1 Promote policy-oriented learning 
In the ACF developed by (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993), policy-oriented 
learning is associated with changes in the belief system of coalition members (see Chapter 
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1.3.4). Learning by coalition members facilitates not only an understanding of problems and 
the associated solutions, but also the use of political strategies for achieving objectives 
(Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014). The concept of policy-oriented learning can play an important 
role in bridging the gap between the donor world and the domestic world, regarding the 
identified policy debates. 
As outlined in Chapters 2 and 3, the donor and domestic coalitions have different 
policy beliefs regarding appropriate policy instruments. While domestic policy makers 
believe that the provision of modern inputs is necessary to develop the agricultural sector, 
the donor coalition believes that input subsidy policies are market distorting and motivated 
by economic and political interests. Evidence-based policy research can provide 
information to facilitate learning across the coalition to reach a consensus. The roles of 
the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), the National 
Agricultural Research System (NARS), policy think tanks, and academic institutions will be 
very important in generating evidence-based research to facilitate policy-oriented learning. 
New knowledge on the policy environment, the role of policy beliefs, and strategies to 
influence political incentives will be essential. Jayne et al. (2002: 1977) observed that the 
literature on market reform debates suffers from its own political economy problem. Most 
analyses that have been funded by major donors (e.g., the World Bank) often support 
market-oriented reforms, whereas analyses funded by international and civil society 
organizations (e.g., UNCTAD) are often critical of such reforms. To solve this problem, 
it is important for scholars to explicitly consider the complexity of the situation of the 
policy landscape, which in turn is likely to shift the intellectual frontier of research, rather 
than falling back on conventional analyses (cf. Kanbur, 2001). 
Specific research could aim at examining domestic and donor coalitions’ policy 
beliefs pertaining to the role of subsidies in improving agricultural productivity. Results 
from the research could be disseminated by policy brokers to facilitate policy learning 
across coalitions and thus update policy beliefs within the donor and domestic worlds. The 
policy brokers could be organizations with considerable experience in the contested policy 
area. In Africa, organizations such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and 
the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) could serve as potential policy 
brokers that conduct research and promote policy-oriented learning across the two worlds. It 
could be difficult for different coalitions to accept policy brokers and their research 
outputs if credibility is an issue, therefore it is critical that the organizations serving policy 
broker roles are acceptable to both the donor and domestic coalitions. Furthermore, high-
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level meetings or conferences could serve as potential forums to openly discuss the 
contested policies. The annual meeting of the Regional Strategic Analysis and Knowledge 
Support System (ReSAKSS) and the CAADP partnership platform conferences could seek 
to promote policy-oriented learning and deliberations. The meeting could target members of 
the different coalitions identified in this study and could aim to update policy beliefs 
through policy learning. 
 
8.3.2 Deliberative democracy 
In light of policy debates, agreement among policy actors has been problematic. 
This lack of agreement is partly due to the existing approaches to policy choice 
negotiation. Past experiences based on this approach have been limited in capturing the 
concerns of some groups, especially marginalized groups (see Resnick and Birner, 2010). 
As the findings from Chapter 4 show, there is a divergence between the policy process used 
by government-driven programs, such as the Block Farms Program, and the policy 
process used by donor driven programs, such as the METASIP program, under the CAADP 
initiative. The interview results suggest that most actors feel that they were only asked to 
endorse the final METASIP document, and did not feel that they were part of a consultation 
process. To deal with these weaknesses in the current stakeholder consultation processes, 
deliberative strategies could increase acceptance and legitimize policy outcomes. 
Deliberations aim at creating a forum for actors (citizens, policy makers, and 
leaders) to discuss societal problems and to reach a consensus for practical action (see Gastil 
and Levine, 2005; Habermas, 1984, 1996). Habermas mentioned the examples of the 
English coffee houses, the literary societies of Germany, and the salons of France as 
institutions of deliberations that served to revive public opinion, and thus were a mechanism 
for shaping policy and influencing government (Habermas, 1989). Deliberations place 
emphasis on collective decision making to reach a legitimate policy outcome that is 
acceptable to the deliberators and based on mutual understanding (see Gastil and Levine, 
2005; Gutmann and Thompson, 2004; Weeks, 2000). 
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Deliberative strategies could bridge the gap between the donor world and the 
domestic world by creating a forum for discussion and fostering mutual understanding of 
each coalition’s position on the policy debates. Considerable effort is required to monitor 
the power structures among the policy actors and to understand how they can influence the 
outcome of the deliberations. Policy brokers, as discussed below, can play monitoring and 
facilitation roles. The findings from this thesis can serve as a starting point to provide 
useful information for the different coalitions to openly discuss their positions and provide 
reasons to guide the deliberation process. The deliberation process could aim at examining 
and promoting an understanding of the policy story-line of the different coalitions. For 
example, the agricultural input subsidy provision story-line of the domestic coalition, and 
the donor coalition criticisms of the distortionary nature of input subsidy provision can be 
examined to understand areas of agreements and conflicts by the donor and domestic 
coalitions. Consensus on improving smallholder agriculture productivity can serve as a 
starting point for deliberations, and disagreements on input subsidy provision can then be 
discussed. Strategies to reduce input subsidies and to switch to targeted subsidies could be 
proposed as a middle ground to reach a consensus. In the animal health service delivery 
sector, consensus among donors and domestic policy makers can aim at proposing “market-
smart strategies” to improve animal health service delivery. The “market-smart 
strategies”, as a middle ground, can focus on developing public-private partnerships or 
targeting poor livestock keepers through a voucher system. Ministries of agriculture can 
focus on contracting private staff, supporting animal health training schools, and setting 
standards in the animal health industry. Institutions, such as veterinary associations, could 
focus on licensing, research, and providing support for veterinarians and paraprofessionals. 
Although alternative recommendations of private sector investment are proposed by donor 
coalitions, this story-line does not seem appealing to domestic coalitions. The domestic 
coalition argues that such policies were implemented in the 1980s and early 1990s under 
the Structural Adjustment Program, and that these policies did not lead to a substantial 
increase in agricultural productivity. Instead, the domestic coalition argues that such policies 
contributed to the limited access to inputs and lack of agricultural services, such as animal 
health services and extension services. 
In the proposed deliberative process, the donor coalition will have to provide 
convincing evidence of what the domestic coalition should implement to increase 
agricultural productivity and make their story-line acceptable to them. While the 
deliberation process aims at reaching a consensus, the conflicting policy beliefs should be 
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resolved through understanding and creating a shared policy belief, rather than overlooking 
the conflicts in the policy process. A helpful strategy can aim at a “dynamic policy belief 
updating” approach (Karpowitz and Mansbridge, 2005) that provides relevant evidence- 
based knowledge during the deliberation process to facilitate policy-oriented learning both 
across and within the coalitions. In the absence of such an alternative and convincing story-
line in the deliberation process, in order to change the existing practices domestic policy 
makers and donors will only maintain and institutionalize their policy preferences. Since an 
alternative story-line does not exist, evidence-based research will be essential to provide a 
more thorough understanding. Scholars and research organizations could conduct this 
research. The FAO could play an advocacy role and IFPRI could provide information 
through research. It is essential for the different coalitions to trust the organizations 
providing research to guide the deliberation process. 
 
8.3.3 Building new coalitions 
From the empirical results, international finance institutions and ministries of 
finance were dominant in the donor coalition, while ministries of agriculture and civil 
society groups were dominant in the domestic coalitions. The coalitions have divergent 
policy beliefs on policy instruments that are hardly connected and expressed through their 
policy narratives. Building new coalitions has the potential to help bridge the gap between 
the donor coalition and the domestic coalition, and therefore contribute to the resolution of 
long-standing debates. New coalitions can be built through deliberations and promotion of 
policy-oriented learning, as outlined in the previous sections. 
Based on the ACF assumption that policy beliefs are not easily changed over time, 
building new coalitions will take effort, time, and resources. In building new coalitions, 
policy actors might not necessarily change their policy beliefs in the short run, however, an 
increased understanding of the policy problems and solutions could change the policy 
preference of policy actors. Policy-oriented learning can be used to create awareness of 
potential benefits and costs of improved technologies (fertilizer, seeds, mechanization, etc.) 
among different coalitions. Such awareness, which is based on an improved understanding 
of the problems and solutions affecting the agricultural sector, could influence the policy 
beliefs of the coalition members over time. For example, the ministry of finance in the 
donor coalition could change their policy beliefs and would be likely to join the domestic 
coalition if there is an increased understanding of the potential benefits and costs of 
government supported input subsidies. The civil society groups could also change their 
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policy beliefs based on an increased awareness of the challenges of current programs (e.g., 
fertilizer distribution programs). As stated in the ACF in the introduction (Chapter 1.3.4), 
such challenges could serve as a pathway to policy change (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014). In 
this context, as policy actors in different coalitions observe challenges affecting the 
implementation of policy programs, they may update their policy beliefs or discuss 
alternative instruments that could serve as pathways to policy changes. In cases of core 
policy beliefs, such as the role of the state versus the market, market-smart strategies or 
targeting could serve a middle point for the different coalitions to reach a consensus in 
certain policy programs. 
In the case study countries, existing platforms, such as the Agricultural Sector 
Working Groups (ASWG) meetings and annual agricultural sector review workshops, could 
serve as forums in which to discuss alternative policy strategies, build new coalitions, 
and promote policy learning. It is essential to utilize such platforms and move toward a 
more consensus-oriented approach to improve the current participatory and evidence-based 
agricultural policy processes in the case study- and other developing countries. Such a more 
consensus-oriented approach will be critical to resolve the different policy beliefs that 
donors and domestic policy makers hold regarding appropriate policy instruments to 
promote agricultural development. As found in this thesis, the different policy beliefs also 
hinder dialogue on policy strategies, and therefore the prevailing two worlds in agricultural 
policy making. In this light, deliberative strategies could strengthen the participatory and 
evidence-based agricultural policy processes in developing countries. 
Deliberations among the policy actors have the potential to reconcile the divergent 
policy beliefs during policy formulation, policy adoption, and policy implementation in 
several ways (cf. Gutmann and Thompson, 2004). First, deliberative strategies may well be 
used to promote legitimacy of collective decision making in policy formulation. Policy 
choices that are carefully considered and mutually agreed on by policy actors could be 
adopted over those that are contested. Second, deliberative strategies could encourage 
policy actors to assume a broader perspective of policy issues and seek the common good, 
rather than pursue individual interests and policy beliefs. Third, deliberative strategies 
have the potential to promote mutually respectful decision-making processes, even if 
conflicting agricultural policy beliefs prevail. Fourth, deliberations among policy actors 
could promote policy-oriented learning, which would facilitate better understanding and 
promote policy change. The deliberative strategies considered in this thesis have the 
potential to move the debates on agricultural policy instruments beyond the current impasse 
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that hinders a fruitful dialogue on alternative policy strategies to promote agricultural 
development, and can bridge the two worlds in agricultural policy making. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Appendix 2.1: Story-lines and policy beliefs identified in the discourse analysis* 
Area Domestic discourse coalition Donor discourse coalition 
Low agricultural productivity 
problem 
The agricultural sector is characterized by low productivity because of the hoe and 
cutlass nature of farming. 
There is a lack of irrigation facilities and agricultural mechanization services to 
open up lands. 
High cost of inputs, low market prices, post-harvest losses, and no value addition 
hamper agricultural development. 
Low productivity is a result of low private sector 
investment. 
There is a lot of policy work and many policy 
documents, but the government is not implementing the 
policies. 
Divergent views on 
agricultural policy directions 
Agriculture should be treated as a social service, just like health care and education. 
The government should invest in the agricultural sector because it is the duty 
bearer. 
Agriculture is a private sector activity. 
 Donor policy programs seek to address some domestic problems through market- 
oriented approaches that do not consider the domestic environment. 
Donor policies are just based on recycling of external knowledge and do not fit 
internal policy processes. 
Government policy programs are demand-driven and 
seek to address the needs of the people through a 
socially oriented approach, which is not sustainable. 
The government should not intervene in the market; it 
should allow the private sector to invest. The 
government should only provide regulations and enforce 
the laws. 
Role of market reforms The government should lead the formulation and implementation of policies. 
Market reforms and privatization ideas were imposed on us by the World Bank and 
IMF. 
Everybody knows that market reforms were done in bad faith and in a rush. 
Donors do not impose ideas, but bring ideas that have 
worked in some places that might not always work in a 
particular context. 
Market reforms were good, but most countries did not 
implement the reform prescriptions. 
Government failure: state institutions were mismanaged, 
coupled with political interference and corruption. 
Fertilizer input subsidy Small-holder farmers cannot afford fertilizers. 
Fertilizer application by farmers will increase production, reduce production costs, 
and increase farm income. 
Subsidies do not get to small-holder farmers, but rather 
to the large and medium-scale farmers. 
1
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Appendix 2.1: Story-lines and policy beliefs identified in the discourse analysis* (Continued) 
 
Area Domestic discourse coalition Donor discourse coalition 
Agricultural mechanization Small-holder farmers cannot afford the high cost of investment in farm machinery 
and the government should support farmers. 
Hoe and cutlass farming is not attractive for the youth. 
There is a lot of drudgery, which cannot help the nation. To attract the youth, we 
need to modernize the sector. 
Mechanization is necessary to modernize and transform the agricultural sector. 
Hoe and cutlass is not helping the country to achieve food security. 
Rural-urban migration is affecting rural labor availability. 
The government mechanization program will help to prepare the land and plant on 
time. 
Tractors have a political image and they are usually 
mismanaged when people receive them based on 
political affiliation. 
Historically, tractor services have not been a viable 
investment. 
Investment in mechanization should not be supported by 
donors because it is private sector activity. 
Government policy of trying to develop mechanization 
is old-fashioned and not sustainable. 
Role of youth involvement in 
agriculture 
High youth unemployment and aging farm household population cause declines in 
food production. 
Youths should be encouraged to take on farming as a business. The youth can read 
and better understand instructions from extension agents. 
To modernize the agricultural sector, current labor must be upgraded. The youth 
offer a better opportunity to achieve this objective. 
The youth program has been politically tinted and is 
only rewarding some groups of people. 
The agricultural sector is employing enough people 
already, it is not necessary to have another policy to 
attract the youth. 
Market price support Supporting farmers with inputs will increase production. Such increase in production 
must be sustained through a guaranteed minimum price to farmers. 
Prices stimulate production and with good prices farmers will respond and produce. 
Farmers are very smart and business-minded people, but the price offered to 
farmers is very discouraging. 
Input and price support must go together and should be balanced especially for food 
crops if the government wants to encourage production and the adoption of new 
technologies. 
Government intervention creates market distortions, 
which hinders private sector investment and growth. 
The mandate of the government is not to fix prices, but 
is to create an enabling environment for the market 
actors. 
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Appendix 2.1: Story-lines and policy beliefs identified in the discourse analysis* (Continued) 
 
Area Domestic discourse coalition Donor discourse coalition 
Role of input subsidies Subsidies are important to transform and modernize the subsistence hoe and cutlass 
nature of agriculture. 
Without subsidies like mechanization services, fertilizer, extension, seeds, and 
market price support, farmers will remain subsistence farmers. 
The sector employs 80 percent of the population. Support from the government will 
have long-term impacts on rural poverty reduction. 
Countries that have developed did so through a small-holder sector; supporting the 
small-holder sector will provide raw materials for industry. 
Subsidies are very expensive to the economy; they 
distort the market and kill private sector initiatives. 
The business of providing fertilizer, mechanization 
services, and seeds is not a government business. 
Instead, it is a private sector business. 
We think that farmers are poor. Go out and see how 
many farmers are buying expensive mobile phones. 
Farming is not for everyone and only serious people 
should remain in farming. For those who cannot make it, 
they need social protection measures. 
Advise on input subsidy Donors advise us not to subsidize our farmers, but they still subsidize their farmers. 
If they stop subsidizing their farms they will import food from Africa. They do not 
want that. They have their own agenda, which influences our policies. 
The government can afford to subsidize farmers by strengthening domestic revenue 
collection rather than depending on donors for budget support. 
Europe and the U.S.A. give subsidies because they can 
afford it. They have a huge industrial and service sector. 
There is just about 2 percent of the total population 
involved in agriculture. 
It is against donor principles to give money for 
subsidies. 
Operational and governance 
challenges 
Some specific policy instruments or strategies may have operational challenges, but 
that does not mean that the overall goal is not good. The overall goal may be good. 
We should build the capacity and strengthen the accountability of existing state 
institutions rather than create parallel structures. 
Leadership and capacity of ministry staff influences 
policy formulation and implementation. 
Most of the government intuitions lack capacity and we 
have to provide policy experts for the ministry. 
They do not have adequate data to feed into the policy 
process. 
* The major story-lines, specific phrases, and metaphors from interviews are emphasized using italics. Source: 
In-depth interviews. 
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Appendix 2.2: Self-and other-representation of the two coalitions* 
 
Type of representation Domestic discourse coalition Donor discourse coalition 
Positive self-representation Capable of understanding the domestic problems and determining the 
best policy options for the local economy. 
Donors are capable of bringing external experience and superior 
knowledge to provide evidence-based policy options to the domestic 
economy. 
Negative other representation They come with external models from other places, which are not 
applicable to our internal processes. 
They come to promote policies that do not ensure domestic food 
security, but rather to create technical dependency. 
The very day they stop subsidizing their farmers, they will have to 
import food from us, and they know it! Their interest is to make 
money for their home countries. 
These bodies are not very committed to our internal processes that 
should generate more sustainable policy analysis, drive, and solutions. 
Instead, they just create dependencies from a technical point-of-view, 
which does not necessary fit into our context. 
They are not aware about the financial implications of subsidies. It is 
huge. That is the problem with the Ministry of Agriculture; they do not 
have figures at all in any of their documents. 
Government officials have a subsidy perspective and want to 
implement the programs for self-profit motives. 
Those policy officers lack capacity, they do not have any figures to 
show, and when they start implementing the program, and they always 
have financial difficulties. 
Politicians think about their votes. Anything that gives them votes they 
will implement if that is what the people want. 
*Specific phrases and metaphors from interviews are emphasized using italics. Source: 
In-depth interviews. 
1
5
4
 
155 
 
Appendix 2.3: Policy themes 
 
 Ghana Uganda 
 Domestic coalition 
(percent) 
Donor coalition 
(percent) 
Domestic coalition 
(percent) 
Donor coalition 
(percent) 
 Frequency 
of themes 
Actors Frequency 
of themes 
Actors Frequency 
of themes 
Actors Frequency 
of themes 
Actors 
Low agriculture 
productivity 
 
10.4 
 
7.6 
 
20.4 
 
14.3 
 
9.2 
 
10.3 
 
28.2 
 
14.3 
Rainfall dependent 
agriculture 
 
8.0 
 
6.6 
 
13.1 
 
12.2 
 
4.9 
 
6.0 
 
10.3 
 
7.1 
Irrigation facilities 6.7 9.6 12.4 16.3 3.4 2.7 4.3 9.5 
Crop insurance 2.0 3.0 3.6 4.1 0.2 2.2 6.0 9.5 
Agricultural 
mechanization 
 
11.8 
 
8.6 
 
2.9 
 
4.1 
 
9.5 
 
8.2 
 
0.9 
 
2.4 
Lack of appropriate 
farming technology 
 
4.0 
 
8.6 
 
2.2 
 
8.2 
 
8.8 
 
8.7 
 
1.7 
 
2.4 
Hoe and cutlass 
farming 
 
11.0 
 
5.1 
 
1.5 
 
2.0 
 
5.2 
 
6.0 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
Inadequate access 
to credit 
 
6.6 
 
9.1 
 
4.4 
 
10.2 
 
13.1 
 
11.4 
 
3.4 
 
2.4 
Counterfeit inputs 0.0 0.0 0.7 2.0 9.9 6.0 6.0 4.8 
Fertilizer subsidy 12.8 8.1 3.6 4.1 2.8 3.3 2.6 2.4 
Youth in agriculture 7.8 5.6 0.0 0.0 3.9 6.0 0.0 0.0 
Lack of storage 
facility 
 
3.1 
 
5.6 
 
4.4 
 
4.1 
 
9.5 
 
5.4 
 
0.9 
 
4.8 
Market price 
support 
 
6.4 
 
5.6 
 
1.5 
 
2.0 
 
4.7 
 
3.8 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
Inadequate 
Inadequate land 
policies 
 
 
3.4 
 
 
6.1 
 
 
17.5 
 
 
0.0 
 
 
4.1 
 
 
8.2 
 
 
4.3 
 
 
7.1 
Public extension 5.8 9.6 0.7 2.0 8.6 9.2 2.6 2.4 
quality and 
standards 
 
0.3 
 
1.0 
 
9.5 
 
12.2 
 
1.9 
 
2.2 
 
23.9 
 
21.4 
Private extension 0.0 0.0 1.5 2.0 0.2 0.5 5.1 9.5 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation from in-depth interviews. 
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Appendix 2.4: Nominal Rate of Assistance values for Ghana and Uganda (1955-2004) 
 
Country 1955- 
59 
1960/ 
1-64 
1965- 
69 
1970- 
74 
1975- 
79 
1980- 
84 
1984- 
89 
1990- 
94 
1995- 
-99 
2000- 
04 
Ghana 
Exportable (%) 
-14.1 -23.7 -57.3 -49.6 -80.9 -83.2 -56.6 -36.2 -19.4 -19.6 
Ghana 
Import 
competing 
products (%) 
-12.1 -10.4 -13.6 0.3 0.1 40.2 69.4 33.2 13.2 35.8 
Uganda 
Exportable (%) 
- -8.9 -15.4 -43.7 -89.8 -66.6 -65.0 -9.6 -1.3 -0.3 
Uganda 
Import 
competing (%) 
- 16.5 22.3 42.6 79.0 54.1 57.8 14.8 13.9 15.0 
 
Note: Import competing commodities covered in the NRA estimation for Ghana are rice, maize, 
and groundnut and for Uganda are rice, maize, bean, and sugar. Cocoa is the main exportable 
product covered in the NRA estimation for Ghana. In Uganda, the NRA estimates for exportables 
are cotton, coffee, and tea (Anderson and Masters, 2009:348, 432). 
Data source: Anderson and Masters (2009:348, 432) 
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Appendix 3.1: Policy themes in the narrative of the respondents 
 
Policy themes Number of 
respondents 
Total 
frequency of 
occurrence 
Constraints 
Rainfall dependent agriculture 15 53 
Depleting soil fertility 12 44 
Old farm equipment 13 58 
Lack of value addition 14 22 
Market access 11 34 
Unavailability of finance 8 17 
Lack of investment by smallholder farmers 2 4 
Inadequate access to agricultural inputs and high prices 8 21 
Poor distribution of subsidized seeds and fertilizer 11 33 
Challenges with harnessing the potential of water resources 18 45 
Low agricultural productivity 25 68 
Policy instruments 
Modern farm equipment 6 18 
Increase farm income 14 40 
Food security and food sovereignty 7 16 
Youth employment opportunities 6 22 
Investment in water harvesting technologies 13 25 
Investment in value addition of primary products 8 17 
Input subsidy provision: fertilizer and seed 9 53 
Government input subsidy provision is not sustainable solution 6 17 
Subsidies benefit mostly large farms and not small farms 3 8 
Subsidies cause a crowding-out of investment 1 3 
High cost of subsidies 5 15 
Subsidies are politically efficient, but not economically efficient 1 2 
Provide subsidized credit from banks 1 2 
Government input subsidy provision is not a sustainable 
solution 
6 17 
 
Note: The numbers show the frequency of each policy theme in the entire narrative. Source: 
Authors’ compilation from in-depth interviews. 
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Appendix 3.2: Summary of agricultural support stories and agricultural support critique non-stories 
Appendix 3.2.1: Agriculture support stories 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Italicized phrases are direct quotes from the transcripts.  
Source: Authors’ compilation from in-depth interviews. 
 Challenges affecting the agricultural 
sector 
Policy instruments to implement Effect of implementing policies 
Challenges affecting 
the agricultural sector 
Low agricultural productivity. 
Concentration on improving production. 
“Farmers are rational and will produce 
if there is a need to produce” 
Government should invest or support 
farmers with subsidies. 
Production should be linked to 
marketing 
Increase farm production and increase income 
Primitive equipment 
use and no value 
addition 
Lack of processing and value addition at 
the base. 
Primitive equipment use, “Since 
independence, the same equipment are 
used, about sixty years now” 
Government support is essential to 
manufacture new farm machines and 
sell them to farmers. 
Government should set up centers to 
train artisans to produce machines 
parts locally 
Processing of farm produce will allow farmers 
to increase income. 
Job creation for the youth and control 
migration 
Locally produced parts will reduce 
maintenance costs for farmers 
Fertilizer input 
subsidy 
Depleting soil quality and low use of 
fertilizer. The “soils are not good 
anymore” 
Fertilizer inputs are necessary. Increase productivity. 
Seed input subsidy Bad quality of seeds, counterfeit seeds, 
and limited quantity of certified seeds. 
Seed production by ISRA 
(government research institute). 
Better seeds will ensure better yield and 
increase farm produce. 
Market access and 
trade policies 
Bad trade policies kill local industry. 
The world food market is volatile. 
Border protection measures. 
“Stop being good students of WTO”. 
Promote domestic production. 
Promote growth of small industries. 
Create markets for farmers. 
Investment in water 
harvesting technology 
Non-exploitation of water resources for 
irrigation purposes. 
Construction of irrigations facilities 
by the government to facility the 
production of crops. 
Make water available for production all year 
around. 
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Appendix 3.2.2: Agricultural support critique non-stories 
 
 Challenges affecting the 
agriculture sector 
Policy instruments to implement Effect of implementing policies 
Challenges affecting the 
agricultural sector 
Low agricultural productivity, use 
of old equipment, depleting soil 
quality, and climate variability. 
Government should not invest in areas like 
fertilizer and seed subsidy: “This is 
private sector investment.” 
“Provides fewer incentives for the private 
sector to invest if government provides 
fertilizer and seed subsidies.” 
Seed and fertilizer input 
subsidy: efficient resource 
allocation 
“There are problems of resource 
allocation….the priorities are 
mainly targeted toward seed and 
fertilizer subsidies.” 
“Government investment should avoid 
crowding out the private sector” 
The efficient use of limited resources. 
The potential to develop sustainable seed 
and fertilizer input markets. 
Seed and fertilizer input 
subsidy: sustainability 
“Subsidies benefit mostly large 
farms and not the small farms” 
“If small farms are profitable they 
will invest in seeds and fertilizer 
inputs.” 
“Subsidies must be rational, distributed 
efficiently, transparently…” 
“Do not give subsidies, but provide credit 
for farmers to buy. It also helps to develop 
the input market” 
“Government programs like PRODAM are 
politically important but not economical 
efficient” 
 
Framing of policy 
problems 
Too many controversies in the 
agricultural sector. 
“Social policies not economic 
policies”, ”Politically efficient 
policies”, and “inconsistent 
policies” 
Develop rational economic policies. “Provides the opportunity to link 
programs to expected results.” 
Investment by small farms “Lack of investment by small farms 
that is why we do not see any 
outcome on the ground.” 
 Public investment into infrastructure such 
as road, railway, research, etc. 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation from in-depth interviews. 
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Appendix 3.3: Cluster analysis  
Appendix 3.3.1: Auto clustering results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
Number of Clusters Schwarz's 
Bayesian 
Criterion 
(BIC) 
BIC Changea Ratio of 
BIC 
Changesb 
Ratio of 
Distance 
Measurec 
1 733.078    
2 557.562 -175.516 1.000 2.688 
3 537.559 -20.003 .114 1.354 
4 541.618 4.059 -.023 1.271 
5 560.196 18.578 -.106 1.357 
6 592.870 32.675 -.186 1.288 
7 634.362 41.492 -.236 1.227 
8 681.525 47.163 -.269 1.710 
9 739.045 57.520 -.328 1.053 
10 797.299 58.253 -.332 1.109 
11 856.911 59.613 -.340 1.097 
12 917.624 60.713 -.346 1.077 
13 979.156 61.531 -.351 1.219 
14 1042.588 63.432 -.361 1.044 
15 1106.386 63.799 -.363 1.089 
a. The changes are from the previous number of clusters in the table. 
b. The ratios of changes are relative to the change for the two cluster solution. 
c. The ratios of distance measures are based on the current number of clusters against the 
previous number of clusters. 
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Appendix 3.4: Model summary and cluster quality 
 
 
 
Model Summary 
 
Algorithm Two Step 
Inputs 23 
Clusters 2 
 
 
Cluster Quality 
 
     
     
 
 
 
     
    
 
 
 
 
Note: Silhouette measure of cohesion and separation. Source: Author’s calculation.
Poor Fair Good 
-1.0                     -0.5                       0.0                       0.5                       1.0 
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Appendix 4.1: Interview guide 
 
A joint research conducted by the: 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Washington, D.C. 
University of Hohenheim, Stuttgart, Germany 
University of Kiel, Germany 
Institute Sénégalais de Recherches Agricoles (ISRA), Senegal 
Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research (ISSER), Ghana AFRISA 
secretariat at the Makerere University, Uganda 
 
Organization category: 
 
 
 
Interview partner: 
 
 
 
Position: 
 
 
 
Contact: 
 
 
 
 
Second interview Partner: 
 
 
 
Position: 
 
 
 
Contact: 
 
 
 
 
Interview No: 
 
 
 
Interviewer: 
 
 
 
Date and time of interview: 
 
 
 
Country of interview: 
 
 
 
Place of interview: 
 
 
 
Brief remarks: 
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Introduction 
Thank you for taking the time for this meeting, I truly appreciate the opportunity to 
meet with you. Perhaps I should start by introducing the topic of this research. As you 
certainly know, participatory and evidence based policy processes involving multiple 
stakeholders have come to play an important role in the agricultural sector, as the design of 
the Development Strategy and Investment Plan (DSIP) and the Comprehensive Africa 
Agriculture Development Program (CAADP) roundtable processes. The development of 
these policy documents demonstrates the changing pattern in agricultural policy processes in 
Uganda. But to what extent are such policy processes and policy concerns meeting the 
expectations of the diverse stakeholders in Uganda’s agriculture sector? This research seeks 
to investigate the question and analyze the policy concerns of the diverse stakeholders. 
This research is part of my Ph.D thesis and similar work will be conducted in 
Ghana and Senegal. We trust that the findings from this research will contribute to the 
future development of participatory and evidence based agricultural policy processes. 
Furthermore, publicity of the findings will fill the knowledge gaps of developing country 
policy concerns and participatory policy processes, and enhance the success of our 
development work. 
We are now especially interested in your views concerning agricultural policy 
concerns and participatory policy process in the country. Your answers are anonymous. 
You are the expert on this subject and we very much appreciate the opportunity of learning 
about your perspective. 
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Agricultural Sector Problems, Policy Concerns and Policy Instruments 
 
In your view: 
1. What are the main problems affecting the agricultural sector in Uganda? 
2. Among the identified problems, which of these can be considered as the three most 
important problems? 
3. What policy instruments could be relevant to address the identified problems? 
Probe more into how these policy instruments could work 
4. Are there some additional policy concerns and how can these policy concerns be 
addressed? 
5. Which of the policy concerns is of high priority? 
The BLOCK FARMS PROGAM Process Net-Map Questions 
Overview of questions 
Definition of questions: Mapping the BLOCK FARMS PROGRAM policy process in Ghana 
1. Who were the actors involved in designing the BLOCK FARMS PROGRAM 
policy process? 
2. What role/contribution did each actor play and how are the actors linked/related in 
the BLOCK FARMS PROGRAM policy process? 
3. How influential was the actors in the BLOCK FARMS PROGRAM policy process? 
 
Implementation procedure 
1. Write names of actors involved in the BLOCK FARMS PROGRAM policy process 
on card and distribute them on empty map? 
NB: Names of actors involved in the BLOCK FARMS PROGRAM policy process 
in a formal and less formal (some interest groups)? Actors can be individuals or 
organizations (consider list of the members but establish links to organizations 
rather individual actors) 
2. Summarize the role or responsibility of each actor in the BLOCK FARMS 
PROGRAM policy process and write on empty side of the map? 
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3. How are the actors linked: connect actors’ cards by different colored arrows 
indicating different kinds of links 
Actor linkages: information linkage; policy advice, sources of policy pressure and 
financial linkage etc., and probe for other kinds of linkage?) 
4. How influential are the actors in the BLOCK FARMS PROGRAM policy process? 
Set up influence towers (stacks of wooden pegs) next to actor cards according 
to their influence? From high to lower 
NB: Influence level towers: zero is no influence and the respondent will determine 
highest influence. Influence level is defined as ability of an actor to use 
technical information (data or evidence) to drive the policy process. 
5. Discussion of map with partner? (What role did DPs play? How was the 
engagement process? Are there some incentives (funds) for governments to initiate 
some of the BLOCK FARMS PROGRAM policies? Does the BF have some donor 
funding?) 
 
Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) Process Net- 
Map Questions 
Overview of questions 
Definition of questions: Mapping the CAADP policy process in Ghana 
1. Who were the actors involved in the CAADP policy process? 
2. What role/contribution did each actor play and how are the actors linked/related in 
the CAADP policy process? 
3. How influential was the actors in the CAADP policy process? 
 
Implementation procedure 
6. Write names of actors involved in the CAADP policy process on card and 
distribute them on empty map? 
NB: Names of actors involved in the CAADP policy process in a formal and less 
formal (some interest groups)? Actors can be individuals or organizations (consider 
list of the members but establish links to organizations rather than individual actors) 
7. Summarize the role or responsibility of each actor in the CAADP policy process 
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and write on empty side of the map? 
8. How are the actors linked: connect actors’ cards by different colored arrows 
indicating different kinds of links 
Actor linkages: information linkage; policy advice, sources of policy pressure and 
financial linkage etc., and probe for other kinds of linkage?) 
9. How influential are the actors in the CAADP policy process? Set up influence 
towers (stacks of wooden pegs) next to actor cards according to their influence. 
From high to lower 
NB: Influence level towers: zero is no influence and the respondent will determine 
highest influence. Influence level is defined as ability of an actor to use technical 
information (data or evidence) to drive the policy process. 
Discussion of map with partners? (What role did DPs play? How was the 
engagement process? Are there some incentives (funds) for governments to initiate 
some of the CAADP policies? Does the CAADP have some donor funding?) 
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Appendix 4.2: Animal health service delivery household questionnaire 
 
Respondent Code  
 
 
Section A-1: Identification 
 
 
Enumerator name………………………………………..………Date of interview ……………………………….. 
Name of respondent…………………………………...… 1 District ………………………...……………. 2 Area Council ………..…….....……………… 3 
Community name……………………………. …....……..5 
Supervisor ………………………………………...…….. 6 
 
GPS READING 
Location of household: Latitude……………….... Longitude….....................Altitude……........... 
1
6
7
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Section A-2: Farmer characteristics 
 
A1: Farm Household information A2: Household size……………… 
   ID 
CODE 
Name Age  
 
If 
less 
than 
1, 
write 
“00” 
Sex 
 
 1= male 
2=female 
Off-farm 
activity 
 
Does 
household 
member 
engage in 
off-farm 
activities? 
 
1=yes 
0=no 
Relationship to head 
 
1= head 
2=spouse (wife/husband) 
3=child (son/daughter) 
4=grandchild 
5=parent/parent-in-law 
6=son/daughter-in-law 
7=other relative 
8=adopted/foster/stepchild 
9=house help 
10=non-relative 
 
Education 
 
1=none 
2=primary 
3=middle/jss 
4=voc/comm 
5='o' level/sss 
7='a' level 
8=training 
college 
9=tech/prof 
10=tertiary 
11=koranic 
12=don't 
know 
Can read 
or write? 
(in any 
language) 
 
1=yes 
0=no 
Marital status 
 
1=married, 
2=consensual 
union,  
3=separated 
4=divorced  
5=widowed  
6=never 
married  
 
Occupation 
 
Record answer 
and then write 
code using 
occupation 
code below.        
Record 
multiple 
options for 
household 
head (at most 
3 options) for 
all other 
members’ 
record single 
primary 
occupation.                                                               
Religion 
Of the entire 
household 
 
1=traditional 
2=muslim 
3=christian 
4=no 
religion 
 
 
Migration 
 
Does this hh 
member 
migrate 
during the 
year?  
 
1=yes 
0=no 
If yes,  
How 
many 
months 
What % of 
time is 
spent on 
farming? 
 
If a 
household 
member 
has 
farming in 
addition to 
another 
occupation 
01               
02              
03              
04              
05              
06              
07              
08              
09              
10              
 
 
 
 
1=Farming  2=Teaching  3=Artisan  4=Office worker  5=Civil servant  6=Health worker  7=Trading  8=Unemployed  9= Non- Agric labor  10=Student/ Pupil  11= Herdsman  12=Other (specify) 
1
6
8
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A3: Land holding 
A4: How many parcels of land do you have? ………………………….please fill in the table below regarding the parcel information 
 
 
Parcel number Name of plot 
(Use the location of plot ) 
Size (Acres) Use of plot 
 
1= Crop 
2= Livestock 
3=Mixed (crop & livestock) 
5= Other (Specify) 
Year acquired Mode of acquisition 
 
1 = Purchased 
2 = Inherited 
3 = Rented 
4 = Others (specify)  
Tenure 
 
1 = Freehold with title 
2 = Freehold without title 
3 = Rented 
4 = Communal 
5=Leased 
6 = Others (Specify)  
How could livestock be used on the plot 
 
1=Grazing 
2=Growing feed for livestock 3=Other 
(specify) 
1        
2        
3        
4        
5        
6        
7        
8        
9        
10        
Total        
1
6
9
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Section B: Farm inputs 
Does your household own any of the following assets? (Please complete the following table) 
 Farm inputs Do you have the following equipment’s 1=Yes 0=No How many? 
01 Spraying machine   
02 Tractor   
03 Plough   
04 Trailer/cart   
05 Ear tag application   
06 Hoe   
07 Axe   
08 Rake   
09 Shovel   
10 Cooling machine   
11 Hay equipment   
12 Fencing equipment   
13 Vehicle   
14 Drenching gun   
15 Feed /Water trough   
16 Water pump   
17 Irrigation pipe   
18 Computer   
19 Feedlot equipment   
20 Breeding equipment   
21 Motor Bike   
 
 
Section C: Other sources of farm income 
 
Source 1 = Yes, 0 = No Average Per Year(Gh) 
Petty Trade   
Employment As Casual Labor   
Formal Employment   
Remittances From Relatives   
Government Pensions   
Dividend On Shares   
Interest On Savings   
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Section D-1: Cropping 
 
Can you please tell me each individual crop that your household planted in 2010? 
(Complete table for each individual crop planting or harvest in 2010. Complete one line for each planting of crop, for example: maize 1, maize 2, yam, beans, etc.) 
Crop 
name 
(Use 
crop 
code) 
What area was 
planted? 
What type of 
cultivation did 
you use? 
 
1= Mono-crop 
2= Inter-crop 
(Provide one) 
Cost of 
land 
preparation 
 
(Gh) 
Which types of 
land preparation 
tools did you use? 
 
1= Manual tools 
2 = Animals & 
machinery 
3 =Tractor 
services 
4=Manual tool & 
Animal 
5=Manual tool & 
Machinery 
(Provide all that 
apply) 
Cost 
of 
seed 
 
(Gh) 
What type of 
fertilizer was 
used? 
 
0 = None 
1= Manure 
2 = Chemical 
3 = Both 
Quantity 
of 
fertilizer 
used 
Cost of 
fertilizer 
that was 
used? 
 
(Gh) 
What was the 
total labor that 
was hired to 
produce crop? 
(man days) 
 
If they not hire 
labor then use 
the opportunity 
cost t of family 
labor 
Total 
cost of 
labor 
that was 
hired? 
 
(Gh) 
Total 
amount 
that was 
harvested 
 
1=Bags 
2=Baskets 
3=Fingers 
4=Tubers 
5=Bowls 
6=Others 
(Specify) 
 
Q(unit) 
Total 
amount that 
was sold 
 
 
1=Bags 
2=Baskets 
3=Fingers 
4=Tubers 
5=Bowls 
6=Others 
(specify) 
 
Q(unit) 
Unit 
Price for 
which it 
was sold 
 
(Gh ) 
Quantity Unit 
1=12x12 
2=Acre 
3=Rope 
4=Hectare 
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
 
 
Crop code: 1=Yam 2=Cassava 3=Maize 4=Sorghum 5=Ground nut 6=Soya beans 7= Guinea corn 8=Millet 9=Pepper 10=Tomatoes 11=Onion 12=Okro 13= Rice 14= others specify 
1
7
1
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Section D-2: Can you please tell me about the crops you sold in 2010? 
 
Crop Where did you sell most of 
the crop? 
 
1= Farm gate 
2 = Village market 
3 = Distant market 
4 = Buyer’s premises 
5 = Cooperative /Association 
Premises 
6 = Central collection point 
7 = Farmer’s House 
8 = Other 
(Provide one) 
Who was the main buyer of 
your crop? 
 
 
1 = Exporter 
2 = Farmer cooperative or 
association 
3 = Consumers 
4 = Relative/Friend 
5 = NGO 
6 = Local Women 
7=I sell at the local market 
7 = Other 
(Provide one) 
What was the average 
value of sale 
 
(GH cedis) 
If you did not sell at the farm gate what do you estimate to be the total 
transportation cost to the point of sale? 
How were you paid? 
1 = Paid in full on delivery 
2 = Paid certain amount on 
delivery and rest later 
3 = Paid full amount later 
4 = Given inputs/credit prior 
to delivery 
5 = Other 
(Provide one) 
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
 
 
Crop code: 1=Yam 2=Cassava 3=Maize 4=Sorghum 5=Ground nut 6=Soya beans 7= Guinea corn 8=Millet 9=Pepper 10=Tomatoes 11=Onion 12=Okro 13=Rice 14= they specify 
1
7
2
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Section E-1: Livestock keeping, Does household keep livestock? 1 = Yes 0 = No 
 
 
Sl. No Type of 
livestock 
No. of 
Livestock 
No. of 
Male 
No. of 
Female 
No. of 
Young 
animal 
For how 
long have 
you been 
keeping 
livestock 
Did your 
parents 
keep 
livestock 
 
1=Yes 
0=No 
Are animals 
owned by 
different 
household 
members 
 
1=Yes 
0=No 
If yes, number 
Husband 
Spouse 
Local variety 
Mode of 
acquisition 
1=NGO 
2=Governme nt 
3=Parent 
4=Friend 
5=Purchase 
6=Other 
(Specify) 
Improved 
variety 
Mode of 
acquisition  
1=NGO 
2=Government  
3=Parent 
4=Friend 
5=Purchase 
6=Other 
(Specify) 
Type of 
Breed 
of 
animal 
(Use 
livestoc
k breed 
code) 
Farming 
Systems 
1=Intensive/ 
zero grazing 
2=Extensive 
3=Semi- 
Extensive 
4=Tethering 
5=Nomadic 
pastoralist 
Reasons for 
keeping 
livestock 
1=Meat 
2=Cash 
3=Milk 
4=Estate 
5=Gift 
6=Status 
7=Culture 
8=Farming 
9=Other 
(Specify) 
Average 
value per 
head 
(GH 
cedis) 
N0. 
sold 
last 
year 
01 Local Goat                
02 Improved 
Goat 
               
03 Sheep                
04 Improved 
Cattle 
               
05 Local 
Cattle 
               
06 Bullock                
07 Poultry                
08 Pigs                
 
 
Livestock breed code: 1=Zebu 2=West African Short horn (WASH) 3=N’Dama 4=White Fulani or Sanga 5=Sahelian Sheep 6=Djallonke 7=Nungua Black head 8= Sahelian Goats 9=West African 
Dwarf Goat (WAD) 
1
7
3
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Section F-1: Expenditure on livestock services, Cattle breeding service 
 
Do you have AI services in this district 1=Yes 0=No 
In the last one year, have you ever hard AI services 1=Yes 0=No 
 
 
No AI 
services 
 
(Month of 
the visit) 
The service is 
administered 
by 
 
1= Vet officer 
2=Vet- 
Assistant 
3= CAHW 
4=NGO 
5=Research 
institute 
Type of 
organization that is 
offering the scheme 
 
1=Govt 
2=NGOs 
3=Private 
4=Animal research 
institute 
4=Other 
Did you 
have to pay 
for the 
service 
 
1=Yes 
0=No 
If yes, 
 
How much 
did you pay 
per animal 
How were you able 
to contact the 
service provider? 
 
1=Public transport 
2=Personal phone 
3=Walk 
4=Ride a 
motorbike /Bicycle 
How long was 
the visit of the 
person? (hours) 
Did you 
have to pay 
for his food? 
 
1=Yes 
0=No 
If yes, write 
the amount 
Did you have to 
pay for the 
person’s transport 
costs? 
1=Yes 
0=No 
If yes, write the 
amount 
How satisfied were 
you with the 
performance of the 
person? 
 
1= Very satisfied 
2=somewhat satisfied 
3=somewhat 
dissatisfied 
4=Very dissatisfied 
Code 1-4 
Reasons for 
dissatisfaction? 
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
1
7
4
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Section F-2: Expenditure on livestock services, Cattle breeding service: 
 
In the past, have you ever accessed a bull service scheme in your community? 1=Yes, 0=No 
 
 
No of 
times 
When was the 
bull scheme 
service 
introduced 
 
(year) 
Source of 
the Bull 
 
1=Project 
(give name) 
2=NGOs 
3=Private 
4=Animal 
research 
institute 
5=Gov’t 
6=Other 
Who keeps the 
Bull 
 
1=Community 
2=Government 
official 
3=Extension 
staff 
4= Farmer 
5=Others 
(specify) 
Did you have to 
pay for the 
service 
 
1=Yes 
0=No 
If yes, 
 
How much did 
you pay per 
animal 
If “No” write 
999 
How did you use the 
service 
1= Bring the bull to my 
home 
2= Take the cow to the 
bull 
3=Took my animals to 
graze in the area 
4= Others specify------- 
------------- 
If 2 do you leave 
the cow in the 
home the person 
in charge of the 
bull 
1=Yes 
2=No 
3=NA 
If yes did you 
pay the person 
keeping the 
bull? 
 
1=Yes 
2=No 
3=NA 
If yes, write 
the amount 
How satisfied were you 
with the performance of 
the Bull scheme 
service? 
1= Very satisfied 
2=somewhat satisfied 
3=somewhat 
dissatisfied 
4=Very dissatisfied 
Reasons for 
dissatisfaction? 
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
1
7
5
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Section F-3: Expenditure on livestock services, Have there been any livestock cases which require treatment? (2010)? 1= Yes 0= No 
 
Section F-4: Number of visits: .......................... 
 
Livestock 
diseases 
How 
often 
did it 
occur 
Last 
treatment 
date of the 
disease 
How did you 
treat the 
disease? 
 
1=Self treated 
 
2= Advice 
from drug 
seller 
 
3=Livestock 
worker 
(CAHW, Vet, 
) 
4=Other 
(specify) 
If self- 
treated 
what did 
you do? 
 
1. The use 
of local 
herbs 
 
2=Seek 
advice 
from local 
drug seller 
 
3= Advice 
from 
another 
farmer 
 
4=Other 
(specify) 
If livestock 
worker 
name of 
person 
From which 
organisation? 
 
 
 
1=NGO 
2=CAHW 
3=Private Vet 
4=Drug seller 
5=Government 
7=LGA 
8=Traditional 
animal doctor 
9=Vet. Service 
department 
10= ARI 
11=Other(specify) 
What was the 
reason of the 
visit? 
 
1=Sheep 
2=Goat 
3=Cattle 
4=Poultry 
5=Pigs 
(specify) 
How did you 
contact the 
livestock 
service 
provider 
 
1 = By phone 
2 = By bicycle 
3 = By 
motorcycle 
4 = By car 
5= without 
request 
5 = Other 
(specify) 
How long 
(distance) did it 
take the livestock 
service provider to 
come? 
 
 
1=km 
2=miles 
 
 
Unit 
Did you have 
to pay for 
veterinary 
medicine? 
 
1=Yes 
0=No 
 
If yes, fill 
amount 
Did you 
have to pay 
for the 
person’s 
time? 
 
1=Yes 
0=No 
 
If yes, fill 
amount 
How long 
was the 
visit of the 
person? 
(hours) 
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
Codes for livestock diseases 
1=Contagious bovine pleuropneumonia (Sapugu) 5=Rinderpest 9=Brucellosis 13= Mange ( Gbani) 
2=Streptothricosis (Nabagu) 6=Bovine tuberculosis 10= Piroplasmosis 14=Heamorrhagic septicemia 
3=Anthrax (Yogu ) 7= Trypanosomosis (tsetse 11= Rickettsiosis 15 Others (specify) 
4=Foot and Mouth 8=Heartwater 12=Peste des petits ruminants (PPR) (Nyeingu) 15 Others (specify) 
1
7
6
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Section F-5: Animal diseases for the past one year, has any of your livestock suffered from any livestock disease? 1=yes 0=no 
 
Livestock diseases Did you have 
other 
expenses (e.g. 
for offering 
tea or food? 
 
1=Yes 
0=No 
 
If yes, fill 
amount 
Did you 
have to pay 
for the 
persons 
transport 
costs? 
 
 
1=Yes 
0=No 
 
If yes, fill 
amount 
Was there any 
other 
community 
members 
present at that 
visit? 
 
1=Yes 
0=No 
 
If yes, how 
many? 
Did the 
animal 
die? 
 
1 = Yes 
0 = No 
If Yes, 
can you 
estimate 
the loss in 
GH cedis? 
Were you 
satisfied with 
the services of 
the livestock 
service 
provider? 
 
 
1=Yes 
0=No 
How satisfied 
were you with 
the performance 
of the person? 
Code 1-4 
 
1 =Very satisfied 
2 = Somewhat 
satisfied 
3 = Somewhat 
satisfied 
4=Very 
dissatisfied 
If dissatisfied 
reasons for 
dissatisfaction 
Do you have 
knowledge of 
any improved 
livestock disease 
control methods? 
 
 
1=Yes 
0 = No 
Do you have 
knowledge of any 
indigenous 
livestock disease 
control methods? 
 
 
1=Yes 
0 = No 
Contagious bovine 
pleuropneumonia 
          
Streptothricosis           
Anthrax           
foot and mouth           
Rinderpest           
Bovine tuberculosis           
Trypanosomiases           
Heartwater           
Brucellosis           
Piroplasmosis           
Rickettsiosis           
Peste des petits ruminants           
Mange           
14.Heamorrhagic septicemia           
15. Other specify……………..           
1
7
7
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Section F-6: Cost of fodder and feed supplements 
 
In the past one month, how much in terms of cash and time to provide the feed and/or fodder to your livestock (Provide estimates for the last one month) Monetary 
costs are given in local currency 
Livestock fed in the farm 
(Use livestock codes below) 
Breeds (Use codes 
for breeds below) 
Did you have 
to buy fodder 
1=Yes 
0=No 
cost purchasing 
fodder 
(local currency) 
Cost of transporting 
to the farm 
(local currency) 
How long did it take to carry / 
transport (estimate time per 
day X 30 days) 
Did you have to buy 
feed supplements 
1=Yes 
0=No 
cost purchasing 
feed supplements 
(Gh) 
Cost of 
transporting to 
the farm 
(Gh) 
         
         
         
         
         
 
 
 
Section F-7: Livestock quarantine Service 
 
Do you know any case where there was livestock quarantine? 1=Yes  0=No 
Was there any quarantine service in the past year? 1=Yes 0=No 
Who was involved in the quarantine service? 1= Government 2= NGO 3=Other 
Which animals was quarantine? (Circle all that apply) 
1=Sheep 2=Goat 3= Cattle 4=Pigs 5=Chicken 
Was there any lost to you? 1=Yes 0=No 
Estimate the cost of the lost to you ……………… 
Livestock code: 1 = local Cattle 2=Improved cattle 3=Bullock 4= Sheep 5=Calves 6=Dairy Goat 7=Local Goats 8=Improved goat 
Livestock breed code: 1=Zebu 2=West African Short horn (WASH) 3=N’Dama 4=White Fulani or Sanga 5=Sahelian Sheep 6=Djallonke 7=Nungua Black head 8= Sahelian Goats 9=West 
African Dwarf Goat 
1
7
8
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Perception on livestock service delivery system 
 
Section F-8: Which livestock service delivery system do you use? 1=Government Private 2= private para-vets 3=CAHW 4=Traditional livestock 
worker 5=Self-treatment 
Section F-9: What is your perception about the following livestock service delivery systems? 
 
Service 
delivery 
model 
 
What is your perception about the following livestock service delivery quality? 
 Which of 
these 
services 
have you 
ever used? 
 
1= Yes 
0=No 
How do 
you rank 
information 
availability 
of each SP 
 
Rank 
(1-4) 
 
* 
How do 
you rank 
access to 
service 
provision 
 
Rank 
(1-4) 
* 
How do 
you rank 
access to 
drugs 
from 
each of 
the SP 
 
 
 
Rank 
(1-4) 
* 
How do 
you rank 
cost of 
drugs 
from 
each of 
the SP 
 
 
Rank 
(1-4) 
* 
How do 
you rank 
your 
transacti 
on cost 
with 
each of 
the ff SP 
 
Rank 
(1-4) 
* 
Did any 
of the 
service 
provider 
s serve 
you on 
credit? 
 
1= Yes 
0=No 
 
* 
Did you 
later pay 
the 
service 
provider 
 
 
 
 
1= Yes 
0=No 
 
 
 
* 
Was the 
service 
worth 
paying 
for? 
 
 
 
 
1= Yes 
0=No 
 
 
* 
If you failed 
to pay, was 
there any 
legal 
enforcement? 
 
 
1= Yes 
0=No 
 
 
* 
How was the 
legal 
enforcement 
administered 
or enforced? 
 
 
1= court 
action 
2=service 
provider did 
not respond to 
call again 
3=Others 
(specify) 
Did you ever 
have to pay a 
deposit for 
before a 
livestock 
service was 
performed? 
 
1= Yes 
0=No 
How do you 
rank the 
attitude of the 
Service 
provider 
 
 
1=Very poor 
2= Somewhat 
poor 
3=somewhat 
good 
4=Very good 
Overall 
performance 
of service 
provider 
 
Rank 
(1-4) 
Govt. Vet. 
officer 
              
Private Vet. 
officer 
              
CAHWs               
Traditional 
vets 
              
#Transaction cost refers all the cost involved in providing livestock services such as transport, drugs cost, payment to service provider, etc. 
*use four different sizes of stones to visualize 
1
7
9
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Section F-10: Marketing of livestock 
 
Can you please tell me about the livestock you sold in 2010? 
 
How many 
livestock did 
you sale? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Code1 
Code2 
Unit 
price 
(Gh 
Cedis) 
Who was the main 
buyer for the 
livestock? 
1=Slaughter house 
2 = Traders from the 
city 
3 = Farmer 
cooperative or 
association 
4 = Consumers 
5 = Relative/Friend 
6 = NGO 
7 = Local Women 
8= I sell them at the 
local market 
8= Other 
(Circle all that 
apply) 
If you sold it 
outside your local 
market, what was 
the distance 
 
Unit 
1=km 
2=miles 
 
 
 
unit 
If you sold outside your 
local market, what was the 
total transportation cost 
How were you 
paid? 
 
1 = Paid in full on 
delivery 
2 = Paid certain 
amount on delivery 
and rest later 
3 = Paid full amount 
later 
4 = Given 
inputs/credit prior to 
delivery 
5 = Other 
(Provide one) 
What form 
was the 
payment? 
 
1 = Cash 
2= Cheque 
3=Barter 
trade 
(Provide all 
that apply) 
How satisfied are 
you with the 
marketing channel? 
 
1= Very satisfied 
2=Somewhat 
satisfied 
3=Somewhat 
dissatisfied 
4=Very dissatisfied 
Do you have 
access to market 
information? 
 
 
1=Yes 
2=No 
How did you 
receive your market 
information? 
1= From a friend 
through use of a 
mobile phone 
 
2= Agric. market 
Information service 
3=From local the 
market 
4= other (specify) 
            
            
            
            
            
            
 
 
Livestock code 1:1 = local Cattle 2=Improved cattle 3=Bullock 4= Sheep 5=Calves 6=Dairy Goat 7=Local Goats 8=Improved goat 9=Poultry Livestock code 2: 1=Male adult, 2=Male 
young, 3=Female adult 4=Female young 
1
8
0
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Section G-1: Can you estimate the labor requirement and cost of the various livestock activities 
 
 
 
Farm activity 
  Labor cost Family labor 
 Do you do any 
of the 
following? 
 
1=Yes 
0=No 
Did you hire 
people? 
 
 
1=Yes 
0=No 
Number of 
people hired 
Frequency of 
performing the 
activity in a 
year 
Unit Cost of 
hired labor 
(per animal) 
 
Gh 
Total Cost of 
hired labor 
(Gh/day) 
Number of 
household 
members 
involved 
Hours spend per 
day in the 
activity 
Are family 
member s paid for 
the service 
1=Yes 
0=No 
If “yes” how 
much? Gh 
Vaccination           
Spraying           
Dipping           
Quarantine           
Feed Collection           
Grazing           
Treatment           
Castration           
Deworming           
1
8
1
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Section H: Access to credit facilities 
H1. Do you have a savings account with any formal or informal financial institution? 
1 = Yes [ ], 2 = No [ ] 
H2. Did you access credit for farming purposes in the last one year? 
1 = Yes [ ], 2 = No [ ] 
If yes, fill the table below 
 
Item of credit 
1 = Cash 
2 = Kind 
Type of provider: 
1 = Bank 
2 = Cooperative 
3 = Trader / shop 
4 = Money lender 
5=Friends and relatives 
6= Merry-go-rounds 
7= Other: 
Purpose of loan? 
1=cropping activity 
2=Farming activity 
3=Home consumption 
Amount(Gh) (if kind 
estimate value) 
Borrowing date 
(month and year) 
Borrowing conditions Problems in repayment 
Interest rate in % Per: 
1 = Day 
2 = Week 
3 = Month 
4 = Year 
 
        
        
        
        
        
1
8
2
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Section I: Institutional factors influencing use of livestock services. 
 
I1. Farmer-based Organizations 
 
1a. Are you a member of any FB0 related to livestock? 1. Yes 2. No 
 
b. If yes: which FBO:  Member since  
 
2a. Do you have any function in this FBO? 1. Yes 2. No 
 
b. If yes: which function  Since when?  
 
3. How many members are there in this group?  
 
4. What are the major activities of this FBO? (List all that apply)   
    
Codes: 1=credit supply; 2=joint purchase of inputs; 3=joint selling of outputs; 4=joint agro-processing; 5=FBO receives agricultural extension;; 8=Other 
(specify) 9=Other (specify) 10=Other 
(specify)   
 
5. How often do you attend an FBO meeting?  Times per  
 
6a. When did you attend the last meeting?  
b. Were there meetings during the last year that you did not attend? 1. Yes 2. No 
c. In last meeting how long did it take?  in-+ hours 
d. Did you lose opportunity to earn income because you went for this meeting? 1. Yes 2. No, and how much  
e. How much did you spend to sustain yourself in the meeting?  
 
7. In case you do not attend all FBO meetings, what are major reasons for not attending      
Codes: 1=had other work to do; 2=topic not of interest; 3=other:  
 
8a. Do you pay a membership fee? 1. Yes 2. No 
b. If yes: how much?  _: per  
 
9a. Do you pay a fee/contribution when the FBO was established? 1. Yes 2. No 
1
8
3
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b. If yes: how much? _: 
 
10a. Does your FBO have a constitution or by laws? 1. Yes 2. No 3. Don’t know 
b. If yes, were you involved in the development of the constitution/bylaws? 1. Yes 2. No 
 
11a. To the best of your knowledge, were your FBO leaders involved in any meetings that local government (LG) organized to plan livestock related activities in 
this District/area? 
1. Yes 2. No 
b. If yes, was there a discussion among the FBO members on what LG should do? 1. Yes 2. No 
 
12. How much influence do you think your FBO has on LG’s priorities? 1 = high 2 = some 3 = little 4 =no influence 
 
13a. To the best of your knowledge, were your FBO leaders involved in any meetings that the District Assembly organized to plan their activities in this 
District/area? 
1. Yes 2. No 
b. If yes, was there a discussion among the FBO members on what the District Assembly should do? 1. Yes 2. No 
 
14. How much influence do you think your FBO has on the District Assembly’s priorities? 1 = high 2 = some 3 = little 4 = no influence 
 
 
I2. Benefits of FBO membership 
 
List your three most important benefits for being a member of the FBO? 
1 
2 
3 
1
8
4
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Section J: Farm records keeping 
 
Do you keep farm records? 
1=Yes 0= No 
If no what is the reason why ………………........................................ 
 
If yes, which type of farm records do you keep? 
1=Crop farm records 2=Livestock farm records 3=Marketing farm records 4= Other (specify)……………. 
Have you ever received training on farm record keeping? 
1=Yes 0= No 
 
Which organization offered the trainings? 
1=NGO Name: ………………. 2=Government extension 3= CAHW 3=Other (specify) ………………………. 
 
Do your farm records follow particular format or structure? 
1=Yes 0= No 
 
Section K: Constraints to livestock production 
 
In your view what is the 5 biggest constraints to livestock production? 
 
What are your five (5) most important constraints to livestock production? Pre-coded Constraints 
 Availability of drugs 
 Availability of transport 
 Market services 
 Lack of credit 
 High cost of livestock service delivery 
 Information service 
Long distance to travel to service provider 
Lack qualified livestock workers 
1
8
5
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